Rehabilitation of Stalin FORMER LEADER RETURNING FROM LIMBO OF UNPERSONS

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30808, 21 July 1965, Page 16

Rehabilitation of Stalin FORMER LEADER RETURNING FROM LIMBO OF UNPERSONS

(By

DAVID FLOYD

> in the “Daily Telegraph,” London.)

(Reprinted from the “Daily Telegraph" by arrangement.)

The writing of history is a difficult task in any society in any ajy. In the Soviet Union today, where what goes into the history books, is dictated by whoever happens to be on top in the Kremlin at the moment, it has become almost impossible. During the Second World War the official teaching in Russia was that there was only one military leader and he was J. V. Stalin. He alone planned and supervised the carrying out of the “Stalin blows” which defeated the German armies.

He was the supreme com-mander-in-chief and the generals in the field merely carried out his will. It was with his name on their lips that millions of Russians were reputed to have gone into battle. After the victory Stalin gave himself the title of Generalissimo and banished the marshals from Moscow. The historians and writers, artists and film-makers settled down to recording the Stalin legend. Stalin had been dead only three years when Khrushchev and others of Stalin’s colleagues started to destroy the legend. It then appeared that, far from being the architect of Russian victory, Stalin was primarily responsible for Russia’s near-defeat in the face of the German attack. The war had been won, in spite of Stalin’s ignorance of military matters, by certain military leaders and their political advisers at the front. Khrushchev’s Story Among such advisers there emerged into history N. S. Khrushchev, who had this to say in 1956 about Stalin’s conduct of the war: “We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. . . . Yes, comrades, he used to take a globe and trace the front line on it.” Since Khrushchev’s departure from the Kremlin scene last October, the pendulum has begun to swing the other way again. Stalin is being rehabilitated. During the Kremlin celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the victory in the last war, Mr Brezhnev paid a modest tribute to Stalin’s contribution. And now the literary journal “Novy Mir” has published extracts from the war memoirs of Marshal Ivan Koniev. clearly intended to bring Stalin back from the limbo of un-persons.

Two passages from the memoirs reveal Stalin as a man with a detailed knowledge of the territory through which the Russian armies were battling and of the sort of maps being used by the military. Towards the end of November, 1944, Marshal Koniev was summoned to Moscow to discuss plans for the VistulaOder campaign of January, 1945. He how he took with him the plan prepared by his staff and submitted it personally to Stalin at the headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme Command in the presence of the members of Stalin’s “War Cabinet.” “I well remember how Stalin carefuly studied the plan of the operation and the special attention he devoted

to the Silesian industrial region, which stood out in relief on the map. According to our plan the thrusts by our troops were to go around this region, to the north and to the south, because the region was an enormous agglomeration of industrial plants, built mostly of reinforced concrete, and of mine shafts with substantial machinery on the surface. Altogether this represented major obstacles to the easy movement of troops if this industrial region was to be attacked frontally. “Even on the map the extent of the Silesian region and its resources were sufficiently apparent. And I understand perfectly well what Stalin meant when he went out of his way to drag my attention to the area. He pointed | to the map with his finger, i drew a circle around the industrial area and said: That’s I gold.’ “It was said in such a way| that no further explanation was really necessary.” Berlin Offensive The second instance concerns events before the Berlin offensive. By the middle of April, 1945, Koniev’s armies] had crossed the river Spree| and were ready for the final j assault on Berlin. He reported to Moscow from his command post set up in a castle. “When I was getting to the end of my report Stalin suddenly interrupted me and said: ‘But things are still going badly for Zhukov. He is still trying to break through the defences. “Having said that, Stalin was silent. I also remained silent and waited for what was to come. After a short silence Stalin asked: ‘Would it not be possible to transfer Zhukov’s mobile troops and let them through the breach! in that section of your front in the direction of Berlin?’ : “I gave him my opinion:] ‘Comrade Stalin, that would' take up a lot of time and would cause great confusion. There is no need to transfer the armoured forces from the first Belorussian front to the breach we have made. The situation is developing favourably here, we have sufficient forces, and we can turn both our tank, armies in the direction of Berlin.’ “I went on to give the precise direction in which the tank armies would turn and gave as an indication the little town of Zossen, 25 kilometres south of Berlin, which we knew to be the place where the German General Staff had been installed. “‘What kind of map are you referring to?’ Stalin asked. “1 replied that I was using the 200,000 one. After a short pause, during which he was apparently looking for Zossen on his map there in Moscow, Stalin replied: ‘Very good. You know that the German General Staff is in Zossen?’ “I replied: ‘Yes, I know.’ “ ‘Very good,’ Stalin repeated. ‘I agree. Turn your tank armies towards Berlin.’ “And that was the end of our conversation.” Two Major Decisions Koniev also gives two examples of the way in which Stalin took major decisions affecting the course of the war and imposed them on the military leaders. Both concerned relations with the Allies. At the beginning of January, 1945, preparations for the campaign which was to carry the Russian armies from the Vistula to the Oder were more or less complete. Koniev records. “It was January 9. There remained 11 days to the start of the advance. I was called by the acting Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Antonov, who told me that, as a result of the difficult situation that had developed on the Western front in the Ardennes, the Allies had requested us to bring forward the opening of our attack as much as possible. “Antonov said that after receiving the Allies’ request the Supreme Command had reconsidered the date for the opening of the operation. The First Ukrainian Front must begin its advance, not on Jan. 20, but on Jan. 12. Antonov was speaking on behalf of Stalin. “I do not want in retrospect either to exaggerate or to minimise the difficulties which arose for us because of this change of date. By and large everything was ready, and I told Antonov without hesitation that we would be ready by the new date. But the eight days of which we had now been deprived were due to be taken up with the most intensive activity, which now had all to be carried out in the two-and-a half days that remained. To complete the preparations demanded a tremendous concentration of effort by officers at all levels. . . . “In short, those eight days which were taken from us had been extremely necessary. But this important period of time was taken from us in order to help our allies, and... as a front commander I felt myself to be in agreement with the decision Stalin had taken.” Finally Koniev reveals how Stalin came to decide to make

an all-out effort to seize Berlin before the Allies could reach it. The Russians’ successful fulfilment of this aim was decisive for the fate of Germany and the future of Europe. On April 1, 1945, he and Marshal Zhukov were summoned to Moscow. Stalin received them in the Kremlin. “We had scarcely managed to greet him when Stalin fired a question at us: ‘Do you realise the situation that is developing?’ ‘Zhukov and I both replied that the situation was clear to us as far as it was reflected in the information available to us at the fronts. Stalin turned to Shtemenko [Chief of the Main Operational Administration] and said: ‘Read them the telegram.’ “Shtemenko read out a telegram the essence of which i amounted in short to the fol- | lowing: the Anglo-American command was preparing an loperation aimed at capturing Berlin and with the object of capturing it before the Soviet Army. The main grouping was being formed up under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery. The direction of the main thrust was planned to be the north of the Ruhr by the shortest I route between the main grouping of British forces and Berlin. “The telegram listed a whole series of preliminary measures which were being taken by the Allied command: forces were being grouped together and troops brought up. It ended by saying that, according to all the available information, this plan—to take Berlin before the Soviet Army was regarded at Allied headquarters as fully realisable and that preparations for it were going ahead at full speed. “After Shtemenko had I finished reading the telegram, Stalin asked Zhukov jand me: ‘So who’s going to take Berlin then, we or the Allies?' “It so happened that it fell to me to reply to this question first, and 1 replied that we would take Berlin and that we would take it before the Allies did. “ ‘That’s just like you,’ Stalin said with a fleeting smile, and immediately shot another vital question at me: ‘And how will you be able to carry out the necessary regrouping? The main forces are on your southern flank and you will obviously have to carry out a big regrouping.’ “1 replied: ‘Comrade Stalin, you can rest assured that the front will carry out all the necessary measures and the regrouping for launching an attack in the direction of Berlin will be completed in good time.’ “Zhukov gave his reply next. His view was that he was ready for the capture of Berlin. “When he had received both our replies Stalin said: ‘Very well. Then both of you, while you are still here in Moscow at the General Staff, must draw up your plans and as soon as they are ready in a couple of days submit them to the Supreme Command, so as to return to your fronts with your plans already confirmed. . . .’ ” And this is what they did. Ready to Consult What emerges from these four episodes is the clear subordination of the military leaders in the field to the Supreme Command “Stavka.” On the other hand, Stalin no longer appears as the unreasoning dictator but as a leader always ready to consult his executives. It is a more credible picture of the man who appears to have co-ordinated the whole Russian war effort than the one Khrushchev gave. But whether it is the true picture is impossible to assess. Marshal Koniev has not always been as kind to his rival Marshal Zhukov as he is in these passages and he may not be the most objective judge of Stalin’s place in history of the war.