THE ISRAELIS IN SINAI

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31071, 28 May 1966, Page 4

THE ISRAELIS IN SINAI

Diary of the Sinai Campaign. By General Dayan. Wiedenfeld and Nicolson. 207 pp. Appendices and Index.

In the sorry military muddles, unnatural political alliances, and blatant propaganda campaigns of a period covered by what has come to be known as the "Suez Crisis” one country alone emerges with dignity and credit. Since the establishment of the State of Israel its inhabitants had become subjected to increasing embarrassment from their Jordanian neighbours, and by 1656 a situation, deliberately created by Egypt, had arisen which was designed to eliminate Israel. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan effectively hemmed in Israel territory on three sides, and paid infiltrators, known as the "Fayadun,” were told off to carry out nuisance raids from Jordan, killing innocent civilians, and committing acts of sabotage on Israeli soil. Israel responded by sending organised military expeditions into Jordan to blow up police forts. Casualties occurred on both sides, and though this did not as yet constitute war it severely imperilled peaceful co-existence.

From early in 1955 the Egyptians had closed two trade outlets for Israel by forbidding it the use of the Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Akaba through the Straits of Tiran. This was dead against the principles of international law. and Israel took its case to the United Nations Security Council, only to have it turned down by the Russian veto. This then was the background of events which led up to the short and brilliant campaign of October-Novem-ber 1956, in which Israel inflicted such a crushing defeat on Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula that its two main objects were achieved: the Fayadun activities ceased; and the Gulf of Akaba was made free as an outlet into the Red Sea for Israeli shipping. General Dayan, who was Chief of Staff to the Israeli forces, has given in his diary an account of a brilliantlyconceived offensive operation in which speed was the essential factor. In view of the negative United Nations attitude to Israel’s aspirations Ben Gurion, who was then in control of his country’s affairs, knew only too well that the invasion of Sinai (a supposedly neutral territory, but one which the Egyptians had occupied and illegally fortified) must be carried through before the Security Council could issue positive orders to halt it. Accordingly, the mobilisation of requisite forces in secret, and the lulling of Egyptian suspicion by seeming to direct a reprisal offensive against Jordan for Fayadun terrorism, was a masterpiece of strategy. The suggestion that the campaign in Sinai was carried out in conjunction with the French and British assault upon Suez is effectively negatived in General Dayan’s account of the Israeli plan of campaign. French and British intentions were known to the Israeli’s who knew that one flank of their army would benefit by the coming assault on Suez, but General Dayan denies collusion.

In its peace-keeping role, the United Nations regarded the Israeli incursion into Sinai with considerable alarm, and from America Ben Gurion received a cable,

prompted by President Eisenhower “suggesting that Israel withdraw its forces from Sinai. ... If Israel would comply... the President of the United States would immediately declare his deep appreciation of Israel." Notwithstanding this gracious promise of such an allembracing benediction, and the fact that for once the Russian and American elements in the United Nations found themselves in complete accord. Israel continued the campaign at accelerated pressure. Of the Russian-American desire to protect Egypt the diarist drily remarks: "These two soloists are accompanied by an assorted choir of ’peace-at-any-price’ enthusiasts —particularly as the price does not have to te paid by them.” The United Nations General Assembly, though convened on November 1. did not have

time to implement the ponderous draft resolution put forward by Mr John Foster Dulles for the ending of hostilities all round, until Israel’s determined dash to protect the Gulf of Akaba had been completed. The end of the Sinai Invasion did not See Israel fully enjoying its war aims. “By virtue: of the authority vested in him by the United Nations, and with the force of the powers who backed him—the United States and the Soviet Union—the Secretary-General became a third party (and as far as Israel was concerned the only other party) in the negotiations for ending the war.” The result was to establish an international emergency force which would henceforth supervise the neutrality of Sinai. The force is i still there. The diarist gives a detailed account of the plan of campaign and its developments. I generously supplemented by (maps, “orders of battle" and particulars of units on both | sides as indeed might ibe expected of a soldier land staff officer of such 'outstanding qualities. He allows himself only muted praise for his countrymen, who were fighting not only for their own lives, but for the life of their infant State: and he shows tolerance in his comments on the enemv and the unsuccessful assaults of the British and French on Egypt

This diary demonstrates that Israel’s armv is the bestorganised and most efficient fighting force in a mainly Arab-dominated territory, and for this reason, perhaps, a gallant and hard-working race may be allowed to pursue its progress to nationhood in peace.