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The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 7, 1963. Southern Rhodesia Crisis

South Africa was the rock on which the Commonwealth was first split. Southern Rhodesia might yet cause a more fundamental cleavage. The Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, which would have been a triumph for the Commonwealth concept of multi-racialism, has failed. Legislation to permit the secession of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, under African Governments, is being prepared. But the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr Winston Field, has now set Britain a problem that seems politically insoluble by demanding independence for his country as the price of participating in the conference to dissolve the federation. Though the demand seems simple and logical, Britain has little option but to reject it. Southern Rhodesia has progressed a very short distance towards racial partnership; and independence would mean handing three million Africans over to a white minority of 250,000 who dominate political, economic, social, and cultural life. This course would not only be repugnant to British and world opinion, but might well cause African and possibly Asian members of the Commonwealth to quit in protest. All British hopes of developing a multi-racial Commonwealth as a force for stability and peace would be gone. Worse, the prospect of civil war, of which warnings were given at the Addis Ababa conference of African States, cannot be ignored. Yet British insistence on radical changes in the constitution of Southern Rhodesia to enfranchise more Africans before the grant of independence would be resented by Southern Rhodesia. Because Britain has a responsibility for Southern

Rhodesia, it is often erroneously thought (particularly by well-meaning but misguided United Nations investigating committees) that it has power there, too. In practice. Southern Rhodesia has been self-governing for 40 years and Britain has no real power to impose conditions. The present constitution, freely negotiated two years ago. ended British authority in all but minor affairs. It was believed then, with good reason, that Southern Rhodesia would be part of an African-oriented federation and that the multiracial policy of the former Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, would be continued. The collapse of the federation and the election of Mr Field have radically altered the situation. The Minister of Central African Affairs, Mr R. A. Butler, is well aware of the advantages of hastening slowly in what has become his most critical assignment. The only key to an agreement which will at least buy time is the calling of a constitutional conference. By established precedent, all the major parties and races are represented at pre - independence conferences to settle the constitution under which power will be transferred. By precedent, too, Britain is the final arbiter on whether'the conference has fulfilled its purpose. If Mr Field, who is more moderate than many members of his party, agrees to this course, Southern Rhodesia, which is facing serious economic trouble, may yet be persuaded to see the advantages of retaining some ties with Northern Rhodesia, its best export market. Much will depend on Mr Butler’s diplomacy—and on Commonwealth good will—if a crisis, as serious for the Commonwealth as for Africa, is to be averted.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19630607.2.71

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30151, 7 June 1963, Page 10

Word Count
518

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 7, 1963. Southern Rhodesia Crisis Press, Volume CII, Issue 30151, 7 June 1963, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, JUNE 7, 1963. Southern Rhodesia Crisis Press, Volume CII, Issue 30151, 7 June 1963, Page 10