The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1964. In Mr Khrushchev’s Shoes

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30593, 9 November 1964, Page 12

The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1964. In Mr Khrushchev’s Shoes

All reports from the Communist world (and from the Communist parties in most other countries) suggest that the deposition of Mr Khrushchev has not proceeded as smoothly as his successors expected. They have been left in little doubt that both inside Russia and outside Mr Khrushchev enjoyed strong support and much affection. If they wish to retain power they, too, must follow substantially the course he had set for his country. Though he had not been able to deliver the plenty he had promised his people (he might still be in the Kremlin if he had), he had opened their eyes to the rewards they might receive for two generations of loyal sacrifice. That is a political fact that cannot be ignored by the new rulers. They have already recognised it by modifying their plans for denouncing Mr Khrushchev publicly and seem content with circulating a “ dossier ” in the party organisation. Even in a totalitarian State public opinion can evidently be influential, particularly after a decade in which the people have become accustomed to being informed, if not consulted, about Government decisions.

The Russian people also have a vital interest in the basic tenet of Mr Khrushchev’s foreign policy, his recognition that Russia could not afford to engage the United States in a nuclear war. He had promised them peace as well as plenty. In this, again, Communist reaction in Eastern Europe as well as in Russia has shown the new regime that it has little room for retreat. They may be more cautious in their dealings with Western Powers; but they can hardly reverse a process in which they had co-operated, unwillingly, perhaps, in some cases, and never with quite Mr Khrushchev’s conviction. But most of them have not had the experience of seeing at first hand, as Mr Khrushchev did, the vast resources, moral as well as material, and the fundamental good will of the United States. His tour in 1959 was probably for him the turning point. If Mr Brezhnev, or whoever happens to hold the reins, could make a similar visit much good might result. No doubt, for a time, while they try to consolidate their political grip and survey the facts of world politics, the men of the collective leadership will be cool towards the United States and Western Europe. Certainly they are unlikely to follow immediately Mr Khrushchev’s plan to improve relations with West Germany. But Western Governments can afford to be patient in waiting for the new men to settle down, in the reasonable expectation that the logic of Mr Khrushchev’s policy of reconciliation will ensure its acceptance.

Where the Mikoyan group finally broke with Mr Khrushchev was on his readiness to accept a final breach with China. That would have been an irrevocable decision towards ultimate friendship with the West that they were not prepared to take yet. Their minimum aim must now be to reach an amicable agreement to disagree with China. How much further they can go will depend greatly on the settlement of frontier disputes, particularly in Sinkiang. The steady drift of Kazakh refugees across the border to Russia has angered the Chinese, who demand the return of their citizens. If that dispute can be settled, however, others along the many miles of frontier will arise. The Peking Government wiR also want the cessation of Russian military supplies to India; and that will call for a difficult decision in Moscow. The new Russian Government is better placed to alter course in Asia than it is at home or in Europe, because most Communist parties, though objecting to China’s policies, do want to avoid the final collapse of their alliance. But in the long run it is hard to see how Russia can avoid the pressure of events that swings it towards renewal of its ancient ties with Europe.