PERSPECTIVE: II CRUCIAL FACTORS INFLUENCE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30769, 5 June 1965, Page 14

PERSPECTIVE: II CRUCIAL FACTORS INFLUENCE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

By

COLONEL HARVEY C. BROWN,

United States Air Force. Retired !

In the Vietnam struggle, so pregnant with early possibilities of escalation and geographic spread, there are several factors which have a significant bearing on any analysis of the subject.

One. is the degree and extent of United States determination to confront communism on the mainland of Asia. While not yet as dramatic as Cuba, the confrontation has indeed already begun. President Johnson has exercised an admirable combination of caution and action. of patience' and response, but constant throughout the developments extending over weeks and months has been an unwavering determination to confront and to contain. Weapons Superiority Second, is recent technological weapons development and the manner of application that are being brought to bear on the problem. The Communists dislike the implications of this—they consider it unfair to their organised subversion—and it is interesting to observe the amount of their propaganda directed against these implications over the last 60 to 90 days. The technique is as old as warfare and. simply stated, is the exploitation of technical weapons superiority. The United States would defend where it is relatively weak and attack where it is relatively strong. Specific weapons employment would be dictated by requirements. The United States has shown itself to be sensitive to world opinion in the matter of nonlethal gases, which have been discontinued, but apparently is reserving the right to use whatever weapons it believes essential to achieve its objec-

I fives. One should remember, i that the whole family of | ground-to-ground guided mis-1 ! siles have yet to be employed I at this time of writing. As far as we know, only air-to-ground missiles have been used to any appreciable extent. The effectiveness of these later weapons has been! impressive. The enemy use of ground-to-air missiles I against air attack is indicated, but there are operational counter-measures that can neutralise these in the present “state of the art." Intelligence Third, and as a corollary to the above, is the improved effectiveness of intelligence techniques which have reached a degree of technical sophistication hitherto unknown. One of the most significant precedents of the post-war era was President Eisenhower's decision to employ the U-2 photographic reconnaissance aircraft as an offset to the massive Soviet agent programme against the United States—a novel technical ef-

fort that yielded extraordinary returns. This was a clear example of exploiting one effective technique that achieved surprise and shock value. In the Vietnamese war the reader can surmise for hiinself what scope there is for obtaining the most valuable current information through systematic coverage of areas indicated to reflect eneiry activity, to say nothing of the target information to be acted upon. When this vital source of intelligence is combined with other equally sophisticated techniques, and the interrogations of a few high level Viet Cong defectors are stirred into the mix, a significant result occurs. The enemy demoralisation stemming from this type of programme as it intensifies is profound, and the cumulative effect is incalculable.

Fourth, is the Chinese obstruction to Soviet military assistance for North Vietnam. This development could be of great longer-term significance, whether or not the obstruction is constant. The fact that it occurred at all is of great interest and reflects the strains and tensions created by perhaps unforeseen events. And fifth, is the grave consequences of a potential misstep on the part of the Com-

. munists as they learn to cope 'with the measured response. One type of mis-step could be | encouraged by the monsoon ; or rainy season which many , observers believe will herald | greatly increased Communist activity. There are some (grounds for estimating that this period of seasonal advanjtage is Ho Chi Minh's best and only chance. This weather period begins in earnest during the early part of June and continues through September, leaving the terrain a quagmire and severely restricting air operations. There is one virtual certainty that can be depended upon by friend and foe alike, and that is that crucial United States policy decisions affecting the war in Vietnam are being made and will be made by the President, with his close Cabinet advisers and with National Security Council assistance. These decisions will not be made by Senators Morse and Gruening or bv university intellectuals, with or without petitions. As an

accurate blueprint for the future the following words of the President are a reliable gauge: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. Wc know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all our purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace. We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as w’ell as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist. I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending. Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

The threat, real and constant, therefore, is the danger of miscalculation, both tactical and strategic, on the part of the Communists as the internal pressures and tensions mount resultirg from progressive military involvement. (A third article will reflect on the longer view.)