The Press WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1966. Rhodesia: Mr Wilson’s Choices

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31028, 6 April 1966, Page 16

The Press WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1966. Rhodesia: Mr Wilson’s Choices

In an address in Salisbury three weeks ago the Minister of Information in the Smith “ Government ”, Mr J. H. Howman, said that the conditions proposed by the British Labour Government for a Rhodesian settlement were completely unacceptable. These conditions would pre-suppose, in the main, unimpeded progress towards majority rule; immediate improvement in the political status of the Africans; guarantees against retrogressive legislation; and positive steps to end racial discrimination. What Mr Wilson was contemplating, Mr Howman said, was “ a “ hand-over to black African rabid nationalist rule ” a prospect that no Rhodesian could contemplate. That being accepted, the stage would appear to be set for some intensification of the struggle to bring down the Smith regime, with Mr Wilson’s hand supposedly strengthened by Labour’s convincing electoral victory.

During the election campaign the Conservative attitude on Rhodesia was, to say the least, equivocal. At an earlier stage Mr Heath had opposed tobacco sanctions—without which, as was said at the time, any other financial pressure would be derisory. On the question of an oil embargo there was actually a three-way Conservative split in the Commons, some members opposing, some supporting, and some abstaining. If the bi-partisan policy on Rhodesia is virtually at an end, as it seems to be, Mr Wilson will have to' decide what his future course is to be, since there are few signs as yet of Mr Smith’s collapse under pressure of sanctions. Although Mr Smith has clamped down on all information that might reveal how much the sanctions are hurting the Rhodesian economy, the effect of them must be considerable. Mr Smith lias survived now for nearly five months; but the full impact of sanctions did not begin to be felt until about mid-January. Mr Wilson will probably delay a while before deciding on further, and necessarily firmer, action. There is a danger, however, that if the sanctions drag on without producing any observable effect in Salisbury, defiance of them may spread. The Japanese were said last month to be defying them.

Mr Wilson faces a limited and unenviable choice. The use of force to end the “ rebellion ” has, by common consent in Britain, been ruled out. Further negotiations with Mr Smith also seems to be out of the question, since there is no apparent basis for it. The most likely outcome, if talks were again proposed, would be outraged protest from the other African Governments. Yet if Mr Wilson is not able to produce an alternative policv, he is likely to be accused of letting Mr Smith “‘get away with” his seizure of independence by not doing more. The only course remaining, it has been suggested, would be for the British Government to go to the United Nations with a proposal for sanctions that would be mandatory on all members, including South Africa and Portugal—the latter since Angola and Mozambique have already been referred to as possible sources of oil supply for Rhodesia. The Government, it is thought, has not been anxious to take the Rhodesian case to the United Nations because the precedents of other United Nations interventions in Africa are not encouraging. The outcome of any appeal to the United Nations on Rhodesia would be unpredictable.

As for South Africa, the probability is that Dr. Verwoerd will carry on exactly as before. Last week’s General Election swept him back to power on a policy of strict neutrality over Rhodesia, as opposed to the United Party’s ill-judged support of Smith. The South African Government has not yet recognised the Smith regime. It is content to do nothing—which, as the “ Economist ” has pointed out, simply means business as usual. The paper’s pre-election judgment of the South African position would seem to have equal relevance to-day: “ Neutrality on an issue like “ sanctions means -that they are not applied. It “is ‘ business as usual ’, which, according to Dr. “Verwoerd’s definition, means that there will be “ neither less nor more State regulation of trade “ across the Limpopo than there was before U.D.I. If “ that trade should swell to unusual proportions, well, “that is the businessmen’s business. And if the “ international oil companies are unable to make their “ South African subsidiaries toe the line, well, nobody “ can really expect the South African Government to “ do the job for them. Put simply, it is a policy of “ making life safe for the bootleggers ”.