Gloomy Fatalism In Washington Found

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30951, 6 January 1966, Page 10

Gloomy Fatalism In Washington Found

<NZ Press Association —Copyright > WASHINGTON, January 5. Under the surface in Washington there is a growing mood of gloomy fatalism about Vietnam. The unjustified optimism of the peace offensive is gradually giving way to unjustified pessimism, writes James Reston, associate editor of the “New York Times.”

President Johnson did not put an either-or proposition to Hanoi. He was careful to avoid any suggestion of an ultimatum, but Washington is an either-or town. It hates to lie quiet and wait. It wants to settle things, to “do something”—to make peace or make war, which is not always the same thing as making sense.

These moods in the capital are important. Error starts in the mind. Wrong assumptions lead to wrong decisions, and this has been the tragedy of Vietnam from the beginning. American intervention in Vietnam started with a mood of exuberant optimism. The French had found Ho Chi Minh and his principal military commander. General Vo Nguyen Giap—who- are still in charge—to be formidable | adversaries. But after all. we (were not the French. They | had lost the war and 172,000 (casualties, we agreed, but we jhad air and naval power and [were different. That was the beginning. | Washington was at first loverly optimistic about the [Diem Government in Saigon, but when Diem did not prove to be very successful, Washington got overly pessimistic [and helped kick him out. New Adventures I The Administration was optimistic about what the American military “advisers” could do, then what American “assistants” could do, then what the American bombers could do—and each disappointment led to new adventures. The pattern is perfectly i plain: from optimism to pessimism to military action—l

(then back over the same (course to more action. BombI ing might bring the Communists to the conference table — (then the commitment of !70.000 troops might do it. I then 170.000. then "victory” in the monsoon battles, then, (the world-wide peace offensive, which, like everything else, is being followed by more pessimism and more cries for more arms. “Not So Different’’ It may be useful this time [to pause and look around What has happened this year is not so different from what (happened last year. There [was a pause in the fighting during the lunar new year (festivities in 1965. When it [was over, the Soviet Premier, Mr Kosygin, went to Hanoi. While he was there, the Viet Cong attacked the American air base at Pleiku, and in retaliation, President Johnson j ordered the first bombing | raids on North Vietnam. Again this year there is a pause in the bombing. Again] ithere is likely to be a cease-! !fire during the lunar new | year celebrations in Vietnam later this month. Again there is a Soviet delegation to (Hanoi, this time led by Mr Alexei Shelepin. He may. as the Chinese say, | be there to urge the North I Vietnamese to negotiate a settlement. Then again, he may] merely have gone to arrange more Soviet weapons for Gen-1 eral Giap’s troops. We do not| know. By the end of the month, however, even if there is no change in Hanoi's negative attitude about a peace conference, the military situation will be virtually the same. Both sides will no doubt have brought up new supplies and regrouped their forces, but

> the balance of power will be - about where it was when all -’the flying diplomats took off. Attitudes of Mind I What will have changed : mainly will be attitudes of mind. The opponents of John ■ son’s limited war for limited objectives will not be able to ! say he did not try to arrange a peace, but his opponents on the other side will argue that he tried and failed and must now raise the level of violence ;in a new offensive. There is no evidence, however, that this will do anything except create an even bloodier stalemate. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, of course, may force the pace. They may put more troops into the battle and force us to retaliate in self-defence, but that remains to be seen. It is not likely, but it is just possible, that the main result |of the pause will be to dei crease the level of violence. I The fighting may never end suddenly in a cease-fire and a [ peace conference. It would just gradually slow down. This is not, to repeat, a likely prospect, but there is no great danger in waiting to see. What's the rush? We are continuing our aerial reconnaissance. There is no danger that we will suddenly be con[fronted by a vast new attackling force that could overI whelm our command. | There is, however, a danger that the old compulsion to I “do something" will prevail once more and we will stall ]the escalation. If this could satisfy our yen to “settle things” it would be a policy, but nobody really believes in quick solutions after the last year. Raising the stakes has produced the stalemate but settled nothing else. Reducing it for a period may not work, but it is worth a try.