What Guerrilla Warfare Really Means

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30802, 14 July 1965, Page 3

What Guerrilla Warfare Really Means

(.V.Z. Press Association —Copyright'

WELLINGTON, July 13.

The leaders of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam were southerners carefully chosen by the Hanoi Government, but no prominent personality had been prepared to join it, said the White Paper on New Zealand assistance to Vietnam presented to Parliament today by the Prime Minister (Mr Holyoake).

“The nominal leader, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a fellow traveller, even if apparently not a Communist,” said the Paper.

The post of secretary-general from the first was held by Nguyen van Hieu, a leading member of the People’s Revolutionary Party.

The party was formed in 1962 to give the impression of independence of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi, said the Paper.

After recalling the many changes in Government in the republic, the paper says: "The record illustrates the difficulty of building a stable political and constitutional structure.

“Vietnam is traditionally cut across by division of region, religion and party. ‘There are marked differences between the north, the centre and the south Religious divisions are significant “One basic political problem has been the readjustment from the period of Roman Catholic predominance to something reflecting more accurate!}' the balance of religious forces within the country as a whole. As has been shown. Buddhism has been a resurgent force and the organised Buddhist movement has been an important factor.

The Buddhist movement has not, however, represented all those who are nominally Buddhists. It has itself been divided, and its thinking and objectives have been uncertain or developing. The politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, have acquired a new significance." said the paper. The Paper described the nature of the guerrilla wa.—

if the Government forces came in strength, the guerrillas withdrew. If the Government forces stayed, they were attacked from ambushes when circumstances were favourable. When the Government forces withdrew the guerrillas came back and took reprisals on those who had co-operated with them. “It is only understandable that, particularly in country areas where the hold of Government has traditionally been weak, the peasantry should hesitate to attract attention by rallying to active support of the Government. “A few prominent acts of reprisal against collaborators with the Government can be an effective deterrent to cooperation. “The Government has to show that it can give effective—that is, continuous—security to the population. If its hold weakens only briefly, guerrilla forces can strike against those who have exposed themselves. “Brutal” “In this way the Government’s grip on the situation in a particular area can gradually be undermined. If it is, some of the local population will be lead to co-operate with the guerrillas," said the Paper. “This kind of war is by its very nature tough and brutal. It is the economic life of the country and the civilian population itself, as much as the

Government forces, which represent the military objec-| tive of the Viet Cong guer-l rilla: moreover, they cannot; retaliate. “Health officials, administrators. school teachers, local administrators, communications, passenger trains, schools, hospitals. medical clinics, village and town offices, police stations, agricultural research. stations, and so forth have thus been in constant danger. “Persuasion is reinforced with terror: a soldier must expect that reprisals may be made against his family, just as he himself may be attacked without warning by a Viet Cong guerrilla who is operating without a uniform. “In 1963, over 1500 civilians and more than 500 Government officials were murdered by the Viet Cong, over 8000 persons were injured in terrorist attacks and more than 7000 were kidnapped. “In 1964 almost 1800 Government officials, school masters and village leaders were assassinated and some 10,000 kidnapped. In any fighting between forces drawn from within the one population incidents of brutality seem inevitable. But the cold and deliberate use of terror against civilians is not incidental to Viet Cong military tactics: it is in a sense their very essence and their main weapon,” said the Paper. The Paper said that the first weapons used by the Viet Cong were of American or French manufacture, but the

proportion of arms from Com raunist countries had increased.

Recent evidence suggested that the Viet Cong main units were being entirely reequipped with the latest Chinese weapons, which used ammunition that could not be captured in South Vietnam.

“This suggests not simply a future dependence on externa] supplies but confidence in the dependability of the established supply system." said the Paper. In one recent capture in the Camau peninsula 90 per cent of the small arms and all the larger pieces were found to be of Communist bloc origin. , Supply “The notion that a force of the size of the Viet Cong can sustain itself by local capture is quite unrealistic. To build up a force of 165.000 by desertion from the armed Government forces, which even today number only 250.000 and local forces and militia of about equal number, would require rates of desertion and casualties that no Government could possibly sustain. “Small-scale guerrilla operations can be conducted on the basis of captured ammunition. Large-scale operations that are sustained over a period of days, however, require assurances of continued supply, which can only come from a well-developed logistics system.” said the Paper.