CHINA IN AFRICA DOUBLE-EDGED POLICY IS POSING DILEMMAS

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30846, 3 September 1965, Page 14

CHINA IN AFRICA DOUBLE-EDGED POLICY IS POSING DILEMMAS

IBy J.

J. D. F. JONES,

in the "Financial Times.”)

(Reprinted by arrangement.)

When Chou En-lai made his famous remark in December, 1963, that revolutionary prospects were excellent in Africa, it was already clem- that China’s policy in that continent was double-edged—a diplomatic offensive to win the support of the newly independent Governments‘ to beaccompanied bv a campaign of subversion against these same established Governments. Indeed, subversion had apparently been priority, and throughout 1964 China made several major inroads into Aiuca.

Now, 18 months after Chou's first African tour, the situation has changed; in diplomacy’ as well as in insurrection, China has suffered a series of checks. African Governments have clamped down on subversive activities, Heads of State from Niger to Zambia have warned Chinese diplomats to behave themselves, a major Peking-backed revolution in the Congo has failed, a bridgehead in Burundi has been lost and, most important of all, Chou suffered a grave diplomatic defeat when he was unable to persuade the African leaders to attend the Afro-Asian summit meeting in Algiers. Significantly, interest has switched from the Congo rebels to Africa's most ambitious development project since the Aswan Dam—the proposed railway between Zambia and Tanzania. A team of Chinese engineers has just arrived in Dar-es-Salaam to survey the Tanzania section of the railway.

Chou’s Failure But the disillusionment of African leaders with China’s friendship campaign was strikingly shown this summer in Chou En-lai’s failure to attract a single invitation from an African Government when he was in Dar-es-Salaam before the Algiers summit. As Chou nurses his wounds, he must have been asking himself—where does China go from here?

This “defeat” should not be exaggerated. China’s infiltration into Africa is visibly represented by some 18 embassies, and under de Gaulle’s example other French-speak-ing West African countries will be recognising the Peking regime. President Aden Osman of Somalia and Uganda’s Prime Minister Dr. Milton Obote have been the most recent of the constant stream of African visitors to Peking. Scores of official Chinese missions of one sort or another, from traders to acrobats, visit Africa each vear. Technicians are scattered across the continent and for every “military adviser” there are dozens of agricultural officers. More and more radio programmes are being beamed at Africa, the Chinese are staging fairs with great success, and there Is a flood of printed propaganda. The vague offer to survey part of the Zambia-Tanzania railway was only the latest of a number of offers of economic aid, most of which are initially far more specific. Tan-

zania. for example, was offered £l6 million and Zanzibar another £5 million. Kenya a £6 5 million loan and a £1 million grant, the Somali Republic a £7 million credit and a £1 million grant, Ghana £8 million. Algeria £lB million, Mali £7 million, the Congo (Brazzaville) a reported £1.78 million and so on.

Misleading Reports The difficulty comes in pinpointing how many of these gifts, loans or credits ever materialise; for this reason reports that Chinese aid offers now total well over £lOO million are misleading. Several Asian countries have already have experience of this strange way in which Chinese aid tends to vanish into thin air and the same thing may now be happening in Africa. Tanzania has a textile mill and—so far—little else; Ghana has seen little of her £8 million; it has never been clear what happened to Algeria’s promised £lB million and Somalia has benefited more from the Russian and United States counter-offers than from any actual Chinese credit. The difficulty seems to lie partly in the method of offering aid (the recipient country is asked to detail what it wants; the Chinese suggest amendments; the agreed compromise is often unobtainable) and partly in the breakdown of aid into cash, commodities, machinery and technical assistance. Tied aid is the rule, of course, and the prominent use of technical personnel (who have to be paid for out of the original credit) means that the effect of the offer is immediately diminished. The Chinese apparently like to insist that money be used for prestige schemes for which the recipient country has to find additional local costs.’ Negotiations on the choice of aid projects have given trouble lately in- Tanzania, as well as in Kenya and Ghana, and the end product is sometimes surprising—Tanzania recently received a consignment of Chinese consumer goods, including cosmetics and canned fruit to be sold in the Government trading stores.

Unable To Compete But the basic difficulty is the single fact that China cannot afford a large-scale aid programme. Peking knows it cannot compete with Russia (which has contributed at least £9O million to the As-

wan Dam), with the United States (1963 aid to Africa totalled 300 million dollars), with Britain (an independence settlement to Kenya of £6O million), or with the West as a whole.

Nor can China hope to extend trading links beyond the limits dictated by the absence of suitable requirements on either side. This cannot be concealed by the signing of a dozen trade agreements or very high percentage increases in trade—from a nearzero level. China would no doubt like to be able to help solve Africa’s problem of falling commodity prices, but what possible use would she have for—to take a recent rumour—massive quantities of Ghanaian cocoa? China’s aid programme is therefore small, piecemeal and cleverly focused on spectacular small projects which attract attention far out of proportion to their size. At the lowest level this can cover secret subsidies for local politicians or rebel groups. At the highest level there is—in theory—the Zambia-Tanzania railway. In spite of the arrival of a survey team this still seems likely to remain as theoretical as Chou En-lai’s (now forgotten) offer in Algiers to build a road across the Sahara, because it is inconceivable that the Chinese can at present afford tn build a 1300-mile railway costing anything between £5B million and £l5O million. The steel is not available in China, the technical requirements would be exacting, and the use of coolie labour (which China brought in to build a road in the Yemen recently, and which even there caused local unrest) would never be tolerated by any African Government.

At Two Levels Effectively then, the Chinese offensive in Africa is left at two levels—subversion and technical assistance at groundlevel. The latter is a longterm policy and already showing signs of success. Chinese experts, for example, are teaching people to grow rice and -other crops in Mali, Guinea, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Libya and Dahomey. There are engineers and prospectors in Somalia and Tanzania, telecommunications specialists in Zanzibar and Tanzania, North Vietnamese field workers in former French Africa and medical teams in Zanzibar and Somalia.

Here again, though. China's resources are limited. President Nyerere has pointed out that there are more United States Peace Corps teachers in Tanzania's secondary schools than there are Chinese in the whole country. Nyerere also recently produced official figures showing that there were 246 Chinese in his country—and 16,000 British! In their subversion campaign the Chinese have the advantage of the latest guerrilla tactics and an unashamed belief in the inevitability of violent “second degree" revolutions in Africa. They have been training soldiers in Zanzibar, on the Mozambique border and. notably, outside Brazzaville and among the exiles from Southern Africa. The African Governments are more concerned with the number of youths who are being trained in “guerrilla academies" in Peking itself.

Recent Defeat Even here there has been a recent defeat: the failure of the Chinese-trained Congo rebel army is the only comfort most African leaders will take from Tshombe’s victory. This same lesson for the Chinese was pointed recently in Algeria, when the majority of African leaders were horrified at the success of the military overthrow of Ben Bella, and critical of China’s backing for Boumedienne. This Algerian coup Indicates the problem China faces in pursuing policies which are, In the end, contradictory. Until recently China was prepared to gamble on the accuracy of Chou’s analysis of “excellent revolutionary prospects.” It was a gamble because, In setting up embassies and giving aid, China was seeking to enlist diplomatic support for her position in world politics. But diplomatic support is controlled by the Governments of the day: China could not hope indefinitely to keep their suppor* iand friendship while she vx iat the same time attempt! n to subvert them.

Attractive Lions

The Marquess of Bath has fallen out with his neighbours because of his plan to import 50 lions for a 98-acre nature reserve on his estate at Longleat, near Warminster, Wiltshire. The Marquess wants the lions as a tourist attraction for his estate, but local fanners are “up-in-arms" over the plan. They fear the lions could escape and destroy their cattle. All precautions were being taken, said the Marquess. The Mon compound would be surrounded by a 12ft high fence with a 3ft angles extension arm. He had been assured that lions could only jump about 7ft Game wardens with rifles would patrol the area and sleep in cara vans nearby at night—London, September 2.