The N.A.T.O. Conference

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31090, 20 June 1966, Page 12

The N.A.T.O. Conference

President de Gaulle’s removal of France from the integrated military organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation vested the recent N.A.T.O. conference in Brussels with high significance. The French action had been so firmly condemned by the other members of the alliance that there was little reason to fear that the French withdrawal might precipitate a break-up of the alliance and, as President de Gaulle wants, a reversion to the old system of constituent national forces, co-ordinated in time of peace only by periodical staff talks. But the degree of firmness of the other 14 members might have surprised the French; it was certainly gratifying to supporters of the alliance. Indeed, so firm was the message from the conference —that the 14 wanted the military integration of N.A.T.O. in peace time to continue and the military links across the Atlantic to remain unbroken—that the French found themselves compelled to take heed and to make something of a tactical withdrawal.

The French had previously said there was no need to discuss at the political level “ the co- “ operation of the French with N.A.T.O. forces and “ command arrangements ” —a formula meaning, for immediate purposes, the future of the French forces in Germany. The question, the. French said, should be left to the French chief of staff and N.A.T.O.’s supreme commander; if there were political questions, they were purely an affair between France and West Germany. Tactics that would have isolated the West German Government from its N.A.T.O. partners were defeated; and it was agreed that questions about the French withdrawal from 'he integrated N.A.T.O. command on July 1 should be discussed by the permanent representatives on the N.A.T.O. council. The agreement leaves French forces in Germany for the present, an arrangement that suits both sides in the controversy and means, in effect, that the life of the alliance is prolonged. This tactical retreat by France must be regarded as no more than an expedient; it is unlikely to affect President de Gaulle’s fundamental disagreement with the majority in N.A.T.O. Consequently, the threat of a final break must be presumed to have been deferred rather than removed, and preparations for a N.A.T.O. without France must continue. The more important administrative and strategical changes can be foreseen—the withdrawal from Germany of French squadrons, deprived of N.A.T.O.’s integrated air control system, for example.

The long-term political effects are more difficult to discern. It seems inevitable that there will be a substantial rise in the power and influence within N.A.T.O. of West Germany; there may be more interest in Spain, if only to improve communications with Italy, which the defection of France would damage; the unity of the 14 in N.A.T.O. may well react to the disadvantage of France in negotiations on Common Market matters. Above all, the crisis in N.A.T.O. may hasten the growth of new attitudes towards Eastern Europe. At the Brussels conference a Danish proposal for an East-West conference on European security was mooted, but did not come up for open discussion largely because of the ticklish problem of reconciling West German attitudes with a move that would bring East Germany as a separate nation to the conference table. But the speech of Dr. Barzel, deputy-leader of the Christian Democratic Union which is led by Dr. Erhard, is a dramatic sign of the drastic change of thinking in influential West German circles about reunification. In a speech prepared for delivery in Washington, Dr. Barzel submitted that there could be a place for Russian troops in a reunited Germany as an alternative to the security guarantee for Moscow of maintaining East Germany as a separate State. The unity and firmness of 14 members at Brussels may have opened new, progressive prospects for N.A.T.O.