The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1963. Communists Still At Variance

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30191, 24 July 1963, Page 14

The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1963. Communists Still At Variance

The suspension of the Moscow ideological talks represents a significant worsening of relations between Russia and China. During the last few weeks exchanges between the two Powers reached a new pitch of acrimony; and nobody has been left in doubt of the violence of the political warfare that has succeeded the earlier phase of “eternal Soviet- “ Chinese brotherhood and “ friendship Now that negotiations, to all apparent intents, have ended, observers on both sides of the Iron Curtain are reappraising the basic causes of the breach. Differences between the Russians and the Chinese are much more fundamental than those originating in Communist theory. Admittedly, the Chinese appear resolved upon upsetting Mr Khrushchev’s ascendancy as leader of world communism, and upon substituting Mr Mao as rightful heir to Stalin. Admittedly, also, there is the sharp clash of Russian and Chinese opinion on the inevitability of war as the ultimate weapon against capitalist society. But clearly practical considerations have swayed the Russians against an accommodation with China at present. China rather than Russia stands to lose through the prolongation of the ideological war. Though frequent resort is made to Marxist-Leninist jargon, the Soviet-Chinese dispute is not primarily ideological in character. It has fed upon a conflict of national interests and even upon inter-racial rivalries. Russian suspicion of foreigners derives from a long history of foreign invasions, notably those of the Mongols. After the Russians shed Mongol rule in 1480, Russia was quickly consolidated under the rule of the Dukes of Moscow; and in the sixteenth century the Russians began to extend their territorial sway to the east. By the middle of the seventeenth century, Russian outposts had been established in Chinese territory on the Amur river. In 1858 Russia secured the cession from China of the area lying east of the Amur and Ussuri rivers (the present Maritime Territory) and thus was given a Pacific

littoral. Continued activity in the Far East brought Russia into frequent clashes with the Chinese, and into a humiliating war with Japan. After the Second World War, Soviet armies moved —not for the first time — into Manchuria; but this province was restored to China when the Communists came to power in Peking. In recent years Russia has spent vast sums on exploiting the resources of Siberia, which is still sparsely populated. It is only natural for the landhungry Chinese to covet former Chinese holdings in Eastern Siberia and the Maritime Territory. The latest Chinese vituperations reflected bitterness engendered by recollections of imperialist and Stalinist Russia's humiliation and robbery of China.

Evidence of Russian disregard for harmony has included the Soviet Central Committee’s statement that in the last three years Chinese trade with Russia decreased by 67 per cent, and China’s imports of Russian industrial plants were reduced forty-fold. Russia’s determination to surpass the United States in economic achievements has exacerbated the feelings of Chinese leaders, themselves dismayed by the failure of the “ great leap “ forward ”. The withdrawal of Russian technicians has symbolised a general reluctance to strengthen the Chinese economy further. Because Russian economic aid has flagged, the Chinese have been unable to consolidate scientific successes. Russia’s consistent denial of nuclear secrets continues to impede Chinese military planning. (The planners are also annoyed by Russian aid to India.) According to the latest information, the Chinese nuclear programme has recently been revised and the first weapons tests are not expected this year. Thus the Chinese military and economic planners had every reason to canvass for an understanding with Russia. That this understanding was not reached at the Moscow talks suggests that Russia has decided to capitalise on its present advantages over China and to refuse assistance that ultimately might result in injury to the Soviet Union.