Shut Hatches Trapped Men On Voyager

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30393, 18 March 1964, Page 17

Shut Hatches Trapped Men On Voyager

SYDNEY. March 17.

Sailors struggling for their lives in the sinking destroyer, H.M.A.S. Voyager, had to use chair legs and mop handles to open escape hatches.

Evidence of this would be given at the Royal Commission inquiring into the disaster, Mr J. W. Smyth, Q.C., counsel assisting the commission, said in his opening address before Mr Justice Spicer today.

Some escape hatches t had been hammered shut with sledgeham- ’ mers in the dockyards and at sea to s make them water- I tight, Mr Smyth said. . There were no wheel span- 8 ners on the Voyager to open * the hatches, Mr Smyth said. The 3500-ton Voyager sank * off Jervis Bay on the night * of February 10 after a colli- * sion with the 19,000-ton air- ' craft carrier, and flagship of 8 the Australian fleet, H.M.A.S. Melbourne. After the Voyager was ’ sliced in two, the bow section ‘ sank within 20 minutes, and ! the after section about three hours later. Eighty-twb men, including t the destroyer’s commanding ] officer, Captain D. H. Stevens, | lost their lives. i In his address to the Commission, Mr Smyth said: 1 The destroyer was lost on a ' clear but moonless night, with a visibility of 20 miles. Exercises by both vessels began on February 5 when ' they left Sydney. A programme was laid down intended to work both vessels up to the ultimate fitness of readiness. For security reasons the whole of the programme could not be made public. There had been substantial changes in the complement of ; both vessels, both in the offi- ; cers and men. A “highly confidential document,” the programme of , the ships on February 10, was submitted. The Melbourne and Voyager had not up to that evening participated in any manoeuvre of that kind previously. The Melbourne had been exercising with aircraft Gannets and Venoms. They had practised “touches and goes,” a manoeuvre where the aircraft , touches the deck and takes off immediately without stopping. During the day, the Voyager was on other exercises. In the evening, the programme was night-flying and 2000 “touch and goes” were

being practised with Gannets, v The programme called for i practice with Venoms from 8.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. e The function of the de- t stroyer was to take up “plane r guard” station. c This was to enable it to be in a position to rescue any t aircraft which ended up in s the water. ' The station was astern of t the Melbourne, on a relative bearing of 200 degrees from ’ the aircraft-carrier, and be- < tween 1000 and 1500 yards J astern. The Voyager's captain had I a discretion to remain at be- 8 tween 1000 and 1500 yards astern, depending on condi- • tions as to whether he thought ' he could best carry out his 1 function as rescue destroyer ! The reason he was not in the wake of the carrier was ] because it could not sight ‘ planes about to land on the flight deck. The Voyager had to main- 1 tain a relative bearing of 200 1 degrees from the Melbourne. On the exercise with Gannets the Melbourne began I

with a course of 180 and then ; varied it to 175 degrees. This was to get the best wind possible, taking into consideration the angled flight deck. It also would make it easier for a plane to land. Melbourne then went to 190 degrees and it was considered the time was due for the Venoms, he said. The Melbourne did not have enough wind for these planes, which required a greater wind. An order, “turn together zero to zero” was then given. This meant both vessels

would endeavour to turn, and use the same turning circles. The Melbourne had a greater turning circle and from then on the Voyager was to maintain a true bearing and distance from the Melbourne. The moment the two ships turned together, provided speed and turning circles were the same, they would maintain the same bearing. The carrier, heading due north, was given an executive order to turn to port to get on to a course for flying operations—the course in the opposite direction, going due south. During the course of the inquiry it might very well emerge there had been a misunderstanding at a critical stage. “It may or may not have happened at this stage." Mr Smyth said. At 8.40 p.m., Melbourne signalled: “My flight operations delayed for five to 10 minutes.” Then, at 8.41 p.m., an order was given from the Melbourne to turn to course 20 degrees starboard, and this was acknowledged by Voyager. At 8.42 Voyager was directed to execute the order. Reading from subsequent orders, Mr Smyth said the carrier was searching for suitable wind for flying operations and had turned almost in a complete circle. At 8.54 p.m. Voyager was told to execute course 020 with a speed of 22 knots. This was an executive order to Voyager to take up her plane guard station. What happened between 8.54 p.m. and the collision time of 8.56 p.m. was subject to conflict between witnesses. If everything had been carried out to perfection, it would have meant Voyager's bearing was 020 and true bearing 040, with the relative bearing between Melbourne and Voyager 10 degrees. They would have been close to dead ahead, which would have been in accordance with the orders. Mr Justice Spicer asked: “If orders had been carried out correctly there would not have been a collision?” Mr Smyth: Yes, that is so.