The Press TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1962. British Spy Inquiry

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29984, 20 November 1962, Page 14

The Press TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1962. British Spy Inquiry

To the British Government’s continuing anxieties about international economic relationships and cold-war diplomacy has been added what appears to be developing into a major espionage scandal. The attempt to expand the Vassall case, concerning the sale of Admiralty secrets to Russia, into something much bigger seemed temporarily to have failed when the public were given the text of correspondence between Vassall, an unimportant clerk, and Mr Thomas Galbraith, formerly Civil Lord of the Admiralty and more recently a junior Minister at the Scottish Office. Copies of the correspondence were included in an interim report issued by the threeman committee set up to investigate limited aspects of the Vassall case. The disclosures were so unsensational that they tended to justify the Government’s original decision against referring the Vassall case to a tribunal completely independent of the civil service.

The interim report was followed swiftly, however, by Mr Galbraith’s resignation from Ministerial office —an action described by the Manchester “ Guardian ” as “ premature ” and by the “ Economist ” as demonstrating that Mr Galbraith’s “ interpretation of honour- “ able conduct appears visibly superior” to that of his most vociferous critics, notably “ those Labour “ M.P.’s and newspapers “ who set up a hullabaloo ” about the correspondence with Vassall. But the Government’s and Mr Galbraith’s troubles were not to be ended as easily as the more responsible British newspapers seem to have supposed. The Labour Opposition seized upon a chance to make political capital. Rumours, innuendoes, and alarms about security risks persisted. The choice of so eminent a chairman as Sir Charles Cunningham did not exempt the Government from criticism for referring to an exclusively departmental committee dealings in which a Minister was involved. Because allegations of extreme gravity have been levelled against Mr Galbraith personally, against his former colleagues in the Government, and against departmental chiefs, Mr Macmillan could scarcely do otherwise than appoint an independent tribunal. Thus Lord Radcliffe, who will head the latest tribunal, will resume a scrutiny of defence security that has already occupied him for many months. Last year the British public were

shocked to learn of the Blake case and of the earlier case of espionage at an Admiralty establishment at Portsmouth. The Prime Minister then set up two committees, of which one (the Romer committee) dealt solely with the Portsmouth affair. Later he set up the Radcliffe committee to inquire more widely into security services. The Radcliffe committee’s report, released last April, made unprecedented revelations about the security system. “ While there are certain “ respects in which improve- “ ments are still possible ”, said this report, “ the “ quality of the security “ organisation and proce- “ dures and the general “standard of security disci- “ pline are good The committee suggested ways in which security might be tightened up, particularly with the objective of checking Communist influence in the civil service staff associations and trade unions, where (in the committee’s opinion) the Communists had “ achieved a higher “ degree of penetration than “ in any other sector of the “ trade union movement ”, Perfection of security, said the committee, could never be achieved, for “ weak- “ nesses . . . are part of the “price we pay for having “a social and political sys- “ tern that men want to “ defend ”. The Government is known to have acted upon much of the advice offered by the first Radcliffe committee; yet the Vassall case raises doubts whether it has done enough.

Lord Radcliffe was at pains in April to emphasise that nowadays in the Western world there is no simple solution, such as a Walsingham or a Stalin might apply, for most security problems. Practically every nation has its spies; and scientific progress has made espionage all the harder to counter or detect. Most minor spies, even in Britain, escape detection. Nevertheless the unfortunate succession of alarming incidents, ranging from the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1955 to the treachery of Hdughton, Blake* Linney, and Vassall, has left the British public in an understandably nervous state. Moreover, not only Britain but all the Western allies may be imperilled by British security flaws; and Mr Macmillan must wish to avoid any appearance of carelessness that might aggravate existing tensions within the alliance. That, rather than tenderness about Mr Galbraith’s political future, is the main reason why another Radcliffe tribunal is now to sit.