THE ROYAL NAVY CAPABILITY TO STRIKE DEPENDS ON CARRIERS

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30971, 29 January 1966, Page 14

THE ROYAL NAVY CAPABILITY TO STRIKE DEPENDS ON CARRIERS

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CLARE HOLLINGWORTH,

in lh« -Guardian.” MancheilerL

(Reprinted bp orranpementt

The 801 Squadron of the Fleet Air Arm are completing their training at Lossiemouth on the Buccaneer Mark II in readiness to embark on the aircraft-carrier H.M.S. Victorious to work up for duty in the Far East later this year. The pilots, many of whom are experienced men in their early thirties, are enthusiastic about the capabilities of the new Buccaneer fitted with the Spey engine which they suggest would be invaluable to the United States Navy in Vietnam or in any other area of limited warfare.

When flying at between 100 and 200 feet above the surface, it is of no importance, they say, whether the flying speed is just below or just above the speed of sound: what is vital is that the aeroplane is under the enemy’s radar beams. Further, the naval pilots claim that one man cannot, with any ease, control the navigation instruments and sophisticated weapons system as well as fly the aircraft. Two-man Machine

This two-man machine therefore makes for greater efficiency whether it be in delivering bombs, firing rockets, or taking photographs on a reconnaissance mission. This is especially true at night or in bad weather, because the Buccaneer, unlike the TSR-2, has no automatic ter-rain-hugging device to enable it to follow the contours of the land. The navigator helps with this aided by a radar screen beside the back seat. It is he, too, who uses the computer for the combination of automatic flying and weapons delivery. The Buccaneer’s radar can “lock on” to any target which is visible on the radar screen, such as a bridge, hangar, military headquarters, radar station, and is thus able to destroy interdiction targets well within enemy territory. The Buccaneer can remain in the air well over three hours and has an easy capacity for inflight refuelling, whilst its steady flight provides a more stable weapons platform than is to be found in most trans-sonic aircraft.

Much of the squadron’s weapons training has been conducted over the tundra in Norway. This is thanks to unusual generosity on the part of a N.A.T.O. ally in providing a training area and permitting virtually unlimited overflying on certain courses. It is indeed a splendid sight to see the Buccaneers fly up the narrow Sognafjorden in close formation as they rush in and out of black cloud formations with confidence and safety or exercise in the circular movement required to “toss off” a bomb.

Tension Beginning Hundreds of highly skilled mechanics, electricians and radar experts work round the clock to keep the Buccaneer Mark II operationally efficient. The morale of these men is high, but tension is just beginning to enter into the team spirit on the station because of their uncertain future. It is not only the pilots who are being offered jobs by foreign airlines anxious to make up the deficits for what is described by one company as a “world shortage of pilots amounting to between 1800 and 2000 men;” bowler-hatted

i gentlemen also wait outside the naval station's gates in attempts to persuade the technicians to take more highly paid jobs in industry, even after the expected pay rise. Officers and men say they would greatly prefer to remain in the Services, but they complain that they have never been given a green light for their future in the Fleet Air Arm. Indeed, some trained men have almost decided to leave the Navy at the conclusion of their eight-year period instead of signing on for a further four years. It is, of course, these men the forces should attempt to retain. There is neither loyalty nor opposition in the attitude of the men to the major political parties: "They both mess us about and fail to provide a clear defence policy for the future,” is the line to be heard frequently both in the ward room and among the ratings. Officers and men openly express fears that the liefence Renew will be what they call “a typical British compromise” which will provide too few F-llls to the R.A.F. for their requirements and, if the Navy is lucky, one, instead of the two mucnneeded aircraft-carriers they consider essential to maintain the new limited war role in the Far East. Senior naval officers believe this type of hostility will increase in area and intensity during the next decade. Indeed. American and French as well as British naval experts argue that without carriers the Royal Navy would soon loose its raison d’etre. Britain, is suggested, already has too many ships designed exclusively for defence in comparison with those few with a strike capability.

Decreasing Bases Limited war can be expected to spread from the Far East to Africa and other parts of the world and it will become increasingly difficult to contain by the West with a fast decreasing number of land bases. Newly independent countries may well be willing to enter into an agreement to permit military aircraft to refuel, but they will never be prepared to allow stockpiling either of ammunition or weapons on their soil. It is expected that the

. military stores now available i in tbe Middle and Far East - will be liquidated within the ’ next year or two and this i gradual termination of landbased facilities will auto- ’ matically increase the importi ance of sea bases—carriers • capable of remaining at sea ' for months with their strike ' force aboard, depending only on ships of the auxiliary fleet for supplies. There are serious doubts about Britain’s ability to fulfil its obligations to members of the Atlantic Alliance, the Central Treaty Organisation, and the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation, as they are now defined, without aircraftcarriers and our allies are becoming increasingly concerned that a new carrier may be laid down. If this does not happen it means that when the veteran Ark Royal goes out of commission the Far East force will be ineffective. Useful Deterrent The carrier is no more—perhaps even less—of a tar get in the case of nuclear warfare than a normal land base. Its nuclear strike capability—the Buccaneer—provides a useful deterrent, especially against those coun tries in Africa and Asia which have already acquired modern weapons and who may, within the next decade or so, obtain nuclear weapons. The cost of the new carrier, known as CVA-OL, is officially stated to be "about £6O mil lions” and this includes everything except the aircraft on board. It would make interesting reading to compare this with the amount spent on a land base of similar capabilities over a period of, say, 10 years; but much of the information is classified. But the men of the Royal Navy, whose opinions this article reflects, are convinced that buying a carrier is “far cheaper than renting bases or bribing sheikhs.” Officially, no decision has yet been taken on the Defence Review, but there is a genuine feeling among sailors that the tide is running against seaborne forces: only the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Denis Healey, can dispel the gloom by a clean statement of Britain's future policy at sea.