The Press FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1964. U.N. Force For Cyprus

Press, Volume CIII, Issue 30389, 13 March 1964, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1964. U.N. Force For Cyprus

The British Government, not surprisingly, has become impatient with the tardiness in organising a United Nations force for Cyprus. Since Christmas, British soldiers have had the unenviable task of preventing open war between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. Their duty has becdme increasingly unpleasant as Greek Cypriots, feeling less need now of British protection in case Turkey directly intervened to protect Turkish Cypriots, have become anti-British. Greek Cypriots, and many persons in Greece, do not understand, or do not want to understand, that, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, “ keeping the “ peace ” must mean, chiefly, protecting a heavily outnumbered and outgunned

minority. It is no coincidence that the people who accuse Britain of being “pro-Turk” support Archbishop Makarios in his determination to abrogate the provision in the 1960 Independence Treaty for three guarantors of Cyprus’s independence— Britain, Greece and Turkey —who are entitled to take action jointly or singly to ensure that the treaty is observed. Long before the present trouble, Archbishop Makarios had been intent on changing the constitution to reduce the minority rights of the Turks. The communal violence and the possibility of intervention by Turkey elevated the island conflict to the international level, which has not been unhelpful to his aims. From the first, Britain was anxious for the peace-keeping responsibility in Cyprus to be international, and proposed entrusting the duty to the North Atlantic Powers, in whose eastern Mediterranean defences Cyprus has an important part. Archbishop Makarios did not want Cyprus considered in the context of N.A.T.0., because Turkey is a partner

at least as strong and as valued as Greece. He then revealed his intention to take the issue to the United Nations. Britain did not re-J gard this as a good solution, though preferable to a worse, and took the responsibility of bringing the Cyprus troubles to the Security Council on February 17. When it became known that the SecretaryGeneral (U Thant) was privately circulating to interested Governments a memorandum containing compromise proposals, the■ parties seemed content to! suspend public discussions. Eventually, on March 4, the Security Council approved of an international force in Cyprus. The Secretary-General’s achievement was considerable: he avoided a veto by Russia, secured the participation of Britain and the assent of Turkey, and obtained the agreement of the Cyprus Government to his arrangements. It was accepted that the Cyprus Constitution can be amended only by negotiation and that Britain, Greece, and Turkey retain their interests. The force will be a self-financing international force, the costs shared by the States contributing troops and by Britain, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, thus avoiding further strain on the United Nations’ own budget. Various forecasts about the composition of the force have been made, and a commander has been appointed. When the force has been assembled, it will have a life, by the Security Council’s resolution, of no more than three months, which is a pitifully short time in which to expect the communities on the island to settle down again. And noone need forget—Archbishop Makarios has shown he has no intention of doing so—that because Cyprus is now an international issue it concerns persons hitherto excluded, such as Mr Khrushchev and General de Gaulle.