EDEN MEMOIRS IX IN WASHINGTON EDEN FINDS THE PRESIDENT PERPLEXING

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30715, 2 April 1965, Page 12

EDEN MEMOIRS IX IN WASHINGTON EDEN FINDS THE PRESIDENT PERPLEXING

[By

ANTHONY EDEN,

now the Sori of Avon)

I arrived in Washington on the evening of March 12 (1943). My first meeting with President Roosevelt was at dinner on March 13. While the talk was general, I gained the impression as I think I was meant to do, that the President intended to do all he could to keep the United States in the forefront after the war.

Unquestionably Roosevelt had the power, for he was head of a mighty country which was coming out into the arena. He would be able to alter the whole pattern of its policy, guiding it from isolation to an active part in world affairs.

My next conversation, with Mr Cordell Hull two days later, was less encouraging about where we might be led. We talked for two hours, with the emphasis on French problems. The Secretary of State persisted in his dislike of General de Gaulle and showed scant sympathy for the Free French.

Most of my numerous talks with American officials on French affairs were, however, concerned with the future, and here I already found our policies at odds with those of the United States. The Americans did not want to see a sole French authority established, even if it were not recognised as a government. They preferred to deal with individuals and were content to see General Giraud and General de Gaulle fall apart. Separate Authorities They also wanted to act separately with the local French in the Pacific Islands and in Martinique. I wondered whether this was connected with the desire which the President had expressed to me to place some of the Pacific Islands under international control.

This dispersion of authority was contrary to my doctrine and I explained in all our conversations that the British Government would much prefer to deal with a single French authority, even if we did not regard it as a government in quite the same sense as the other European Governments in exile.

Nor could 1 agree to another American project, that Allied forces landing in France should administer liberated French territory. It seemed to me that Roosevelt wanted to hold the strings of France’s future in his own hands so that he could decide the country’s fate. I did not like this and preferred a French civil authority to work with the Allied forces from an early stage.

On the night of my talk with Hull I dined alone with the President and Harry Hopkins (special assistant to the President). Mr Roosevelt expatiated happily to me about his views on European problems. He thought that after the war armaments in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller Powers should

have nothing more dangerous than rifles.

He seemed to be ignoring the obvious difficulty of disarming neutral countries, but I did not take the idea as a serious proposal and it passed with little comment. Though I enjoyed these conversations, the exercise of the President's charm and the play of his lively mind, they were also perplexing.

Roosevelt was familiar with the history and geography of Europe. Perhaps his hobby of stamp-collecting had helped him to this knowledge, but the academic yet sweeping opinions which he built upon it were alarming in their cheerful fecklessness. Like A Conjuror He seemed to see himself disposing of the fate of so many lands, allied no less than enemy. He did all this with so much grace that it was not easy to dissent. Yet it was too like a conjuror, skilfully juggling with balls of dynamite, whose nature he failed to understand. One evening the President said to me: “Anthony, you’ll have to make a speech to us before you go home.” I judged this an opportunity to express some of my ideas about the post-war world: “If there is one lesson we should have learnt from the distresses of those years (between the wars), it is surely this: that we cannot shut our windows and draw our curtains, and be careless of what is happening next door or on the other side of the street.

. . . We cannot have prosperity in one country and misery in its neighbour, peace in one hemisphere and war in the other. . . .

“And one thing, I am sure, is above all essential. Never again must the civilised world be ready to tolerate unilateral infraction of treaties. For that would be to sap the whole foundation of the secure international life, which it is our principal purpose to restore.”

Unfortunately, these hopes have once again been disappointed, more sharply this time than in the first years of the League of Nations. The United Nations applies two standards, with consequent loss of respect, being indulgent with newly emerged dictatorships and stern with European democracies which were once colonial Powers.

So are new tyrannies fostered while the peoples of formerly rich territories, as in Indonesia, suffer impoverishment that their ruler may buy arms and the Papuans are bereft by the United Nations of an old tolerance and subjected to a new despotism. Of course, this and comparable events will have consequences. Views Summarised

Eden summarised some of Roosevelt’s views in a telegram to Churchill:— “In the Far East the policy is to be ‘Japan for the Japanese.’ Manchuria and Formosa would be returned to China and southern Sakhalin to Russia. The Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific would pass under the trusteeship of the United Nations. “All other Pacific islands, with the exception of the two groups mentioned below, would remain under their present sovereignty British, French or whatnot, but would have a common economic policy, such as is to be set up in the West Indies. “The French Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands would nass to the United Nations, for use respectively as stages on the northern and southern air routes across the Pacific from Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand. “Korea and French IndoChina would pass under international trusteeship; for the former the trustees might he the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Timor was most important for Australia and would also have to be dealt with. . . .’*

During these weeks I had also some discussions, principally with Harry Hopkins, about progress with the atom bomb. I was conscious of the effect these developments might have on the course of a foreign policy and the power of nations; and they formed, of course, a frequent topic of conversation between the Prime Minister and myself. The Prime Minister and the President sent a message to Stalin setting out the conclusions of their conference (in May, 1943], including the decision to launch an all-out invasion of the Continent in the spring of 1944. Inevitably, Stalin took the news of the further postponement of the second front badly. His messages during June reached such a pitch of acrimony that for several weeks Mr Churchill dropped all personal correspondence with him. Mussolini Resigns “July 25: Winston rang up about 11.30 p.m. to announce the great news that Musso had resigned. After some jubilation and reminiscence, we discussed next moves. “W. made it plain that he wanted to treat with King and Badoglio [the new Prime Minister] I said I thought it likely this Government would not last. Certainly it would not be able to make Italians fight.”

The new Italian Government lost little time in deciding to make contact with the Allies while still trying to avoid an open breach with the Germans. This involved intricate and sometimes burlesque exchanges, with much toing and froing of envoys, crossing and double-crossing Tangier and Sicily, but all ending up on September 3 on terms which were sensible rather than drastic. This was the date of the AngloCanadian landing on the Italian mainland.

Much of September was spent in arguing where the conference (of British. American and Russian Foreign 'Ministers) was to be held. Mr Churchill and 1 strongly pressed the claims of London. The Russians, as usual, were reluctant to leave their own soil, even though Stalin was not going to take part. “September 10: Felt depressed and not very well all day, partly, I think, because of exasperating difficulty of trying to do business with Winston over Atlantic. Two telephone calls during the day. Roosevelt has had his way again and agreed to Moscow for the Foreign ! Secretaries’ conference with | alacrity. I “His determination not to agree to a London meeting for any purpose, which he says is for electoral reasons, is almost insulting considering the number of times we have been to Washington. “I am most anxious for good relations with the U.S. but I don’t like subservience to them and 1 am sure that ■this only lays up trouble for us in the future. We are giving the impression, which they are only too ready by nature to endorse, that militarily all the achievements are theirs; and W., by prolonging his stay in Washington, strengthens that impression.” In Teheran

On arrival in Teheran (on October 16) I received a telegram from the Prime Minister about the Arctic convoys to Russia. On October 1, in response to a Russian request for their resumption, Mr Churchill had informed Stalin that we planned to send four convoys to North Russia between November and February. He had, however, given a warning that this was not a contract to be fulfilled whatever the circumstances, and had also set out a list of complaints about the difficulties made by the Russians over the treatment of our sailors and arrangements for their relief.

After nearly a fortnight Stalin sent an offensive reply. On October 18 the Prime Minister saw the new Soviet Ambassador in London. Mr Feodor Gusev, and handed Stalin's message back to him, using the correct diplomatic phrase for that action. Once or twice in conversation over the years, Mr Churchill had asked me if I had even used the expression “nul et non avenu” [null and non-acceptable] in handing back a document from a foreign embassy, I said never. On this occasion the message should not have been sent, so the words were apt, though their significance was no doubt lost on Mr Gusev, who had little English and no French. However, the Ambassador understood quite enough to know that he was outside the door with the pecant document back in his pocket, as I was soon to learn in Moscow. (To be Continued) Copyright 1965 The Times Publishing Company. Ltd. All rights reserved by Opera Mundi Paris in all countries except Great Britain. Reproduction in whole or ' n P art strictly prohibited.

President Roosevelt sent a message to Anthony Eden on January 4. 1943, saying that he looked forward to seeing him soon. Winston Churchill suggested an early visit, and the President agreed. However. Churchill fell ill and Eden had to remain at the Foreign Office until the Prime Minister was well enough to take charge In his absence. Thus it was March before Eden was able to visit the President