Indonesia’s Course

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30107, 16 April 1963, Page 10

Indonesia’s Course

Indonesia’s future course

should soon be charted more clearly. The diplomatic struggle between Russia and the United States for the country’s allegiance seems to be nearing a climax. Russia clearly is disappointed by the lack of political dividends from its heavy investment in Indonesia, and some observers have suggested that the current visit of the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Malinovsky, is not only to sell Indonesia more military equipment—it already has about 800 million dollars worth of Soviet arms—but to assess whether it would be possible and desirable to make Indonesia a Soviet satellite on the Cuban model. The advantages in such a course would be immense, for Indonesia has a population of about 100 million, many economic resources, and a key strategic position in Asia. In addition, Mr Khrushchev would be able to demonstrate decisively to Peking that Russia does indeed do something about furthering the Communist cause in the world. President Soekarno’s chief military adviser is to visit Cuba and on his return will no doubt report fully on what the Cuban model would mean for Indonesia. But Marshal Malinovsky has probably discovered already, as did Mr Mikoyan on his visit last July, that Indonesia’s financial, economic, and administrative problems are daunting. They would necessitate heavy Soviet involvement—probably hundreds of times the men and resources thrown into Cuba—and Moscow is believed to be unwilling to shoulder such a burden. Protection of, and payment for, its heavy investment in Indonesia is, however, a different matter; and political favours, including the selection of more Communists when President Soekarno carries out his projected Cabinet reshuffle next month, have undoubtedly been sought by the Russians. The prospect of increased Indonesian harassing (at Moscow’s request) of the Malaysia Federation, due to be formed by August 31. cannot be discounted, either.

But there are growing fears in Djakarta about the extent to which Indonesia U mortgaging its independence to Russia. The payment of 60 million dollars 1 year for weapons Indonesia could have bought in the West is a heavy burden; and it is significant that Indonesia has failed to draw very deeply on the 500tnillion dollar credit Moscow established for it. Consequently Indonesia will look with more favour on American and World Bank

proposals now being discussed for underwriting the economy. There are few “ strings ” to this aid: some measures to achieve financial stability must be taken, and Indonesia must guarantee that American and World Bank money will not be used for the benefit of the Soviet economy. Since it was through the good offices of the United States that Djakarta achieved its ambition of ending Dutch rule in West New Guinea, there is an unspent fund of Indonesian good will for Washington. The outcome of the East-West tug-of-war for Indonesia is not likely to be clear cut. President Soekarno. like most of the uncommitted leaders, is expected to seek the best of both worlds, accepting both American financial aid and Russian technical aid and advisers. If that course helps to settle some of Indonesia’s outstanding problems, it will be welcome in Australia and New Zealand, for a more prosperous neighbour is easier to live with than an impoverished and discontented one. But there is a danger of Indonesia’s falling between two stools and perpetuating the indecision and muddle that have plagued the country since its independence.