The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1966. No Role Now For Sukarno

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31016, 23 March 1966, Page 18

The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 23, 1966. No Role Now For Sukarno

It may be foolish to attempt an explanation of Indonesian events by process of logic. Yet a close scrutiny of the background of recent happenings in Djakarta must suggest a relatively simple explanation —that Indonesia in the last few months had come so close, socially and economically, to absolute collapse that the person mainly responsible, President Sukarno, in the national interest had to be denied any further opportunity to exercise power and make decisions. The Army chief, General Suharto, is now reported to have assumed complete political control; and that is probably true, for the reason that the Army leaders, with responsible civilian concurrence, must know that the time for half-measures is past if the Indonesian economy is to be retrieved from the very edge of chaos. The pattern is not unfamiliar. It has been followed closely—and changed in shorter time—in several of the emerging African States, where attempts to mix Marxism with a strident nationalism have lately led to Army intervention to save the economy and destroy tyranny. Dr. Sukarno had repeatedly promised a “ political solution ” in Indonesia; but his maladroit efforts to fuse incompatible elements in government—religious, military, and Communist—in a policy described as “guided “ democracy ”, inevitably did no more than produce revolt within the revolution. A month ago, after Dr. Sukarno's political denigration of his former trusted aide. General Nasution, we suggested that the time must come when responsible leadership in Indonesia would decide that Dr. Sukarno was dispensable, and that, as student and peasant protests mounted in gravity, the Army leaders would become convinced that the only “ political solution ” was to transform their nominal control of government into total control. That has apparently happened—in circumstances which appear to preclude any possibility of Dr. Sukarno’s being returned to a place of power, though he might yet re-emerge as a figurehead on the strength of his self-conferred status of “ President for life ”.

Clearly much must depend now on the cohesion of the Army and its ability to integrate with civilian elements in the political field. There seems little reason to doubt that the military leaders, who quelled the September 30 rising and restored Dr. Sukarno’s authority, but otherwise preferred to remain watchful in the background, are persuaded now that there is no alternative to a full take-over. The condition of the country would make, for those who decided to depose the President, the ultimate argument. Indonesia, despite Dr. Sukarno’s gross mismanagement of the economy and his profligate expenditure on Malaysian “ confrontation ”, remains a rich country with considerable resources of oil, rubber, and copra. Its 3000 islands are yet to realise the unity of real confederation. Many of them, indeed, have had to function with little or no help from Djakarta. The land generally is capable of prolific growth; yet there are many millions of people, mostly in the cities in Java and Sumatra, for whom rice must be imported. Cloth also must be imported since little is manufactured locally.

Yet Indonesia, thanks to Dr. Sukarno, has nowhere at the moment to turn for help. The military confrontation of Malaysia and Singapore has alienated American and British sympathies. China has had to admit yet another full-scale diplomatic defeat, and has been angered by the ruthless destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party—a short time ago the strongest in the world outside Russia and China. The Russians have poured in money and military equipment, and have nothing to show for it. They are thought to have sunk up to one and a-half billion dollars in Indonesia. Japanese reparations and Government-backed credits have been vital in keeping the economy going; but the Japanese have also been alarmed at the useless wasting of Indonesian resources, and credit sources are drying up. When Dr. Sukarno pulled Indonesia out of'the United Nations he slammed the door on aid through the World Bank. From an investment point of view, Indonesia is presently at the bottom of the list. Any new regime will inherit that situation—and an overseas debt amounting to about £B6O million. These are some of the facts which support the view that the Army can no longer evade its responsibility to reform the Government and recruit the country’s best brains in the struggle for economic rehabilitation. It is impossible to imagine that there can be any place for Dr. Sukarno in a programme of such magnitude and such moral significance for Indonesia’s hundred million people.