N.A.T.O. ALLIES HAVE NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30914, 22 November 1965, Page 15

N.A.T.O. ALLIES HAVE NUCLEAR WARHEADS

President Reported As Unaware Of Details (N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) WASHINGTON, November 21. For more than six years United States nuclear warheads have been mounted secretly on planes and missiles of West Germany and other N.A.T.O. allies, according to persons close to the United States Atomic Weapons Programme, the “New York Times” reports.

Although President Johnson has been kept informed of the general programme, it is understood that at times he and other top policy-makers have been largely unaware of the specific arrangements made by the Defence Department with the N.A.T.O. allies.

Through a combination of physical and electronic controls, the warheads remain under American custody, and the allies cannot use the weapons without the specific approval of the United States

Under the current controls at least two American sentries stand guard over the nuclear-armed ’plane, and the allied pilots cannot enter the cockpit without the approval of the American servicemen.

At times, however, according to well-qualified sources, this American control has existed more in principle than in fact.

Only in recent years, it has oeen reliably reported, have the controls been strengthened to the point where unauthorised use of the warheads by an ally could be regarded as a highly unlikely possibility. This extension of American nuclear capability to the N.A.T.O. allies is now becoming involved in the debate over creation of an allied nuclear force. In the opinion of some influential American Congressmen, there can be no logical discussion of the need for such a force until there is greater understanding—both in America and in Europe—of the degree to which N.A.T.O. allies are already participating in their own nuclear defence. Unwilling To Talk The Administration, therefore, is being urged by these Congressmen to talk more openly about the present nuc-j lear arrangements w i t h i America’s N.A.T.O. allies. However, the Administra-1

'tion is still unwilling to rellax the secrecy. After three days’ consultations with the State Departement .nd the Atomic Energy | Commission, and, presumably, ' the White House, the Defence Department declined to answer questions about the of allied weapons with the nuclear warheads. In response to questions submitted to its public infor- . mation office on whether American warheads are '• mounted on German war- ■ planes or missiles, the Dei fence Department replied: “It : is Department of Defence s ■ policy not to discuss location. numbers or operations - involving nuclear weapons.” However, it was learned . from qualified sources that . in addition to maintaining . separate stockpiles of nuclear warheads for use by allies in event of war, the United i States in some cases is actu--3 ally mounting the warheads . on the missiles and planes of » certain allies. i For example, American atomic weapons are mounted . on German FlO4 fighter-inter- . ceptors on a “quick reaction ] alert," which means they r must be able to take off on 5 air defence or air strike j missions within a matter of f minutes. i German Missiles i I It was also reported that i American atomic weapons | were mounted on some of ; the German-manned Persh- ! ings—a ballistic missile with ■ | a 400-mile range. ;: Similar arrangements were ■! reported to exist with some 11 of the eight other N.A.T.O allies with whom the United ■ I States has bilateral agree-

ments for co-operation in atomic weapons—Britain, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Holland, and Turkey. The military justification for these arrangements is that in the case of certain weapons there would not be sufficient time to take the warhead from a bunker and mount it on the delivery system in event of attack. Under the terms laid down by the United States, it was understood that Allied planes equipped with American warheads are not permitted to take off on patrol missions. Instead, they are kept near the end of the runway. Three years ago. however, the Defence Department made a move to permit British and Belgian pilots to go aloft with nuclear-armed air-to-air missiles supplied by the United States. Move Blocked This move was blocked at the last minute by the intervention of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The arrangements date back to 1958, when the Atomic Energy Law was amended to permit the United States to share certain information on American atomic weapons with her N.A.T.O. allies. At the time, Administration officials argued before the Joint Congressional Committee that relaxation in weapons secrecy was necessary so that America’s N.A.T.O. allies could train their crews and equip their planes and missiles to use the warheads in event of war. In public testimony, however, the impression was left by Administration officials that the warheads would be kept under a separate American lock and key and only turned over to the allies in event of attack. Within months after the amendments were passed, the Congressional Committee discovered that the Defence Department had gone a step further and mounted the warheads on some allied weapons systems. Inadequate Control The committee also reached the conclusion that the Defence Department was exercising inadequate control over the stockpiled weapons. Out of this Congressional concern came the initiative to strengthen the American controls over the nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe. In the winter of 1960 an atomic energy sub-committee made an extensive inspection trip through Europe. The general conclusion reached by the sub-committee was that the control arrangements were inadequate. For example, it found that the American commander in Paris was relying upon the fickle European commercial telephone systems to maintain command and control over American warheads as-

signed to military units in Italy and some other N.A.T.O. countries. Out of the trip came a still top-secret report to President Kennedy shortly after he took office. Control Systems Two of the principal recommendations of the report —both adopted by the Administration—were the removal of the Jupiter ballistic missiles from Turkey and Italy and the development of better physical and electronic control systems over the warheads assigned to N.A.T.O. This lead to the development of what are known as “permissive action links” on the American warheads as signed to N.A.T.O. forces. These links are a combination of electronic and mechanical devices to prevent unauthorised use of the warheads. It is known that these “links” operate on the general principle that it takes a positive action by an American custodian, either physically or through an electronic signal, to release a plane or missile and to arm the warhead. The Defence Department declined to elaborate on the control arrangements. The present appraisal of Congressional committee members is that the present control arrangements, while not foolproof, are about as secure as can be humanly devised. New Concern But there is a new concern in Congressional circles that, because •of the tight secrecy maintained by the Defence Department, some top-level policy-makers may be un aware of the extent to which the United States has gone in giving some of the N.A.T.O allies a nuclear capability. President Kennedy, for example, according to Atomic Energy sources, was not specifically informed on the manner in which the Pentagon was equipping some allied weapons with nuclear warheads until a representative of the Atomic Energy Com mission told him at a White House meeting in late 1961: “Mr President, do you realise that a Belgian pilot could start World War III?” It was because of this Congressional concern that the chairman of the Congressional committee, Mr Chet Holifield, took the unusual step of disclosing the hitherto secret fact that the United States has assigned to West Germany nuclear warheads with a total explosive yield exceeding three million tons of T.N.T.

Because of its policy of secrecy, the Defence Department, in response to questions, refused to confirm this statement.