Carrier Officer Attested To Report He Had Not Seen

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30399, 25 March 1964, Page 17

Carrier Officer Attested To Report He Had Not Seen

(N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) SYDNEY, March 24. The first watch-keeping officer of the aircraft-carrier H.M.A.S. Melbourne said today that he had signed as correct a detailed account of the Voyager disaster without seeing the account. The officer, Sub-Lieutenant James Alexander Bate, told the Royal Commission investigating the sinking of the destroyer H.M.A.S. Voyager that he had received a message from the Admiral’s secretary to sign a form referring to the account.

Bate said he had thought the account that would be sent to the Naval Board—with the form concerning which he signed—was a report dictated on the bridge of the Melbourne on the morning after the collision, by the commander of the Melbourne, Captain R. J. Robertson.

Bate how he was so sure, and Bate said he had been pre" < occupied with plotting her course, and making sure she i was on course. “I maintained 1 a close watch on time and : speed after she gained her ; course,” he said. He said he could not remember what the speed had been when the flying course was given, but said it would ; have dropped, during the : turn, to something less than the original speed of 21J ' knots. In his opinion, there 1 was a margin of error of : three knots when the speed ’ indicator showed 211 knots. Speed In Turn Bate said the Melbourne had been in a turn four minutes before the collision and he would not expect the carrier’s speed, at that stage, to have been lower than 18 or 19 knots. When the carrier got out of the turn, and' steadied on course, she would have picked up speed, but it would have been three or four minutes before full speed was regained. He agreed that to the Voyager, which had to give right of way to the Melbourne, the carrier’s speed was important. He agreed that had he been officer of the watch in the destroyer, he would have taken into account the carrier’s speed, had he intended to go under her stern. Mr Smyth: Suppose you were told the carrier was steaming at 22 knots, and she was, in fact, steaming at. 18 knots—that would throw your calculations out, wouldn’t it? Bate: Yes, sir, to a limited degree. Four knots is 400 feet a minute?—Yes, sir. That would be 800 feet in two minutes? —Yes, sir. The carrier is a little more than 700 feet long?—Yes, sir. And that would make all the difference in going under her bow or under her stern? —lf it was a fact, yes, sir. Captain’s Remark Bate agreed he had said in his statement that Captain Robertson had remarked that Voyager had altered course to starboard. He had not seen the destroyer do this himself. He had heard Captain Robertson say to Commander Kelly: “What is Voyager doing turning to starboard?” i Commander Kelly had rei marked that she was possibly I taking up her plane guard i position. Bate said his own . opinion was that he would ; have expected Voyager to > turn to starboard, and, then, possibly to turn hard to port. He had expected the Voyager to go astern of the carrier. It had been one of his dui ties, as officer of the watch, i to take into consideration the ■ position of other ships, Bate ; said. He had been on the i port side bf the bridge look- > ing for merchant ships until just before the collision. • Mr Smyth: You would t know, from your radar, that ! the closest one was eight miles r away? Bate: Yes, Sir. s Yet you had Voyager on t the starboard side, very close, s and you did not look?—Yes, r Sir.

Mr L. W. Street, Q.C. (for t the late Captain D. H. j Stevens, commander of the Voyager) told Bate the report he signed specifically stated it superseded an interim report which had been I dictated on the bridge. i Bate agreed that he was s comparatively inexperienced < in watch keeping on t the night of the collision < with the Voyager and that l one of his duties was to see s his ship did not come into 1 collision with any other. I Questioned by Mr J. W. < Smyth, Q.C. (assisting the s Royal Commissioner) Bate said he had been officer of : the watch aboard the Mel- < bourne when the collision < occurred. ; 1 Possibly First ] After repeated questioning, , Bate agreed that the night of ; February 10 might have been the first when he had been ■ first officer of the watch with . a destroyer in “plane guard” station. i The night had been clear and dark and the Voyager ' had been in “plane -guard” station on the port quarter, 1500 yards away. About 8.35 it had been decided to turn both ships together to starboard on course 020 to seek wind suitable for flying. This order had been passed to the Voyager and at 8.45 p.m. both ships had turned to starboard. On gaining this course a further turn to 060 had been ordered for both vessels. Bate said that at this turn the Voyager had been slightly out of station in range and bearing. The range had been 1750 yards instead of 1500 yards, and the bearing five degrees out but the Voyager had quickly returned to station. Mr Smyth told Bate the tactical operator’s log recorded that the order to turn to course 020 had been given at seven minutes to nine and the ship’s log showed it as eight minutes to nine. Bate said the tactical operator’s log would be approximate time. Earlier Statement [ He agreed he had said in 1 an earlier statement that it • would have taken two or j three minutes from receiving 1 the order to execute a turn ’ until the Melbourne was ‘ steady on course. ; Mr Smyth said that if the 5 order had been given at r seven minutes to nine she ’ could not have been steady 5 on course until four minutes • to nine, and Bate said that was possible. (Four minutes ' to nine is the time given for 5 the collision.) ■ Bate told Mr Smyth he ! would have expected the • Melbourne to be steady on • course by the time she sent ■ the flying course order. “She » was steady on course,” he added. The Royal Commis- • sioner (Mr Justice Spicer) 5 pointed out to Bate that ® according to the log the 8 Melbourne had been on 1 course only one or two 8 minutes after the order 8 was given, and Bate agreed. Mr Justice Spicer asked

After Commander Kelly’s exclamation, he had seen the Voyager’s port light appear and become more brilliant. He could not see at once that if she continued she was on a collision course. He had had no idea, at that stage, what was happening. In a supplementary statement he (Bate) had said be and the navigation officer rushed to the radar screen. He had seen the Voyager was at a distance of three cables (600 yards) and had realised that if something were not done quickly there would be a collision. There had been a siren on the bridge about eight feet from the radar. It had looked to him as though something was radically wrong with the Voyager.

Bate said he had said in his statement: “Approximately half a minute before the collision the fleet navigation officer, Commander Kelly, in a loud, startled voice said: ‘What the hell is Voyager doing?’ ” At this stage, Bate said, he had been still looking for merchant ships on the port side. He had looked round and could see the red light above the Voyager’s “blurred superstructure,” about 700 yards away/

Asked if it had not occured to him to see that someone sounded the siren, Bate said, at that stage, he had been making engine orders. The tactical operator had been standing nearby with a telephone and could have communicated with the Voyager immediately. No Call To Voyager Bate said it had not occured to him to tell the tactical operator to put a call through to the Voyager. It would not necessarily have been the prudent thing to do. A dangerous situation had developed, Bate said. He believed that if the Voyager had been steaming at 20 knots it would have taken less than a minute to travel 700 yards. He agreed a destroyer was far more manoeuvable and was capable of much greater acceleration, and could turn more tightly. Bate said the only avoiding action he had taken was to stop the engines half astern, and then the captain had come in from the wing of the bridge and ordered full astern.

Mr Justice Spicer asked Bate if the Voyager could have done anything to avoid a collision had she been alerted when she was 700 yards away and he replied. It was possible. Mr Smyth: The fact is nobody on Melbourne’s bridge did anything to warn Voyager of the situation which was developing. Bate: No, Sir.

Bate said the Voyager could have altered course one way or the other, and might have been in the process of turning. He has considered the safe thing was to maintain the Melbourne’s course. He had had to take into account the safety of his own ship. He did not know the capabilities of the Voyager when stopping.

“Forlorn Hope”

When Mr Smyth asked whether the object in stopping the Melbourne’s engines and ordering full astern had been to slow the Melbourne and give the Voyager a chance to cross the bow. Bate replied: “It was a forlorn hope.”

Mr Justice Spicer: Wouldn’t it have been a forlorn hope that would have been made a little more promising if the other vessel’s speed had been reduced?

were engaged in checking instruments taking ranges on the radar and making plots.

He had not the faintest idea whether any officer had been watching the Voyager. Bate agreed he did not expect ratings to gauge distance, course and speed. There might not have been any competent person watching for the Voyager at all, for all he knew.

To Mr Justice Spicer, Bate said he had been in control of the ship which was his responsibility, unless the captain took over. After Mr Smyth had quoted from the naval regulations Bate agreed it was his duty, as officer of the watch to ensure there was no collision.

Bate: To get out of a situation like that I would have gone to starboard and increased speed in the destroyer. But she was not given any warning to do that?—No. Bate agreed to having made a statement that there could be occasions on the bridge when noone was looking, only perhaps the lookout, ‘because officers of the bridge

“And the only safe way to avoid a collision is to keep your eyes glued on the one ship with which you might collide?” Mr Smyth asked. “That’s only one ship, sir,” replied Bate. He had responsibility for watching all ships in the area. Bate agreed the ship’s lookout had not reported other ships in the area and said that after the collision he immediately telephoned Melbourne’s damage control headquarters. He had not had anything alcoholic to drink that day.

Bate said to Mr N. A. Jenkyn, Q.C. (for the Navy) that he had no doubt whatever the turn from 60 to 20 degrees had been completed and the ship steadied by the time the next signal was given for the new flying course. The time which elapsed between the turning and steadying of the ship, and the sending of the signal, could be between a minute and two minutes. It was long enough for the captain and the navigator to agree the wind would be suitable. , Bate said that when he had spoken of a possible margin of error so far as speed was concerned he wanted to convey that logs could have a margin of error up to three knots.