MONDAY, MAY 3,1965. France and S.E.A.T.O.

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30740, 3 May 1965, Page 12

MONDAY, MAY 3,1965. France and S.E.A.T.O.

The French decision to take no part in the Ministerial council meeting of the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation (S.E-A.T.0.) in London underlines President de Gaulle’s growing estrangement from United States policy in both Europe and Asia. Differences over Asia were evident at last year’s S.E.A.T.O. council meeting at Manila, when the French Foreign Minister, Mr Couve de Murville, in pressing President de Gaulle’s concept of neutralisation of South-east Asia, outraged his fellow-delegates, who wanted to know what a charter member of S.EA.T.O. was doing proposing a neutrality deal with Peking. Mr de Murville pursued an argument which seemed to be designed to reduce the status of 5.E.A.T.0., and finally refused to accept that part of the final communique dealing with Vietnam. The French have since retreated still further from S.E.A.T.O. policy, a major purpose of which is to deter Communist China and North Vietnam from overt aggression or subversion against their neighbours.

At Manila one country after another—the United States, Britain, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand —firmly opposed President de Gaulle’s concept on the ground that it would bring not a compromise solution but an eventual surrender to the Communist side. However, Mr de Murville’s demands on his colleagues “ to do away “ with myths, to eliminate ambiguities and squarely “ face realities ”, provoked a close examination of 5.E.A.T.0., which indisputably has some “ myths ” associated with it. S.E.A.T.O. is not truly an organisation of South-east Asian nations. Only Thailand and the Philippines are in that category. Malaysia has chosen to stay outside, even though a main base used by at least three S.E.A.T.O. countries in the area is on Malaysian soil. Since it was formed 11 years ago in the troubled days after the defeat of France in Indo-China, S.E.A.T.O.’s support and tasks have changed. At Manila, the Thailand Foreign Minister asked whether the organisation’s vitality had “ waned “to vanishing point ”, On the other hand, the realities of power—chiefly the United States military power which the alliance connotes—have made Asian Communists view the alliance as a serious impediment to their expansionist ambitions, an impediment strengthened by S.E.A.T.O.’s recognition (expressed in last year’s communique) that the reply to the Communist challenge in the region must be as much political, economic, and social as military. France has reserved its position about leaving S.E.A.T.O. altogether. As for the military situation in the area, France’s refusal to co-operate would make no practical difference. But in the political field France’s abstention might have important effects. The loss of France’s advice on the problems of the S.E.A.T.O. area would be regrettable: Vietnam, though of great importance, is not the only question the Ministerial council will consider. More significant might be the influence on Asian nations if a European Power showed its dissatisfaction with S.E.A.T.O. by withdrawing. President de Gaulle may be playing for high stakes. Already France is on a more intimate footing with Peking than any other Western Power. Is S.E.A.T.O. to be used as a means to the end of elevating President de Gaulle to the role of mediator between East and West in Asia?

It is a pity that New Zealand’s support for S.E.A.T.O. will not be demonstrated, as that of other members will be, by representation at the highest diplomatic level. It would surely have been advantageous for New Zealand’s Minister of External Affairs to have first-hand contacts with other Ministers interested in New Zealand’s own defence region—especially the new British Foreign Secretary, Mr Stewart.