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VOYAGER INQUIRY Helicopters Fly Commission To Sea Manoeuvres

(N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) SYDNEY, May 19. The Voyager Royal Commissioner, Mr Justice Spicer, and counsel appearing before the commission, will go to sea tonight in the aircraft-carrier, H.M.A.S. Melbourne. They will observe manoeuvres in the Melbourne off Jervis Bay, the area in which the carrier came into collision with the destroyer, H.MA.S. Voyager, on February 10.

Mr Justice Spicer announced when the Royal Commission resumed today that two Navy passenger helicopters would take legal men to the carrier tonight. The helicopters would leave Sydney airport at .5 p.m. and fly to the Melbourne at sea. They would return to Sydney at 11.30 p.m. Mr Justice Spicer is inquiring into the cause of the collision in which the Voyager sank with the loss of 82 lives.

Mr L. Street (for the interests of-the late Captain D. Stevens, captain of the Voyager) then continued his cross-examina-tion of Captain R. J. Robertson. Melbourne’s captain, who was spending his fifth day in the witness box.

Captain Robertson said on a Daring class destroyer the only position from which anyone on the bridge could observe directly astern was oh the aft part of the bridge. He said during manoeuvres similar to those being carried out by Voyager and Melbourne on February 10, if he was in charge of a destroyer, he would go where he could watch the carrier. If an officer went to the after part of the bridge to watch astern he would be seven to eight yards from the compass pelorus, Captain Robertson said.

An iron partition separated the officer from the pelorus. From part of the bridge the officer would not be able to see the radar,, and if the destroyer was travelling at about 20 knots, he would have to shout to be heard by anybody on the forward part of the bridge. He said the navigational instruments in front of the captain’s chair would be visible from the after section of the bridge, but the. officer would not be able to read them.

Anything coming over the

•tactical primary circuit loudspeaker and the operations room loudspeaker would probably not be heard. When asked • if he would be able to pass orders from that section of the wheelhouse; Captain Robertson said when he had command of Vendetta the lead on the

microphone to the wheelhouse reached to the after section of the bridge. He said he normally conned Vendetta from there when docking, but he did not know if the same applied with Voyager. He agreed that in some types of exercises the Captain would probably not be on the bridge, and could be expected to be found in the operations room. “Quite Proper”

The captain said he considered the manoeuvres being carried out on the night of February 10 were quite proper considering the state of training and working up of the ships and two crews. Captain Robertson told Mr Street that it would be easy for an experienced officer to stay on station with a carrier on a turn together through 190 degrees. It would be a difficult manoeuvre for a young officer doing his first time on the bridge, he said. Mr Street: Assuming you have a lieutenant officer-of-the-watch who has been a lieutenant since August, 1958, and has held a watch-

keeping certificate since December,. 1958, would you describe that-type- of officer as an experienced officer of the watch?—Yes. Qualified

Answering a question by Mr Justice Spicer, Captain Robertson said he considered both Lieutenant Price, the officer of the watch on Voyager at the time of the collision, and Lieutenant Cook, the navigating officer, were qualified to carry out the manoeuvres undertaken that night. Mr Street: Normally when a ship is manoeuvring such aS Voyager, if the officer-of-the-watch has the con and if the navigating officer is on the bridge during that time, what ' would he be doing?— Firstly, he would be keeping a plot of the ship’s position. Secondly he would be keeping in touch with what is going on to be able to give advice if asked, or extend advice if necessary. Captain Robertson said the captain could take over command of his ship from the officer-of-the-watch at . any time he desired. Ship’s Safety Captain Robertson told Mr Street the safety of the ship was the responsibility of the officer-of-the-watch. Mr Street then questioned the captain about his theories on the cause of the collision. Asked whether he would have expected Captain Stevens to request permission to go across Melbourne’s bows, Captain Robertson said this was “very much a personal matter.” He said he did not know Captain Stevens well enough at sea to know whether it was his practice to make such a request. Station Speed

Captain Robertson said he would expect a destroyer shifting station .and using any method to do so, to increase speed to the “stationing speed” which at the time was 25 knots.' It would have been “almost indispensable” to have increased speed in the circumstances. . ■

Captain Robertson told Mr C. L. D. Meares, Q.C. (for the relatives of the late Lieutenant Price), that he had had experience of similar manoeuvres while in command of H.M.A.S. Vendetta.

He also had had experience of these manoeuvres while he' was executive officer of H.M.A.S. Sydney and also when he was signals officer for the destroyer -squadron in 1941 and 1942 while he was on H.M.A.S. Napier. He had. also had experience during 1944 and 1945. Captain Robertson said that he Could not remember how long he was on the wing of Melbourne watching Voyager manoeuvre, on the night of the collision. Observation Captain Robertson said that with his experience of destroyers he would not have moved to a position where he could ■ not keep the carrier under observation. Referring Captain Robertson to his last sketch of the courses of Melbourne and Voyager, up to the time of the collision, Mr Meares asked Captain Robertson if the turn to port three minutes before the collision indicated an intention by Voyager to cross Melbourne’s bows. Captain Robertson replied that it would not. Why not?—lf Voyager had the intention from minus three ■ minutes to go across Melbourne’s bow I would expect her to come around to the same course as Melbourne to continue on about 10 degrees to Melbourne, and increase her speed until some time that would take her across Melbourne’s bow and then increase her turnto come around on station.' Different Curve Mr Meares: With a slightly different curve or more speed Voyager would have got across the bows? —Yes. If the turn was slightly different . or the speed was slightly more'it would be possible for Voyager to get across the bow, but I do not agree it is consistent with- an ntention by Voyager to go icross the bow. Suppose it was the inten‘ion to cross the bow. That, vould be a decision to be taken by the captain?—Yes. Or at least, he would agree with it.

I j It would be a decision that was somewhat extraordinary? i —ln these circumstances, yes. I On this night, from what . I you observed, it would be an extraordinary decision for the captain of the Voyager to ' cross your bow? —If you go iback to the time the flying i course signal was made, 8.54 p.m., at that moment I would I say it was not advisable for Voyager to go across MelI i bourne’s bows, but quite possible for her to- do it. It could be done safely by not getting closer than five 'or six cables from Melbourne. 1 Would it be an unusual i manoeuvre in your opinion? 11 —I would not have expected i it. I He said if the circum-

stances that prevailed, from his observations that night, were experienced in the daytime, he would keep a watch until his ship was on station. Mr Meares then asked if he regarded two cables as a comfortable safety margin. “I would not go as close as that to a carrier. You choose at least six or seven cables or more,” Captain Robertson said. Inhibition An experienced destroyer captain would be' inhibited even in daytime to take a decision to turn across a bow?—Certainly.. Captain Robertson said that at night it was difficult to judge distance or inclination of other ships. At night time he should be even more inhibited from deciding to turn • across a bow. He would not say it would be incomprehensible for a man of Captain Stevens’s experience to take that decision. It was unlikely. If he decided to do that'it would be his decision, but he did not consider that as a possible theory. Mr Meares then questioned Captain Robertson about theories he advanced to the commission as possible reasons the collision took place. Position Resumed Captain Robertson’s first theory was that when the flying course signal was given, Voyager had immediately turned to starboard to execute that order, but after some discussion on the bridge had turned back to port to take up its previous position on the carrier. Captain Robertson told Mr Meares that this theory (his first) was not his, originally, but was one that had been discussed over the last few months, and he had dismissed it. Second Theory Questioned about his second theory, Captain Robertson said it would not have been safe for the destroyer to alter- course either way unless she was satisfied Melbourne was on course 020. He agreed that -.this theory involved some. discussion on the bridge of Voyager after the destroyer had turned to starboard, which resulted in Voyager turning back to port. ■ .. . He assumed that someone on the destroyer’s bridge had said: “Isn't that rather a silly thing to do, as our station is to port?” The destroyer had . then come around to go back to port.

He agreed that this decision would have been made by Captain Stevens ■or by Voyager’s officer of the watch with the approval of the captain. Captain’s Approval Mr' Meares: Do you irnag-. ine for a moment that an officer of Captain Stevens’s experience would have • given that order or approved of it unless he was quite satisfied it was a safe turn?—l would not have thought so. Captain Robertson said that he would have checked the carrier's position himself had. it been his decision. Mr Meares: Assuming this incomprehensible order was made, would not you think that the captain would have been watching Melbourne like a lynx?—l would, myself. Side Mistaken Captain Robertson agreed that this theory involved those on the bridge, of Voyager thinking the destroyer was on Melbourne’s port bow, when she was in fact on the carrier’s starboard bow. One reason- he thought that this theory held water was that Lieutenant Price was looking through his binoculars at Melbourne. Captain Robertson said if the officers on Voyager’s bridge thought that Melbourne was on a course of 270, it would take them some time to find out that she was not, and was on a course of 020. •If Voyager thought Melbourne was on 270, in some way it would involve a mistaken interpretation of his orders. Misinterpretation He said that the theory put forward by Mr Meares could be put to what Mr Meares had described as a “universal aberration” by the officers on Voyager’s bridge. I suggest the cause of the collision was substantially a misinterpretation of your order?—No. That would be a cause?— A possible cause. What others?—lncorrect observations from Voyager’s bridge. This theory requires a degree of mental aberration on the part of those on the bridge of Voyager that is incomprehensible? ■ No, it doesn’t. Very Easy Captain Robertson said it was “a very easy thing to do” to look mistakenly at the! carrier from Voyager and not, incomprehensible. During the turn by Melbourne and Voyager it was the responsibility of Melbourne’s officer of the watch to glance every now and!

then at the destroyer, he added.

Voyager’s officer of the watch had similar duties to look at . the carrier. In executing a turn, Captain Robertson said, the Voyager’s officer of the watch would have greater responsibilities than those of the officer on the carrier, as he had to keep his ship in station on the larger vessel. Constant Lookout He would have expected Voyager’s officer of the wateh to have been looking at Melbourne “more or less all the time.” . Captain Robertson, being re-examined by his counsel, Mr D. Hicks, said that, if Voyager had turned to port without him signalling the turn, he would have asked what she was doing. He told Mr Justice Spicer that having seen her turn to starboard and then to port, he would not have made any signal to her because, he thought the turn to port was consistent with the orders he had given. Merchant Ship However, if the turn had been made by a merchant ship in front of him, it would have made a “tremendous difference” to his actions. “Voyager was in company with us and under my tactical command, and was carrying out orders I made,” Captain Robertson said.

“If it was a merchant ship near the carrier, one would not know where he was going or what he was going to do. “Besides, I would never get a carrier anywhere near as close to a merchant ship as Voyager was on that occasion.”

Picking Oysters. Marine Department rock oyster pickers will begin collecting . today at Kaipara, Hauraki Gulf, Coromandel, Whangarei, and the Bay of Islands. Officials expect about 3000 sacks, the same quantity as last season. —(P.A.)

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19640520.2.59

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30445, 20 May 1964, Page 5

Word Count
2,265

VOYAGER INQUIRY Helicopters Fly Commission To Sea Manoeuvres Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30445, 20 May 1964, Page 5

VOYAGER INQUIRY Helicopters Fly Commission To Sea Manoeuvres Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30445, 20 May 1964, Page 5