The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1965. The Vietnam War

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30802, 14 July 1965, Page 14

The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1965. The Vietnam War

The Communist capitals have finally rejected the Commonwealth peace mission: and President Johnson has declared that the war in Vietnam is going to get worse before it gets better. Realists must therefore reconcile themselves to a hard, bitter war. at least for the two or three months while monsoon weather limits the advantages of air power. Mr Kosygin is right when he says that “ everything “ depends on Hanoi but little can be expected from that direction while spirits in the North Vietnam capital are buoyed by hopes of victory which rest not only on military considerations but on estimations that the United States will falter and ultimately give in. Distaste for the war in Vietnam is proclaimed every day by voices in Western countries (including the United States): and the Communists are hardly to be blamed if they find in these statements signs of a lack of resolution. The United States Administration has repeatedly insisted that it does not intend to get out of Vietnam until the main objective there has been achieved. The Administration's determination has recently been emphasised by heavy reinforcements, deeper probes into North Vietnam for aerial targets, and the engagement of United States troops in. ground operations. 'Military experts in Vietnam believe that in their campaign against the Saigon Government the Viet Cong have followed Mao Tse-tung's “ three-phase ” theory'of guerrilla war. In the first phase they operated in small partisan units with little over-all organisation. Their primary aims seemed to be destruction of security and Government control in the countryside, and seizure of weapons for their own use. Gradually the guerrillas became better trained, better organised, and better equipped, eventually operating in units of 1500 or more, and no longer avoiding open combat —the “ second “ phase ” of operations that coincided with the arrival of monsoon weather. Using sophisticated weapons made in Communist countries, large units of the Viet Cong have raided district capitals in the central highlands. They retained control of at least one when commanders of Government troops decided they had insufficient reinforcements to reclaim the town. During the monsoon the loss of such places is inevitable, and their recovery unlikely. General Westmoreland, the American commander, says he is not going to risk the casualties that would be involved in trying to send relief columns up ambush-infested jungle roads every time an outpost falls. Of many daring raids by small units, the most dramatic was the attack on Da Nang air base, where, despite the presence of 9500 American marines, the Viet Cong caused an estimated damage of five million dollars to aeroplanes and property. The next and final stage of Mao’s three-phase theory would involve' full-division operations, requiring artillery, road transport and all the other heavy equipment of a modern army. This would involve the whole North Vietnam army, and probably Chinese “ volunteers

The American Administration’s aim has been to prevent the struggle from entering the third stage, which would probably “ escalate ” the war to Korean scale. The American policy has been to combine a “ holding action ’’ against the Viet Cong’s secondphase offensive with air attacks on North Vietnam in hopes of persuading the Communists that it would be worth while to seek a settlement. The “ search “ and destroy ” operations by Americans, Vietnamese. and Australians in what is known as “Zone “ D ” are a critical part of the “ holding action ”, for the heavily-jungled Zone D area is well suited to the building up of Communist offensive forces. The Viet Cong have been able to slip away from the searching forces through jungle routes and through natural caves and tunnels constructed at the time of the French colonial war in Indo-China. Dumps of food —there were 200 tons of rice in one—and medicines have demonstrated the importance of Zone D as a Communist warehouse.

The immediate future may see some large-scale efforts to capture American bases before the Americans become too strong. The Viet Cong’s ability to do this must be doubted. When the monsoon ends they will probably occupy considerably more territory than at its beginning; but while extending their hold over the countryside, the Viet Cong must know that the Americans are building airfields, roads, and harbours able to handle far more American troops than are in the country now. At this time Hanoi and Peking will be able to calculate what a “ third “ phase ” war is likely to cost a side using more substantial—and therefore more vulnerable units—against opponents possessing overwhelming air strength. For the time being, however, there are two factors of major significance in the Vietnam war. One is the effort by the South Vietnamese and their allies to contain the Viet Cong in conditions that favour the latter. The other is the build-up of American forces to a demonstration of impressive power. Berlin, Korea, and Cuba have demonstrated that power can persuade Communists to review their aggressive policies.