The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1963. The TSR-2

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30288, 14 November 1963, Page 16

The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1963. The TSR-2

The TSR-2 bomber, a subject of political controversy in Britain and an issue in the Australian General Election, was intended as a replacement for the Canberra, a great aircraft, which earned the British aircraft industry great prestige. From the tactical, strike, and reconnaissance

functions of the Canberra, the TSR-2 received its name. It was developed as a strategic nuclear bomber only because the United States abandoned the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. That decision left a gap in Britain’s capacity to deliver a nuclear deterrent—from 1964-65, when the Skybolt is due in service, until the Polaris missile-carrying submarines become available about 1969 or 1970. It is useless for a country to have a nuclear deterrent unless its allies and its enemies both believe in a capacity to deliver it The conventional high-flying bombers were no longer “ credible ” after the Russians were able to shoot down,the high-flying, and supposedly invulnerable, U-2. The TSR-2 is “ credible ” because it will fly under radar screens and beneath a missile barrage. With functions ranging from tactical support for the army to long-range strategic bombing, the TSR-2 would, if successful in them all, fulfil the claim that it is the most formidable and flexible weapons system ever built for the Royal Air Force. Unfortunately, grave doubts exist.

The “ Economist ” complains that the designers neglected to incorporate in the aircraft the one device that would have given flexibility in speed and range: “ variable geo“metry” wings that could change shape in flight and permit a supersonic aircraft to fly when the pilot chose “as slowly as a butterfly”, The Americans, the “Eco- “ nomist ” says, by adopting variable geometry for the TFX (which Australia is buying) have produced a genuine Canberra replacement, a light bomber cheap enough to be ordered by

the thousand. Other critics contend that the TSR-2 requires so complicated a supply train, especially to service its many electronic devices, that its value as a support aircraft for the army must be limited. The cost is also criticised. It has been estimated that by the time the TSR-2 goes into

squadron service it will have cost £4OO million to develop. Some say this figure is a gross underestimate. The cost of each single aircraft (much of which lies in its electronic equipment) is said to be £2.5 million, though it is now reported that the TSR-2 was to be offered to Australia at a “cut-rate” of less than £2 million. Incidentally, one factor that seems to have been overlooked in the Australian argument is that the Australians need a replacement for the Canberra, not a plane to deliver nuclear arms.

The TSR-2 means much to the British aircraft industry, apart from the defence programme. Just as the B-70 Valkyrie supersonic bomber programme taught the Americans much of value in the development of supersonic airliners, so the TSR-2 programme is teaching the British aircraft industry. The Bristol-Siddeley 593 Olympus engine for the Concord supersonic airliner is a civil development of the engine for the TSR-2. Similarly, the new electronic navigation and ter-rain-following techniques of the TSR-2 will be of considerable value in civil aviation, perhaps revolutionising the approach to fog-bound airports. It is to be hoped that the TSR-2 will prove to be much better than the “ Econo- “ mist ” expects. By contrast with what could have been devised, the “ Eco- “ nomist ” says, “ the TSR-2 “is an expensive mon- “ strosity, even though—so “ long as we insist on “ having an independent “ nuclear deterrent during “ the last half of the 1960’s “ —it must now be accepted “ as the best monstrosity we “ have ”.