CHALLENGE TO MALAYSIA—II PARTNERS MUST LEARN HOW TO LIVE SEPARATELY

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30916, 24 November 1965, Page 20

CHALLENGE TO MALAYSIA—II PARTNERS MUST LEARN HOW TO LIVE SEPARATELY

[By a special correspondent of "The Times” who recently toured Singapore and Malaysia.l /Reprinted from “The Times.")

Nothing was more disheartening in the first turbulent days of Singapore’s independence than the resort to economic reprisals. They betrayed, on the part of some in Kuala Lumpur, a desire to do Singapore down and, among some in Singapore, a hypersensitivity to their new vulnerability. In contrast to the sober agreements rapidly reached in the defence field, in which Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Prime Minister, gave ample proof of his realism by sending promptly his only battations to Borneo, and by pleading desperately with Britain not to pull out, economics were shot through with political passion.

Things have not yet sobered down, as can be seen in the furore over Singapore's wish to resume barter trade with Indonesia. But one must hope that the businessmen, with indissoluble interests in both countries, who would never have allowed separation had they been asked, will soon be getting their message through. Common Market

It is commonplace that the two need each other, but truer still, perhaps, that Singapore needs Malaya more than it is needed. It would seem folly to try to dislocate traditional flows of trade in rubber and tin down the peninsula to the great port at Singapore. Some in Kuala Lumpur seem to wish to try it. And, no doubt, as if to spite one’s face, it could be attempted. Although Singapore with its two million population, does represent some 40 per cent of the former federation’s purchasing power, Malaya could just do without Singapore’s market. For all Singapore’s indomitable spirit, it could not do without Malaya’s trade nor its market. One mentions these possibilities because they are live fears in Singapore, and because continuing prosperity is the condition of Singapore’s stable survival. Future cooperation is essential because, beyond the traditional pattern, both countries are entering upon elementary industrialisation. They promise to be directly competitive rather than complementary. Singapore will doubtless press for the long discussed common market it needs with Malaysia. But Malaysia will want to make sure that Singapore, for one thing, does not get all the plums in foreign investment. Cheap Housing It must also lie in Malaysia’s defence interests, and those of others interested in the region, to see that Singapore prospers. Ironically, nothing illustrates better the startling progress Singapore has made than the confidence of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, in ousting the island. Only three years ago he was arguing with his own reluctant followers that they must have Singapore in the federation to avert another Cuba on the

doorstep. No-one who has heard Mr Lee expressing Singapore's wish to survive through the retention of British bases can imagine such a threat developing under his government. The reduction of the Communist political threat is due entirely to Mr Lee’s Government. It has succeeded, remarkably, as have few others in South-east Asia, in giving the people a good share of the port-city’s growth in prosperity. The achievements in the social programme are astonishing. Over 51,000 cheap flats have been built in the last five years and a further 60,000 are planned for the next five. The housing problem, I was told, had been abolished.

Education is thriving—significantly only the Malays get free Government education. Teachers are among the better paid members of the community. Car ownership grows apace, and Orchard Road is virtually one continuous car showroom, testifying to the salesman's confidence in an expanding market. Affluence and a widely appreciated dynamic, efficient and, above all, uncorrupt administration have given Mr Lee great popularity—even among the remaining British businessmen. Communist Core

The Communist threat is not yet eliminated. There is a hard core of party members and there are plenty in the teeming Chinese community —half of whom are under 21 —whose admiring thoughts tend to drift towards Peking. Mr Lee's great boast of thrashing the Barisan Sosialis (the far-left socialist front) on their own ground in a recent by-election was, in fact, won only by a 60-40 vote. The Barisan Sosialis has so far courted disaster by flirting with Indonesian pretensions. But Mr Lee is the first to admit that economic recession, either through hurting the Malaysian relationship or in closing down the British bases, could have disruptive effects. The current prosperity is not without its precarious aspects. Very high wages have been achieved by the union movement. There is no reserve of cheap labour. Singapore’s economic “tour de force” has tended to dazzle, and cause resentment in Kuala Lumpur that Malaysia’s own achievements are being ignored. This is partly’ natural since Singapore’s achievements are so eyecatchingly concentrated, and because there is undeniably a bustle and drive among the Chinese which is in striking contrast to the leisurely bonhomie of the Malay in Kuala Lumpur. But these should not hide the progress that has been made in Malaysia—in housing and in industrial and rural development. In some respects, such as in foreign investment, the claims of some Ministers in Kuala Lumpur to be more socialist than Mr Lee seem justified. Social Problem

Even if economic harmony with Singapore is achieved, a basic problem in Malaya will remain. It is a social and racial one. The Chinese and,

to a lesser extent, the Indians are taking the chances that education and an improving economy bring quicker than the Malays. Already they are forming prosperous selfcontained communities in the towns which contrast with the backwardness of the predominantly Malay countryside.

Socially, too, Malays and non-Malays tend to mix little. Chinese and Indians occassionally intermarry, for instance, but Islam sees to it that Malays rarely choose outside their own religion. And there is the simple problem of eating. Of course, whoever it was, either in Singapore or Malaya, who divided the races up into pork-eaters and non-pork-eaters was asking for trouble. The fact remains, as a cultured Indian told me, it is difficult to get on with Malays when you always have to be careful about food and drink. None of this might matter much if everyone were, or could be content with the status quo. There are two factors working for imbalance The remnants in Malaya, if not in Sabah and Sarawak, of Mr Lee’s "Malaysia Solidarity Convention." could become a political rallying point for non-Malays if they felt threatened. Much will depend on Mr Lee’s stand. Though now a foreign Prime Minister, he remains the spiritual head of a movement that had much of the ardour and rhetoric of some civil rights movement. Even without his help nonMalays could well have reason to fear from the “language problem” which opponents of “Malay domination” are quickest to produce. National Language After September, 1967, the Malaysian Parliament is free to make Malay the sole national language in Malaya and the medium of education in Government schools. Nothing is decided yet. But the febrile promoters of Malay are determined to begin the process in 1967, with the new classes starting in Malay and dropping English. But the Indians and Chinese prize their English, and they prize their own cultures. There is growing resentment at the prospect of either having Malay forced down their children’s throats or having to resort to private schools. Mr Lee reckons he has evidence that the Communists will be all out to cause trouble here, and he seems obsessed, if the language issue is pressed home, with the prospect of having another Vietnam on his doorstep, from whose turmoil he would be unable to stand aside.

The Malaysian Government obviously discounts Mr Lee's nightmares. It may claim that its intentions are misunderstood. But it does have a considerable task in removing that misunderstanding by patiently explaining its language policy, and being willing to listen to reasonable disquietude. Only thus can they lay the bogy of “Malav domination” which has caught an even stronger hold in Sabah and Sarawak. f Concluded 1