THE EDEN MEMOIRS—XIV “CLEAR NECESSITY TO INCREASE OUR ARMED STRENGTH”

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29984, 20 November 1962, Page 11

THE EDEN MEMOIRS—XIV “CLEAR NECESSITY TO INCREASE OUR ARMED STRENGTH”

Dispute With Labour About Rearmament

IBy ANTHONY EDEN, now the Ea-l of Avon]

TT was clearly necessary to increase our armed strength. When supplementary estimates were submitted to Parliament to cover the extra expenditure incurred in respect of our armed forces during the Abyssinian crisis, the Labour Party put down amendments to reduce all votes.

In my speech of February 24 I said: “So long as there is no general disarmament there can be no question of Great Britain continuing to practise unilateral disarmament.”

Mr Attlee stated that the Socialists would not be party to piling up armaments and following a policy of imperialism and alliances, but only to a policy of collective security through the League (of Nations). He did not tell the House how security was to be provided when Germany, Japan and the United States were outside the League, Mussolini was busy breaking the Covenant. Soviet Russia was unpredictable and Britain was weak in armaments. French Conduct The truth was that the active leadership of lawabiding countries had now fallen, perforce upon France and Great Britain alone among the Great Powers.

Moreover, the effect of Laval's conduct of policy over Abyssinia had been to weaken those who wished to found British policy on an Anglo-French alliance and to swell the number who were isolationist or considered that we must come to terms with Hitler, even though the price were high. The only line of conduct I could see open to a British Foreign Secretary was to increase our strength, hold on to the French alliance and, through the increased power of both, enforce respect for treaties and for the rights of nations. We now had to confront a situation which our own and French uncertainties in policy had helped to bring upon us. The French Government under Laval (who left office in January, 1936), having been cool toward their obligations to the League over Abyssinia, their successors now wished to invoke its authority over the Rhineland. Doubtful Cause To the British people this was a much more doubtful cause. There was not one man in a thousand in the country at that time prepared to take physical action with France against a German reoccupation of the Rhineland fOn Saturday. March 7, 1936, the German Ambassador dor called on Anthony Eden with a memorandum, which said . . .1 “In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and eqsure its possibilities of defence, the German Government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignity of Germany in the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland.”

The German Government, however, offered to conclude new agreements. The memorandum spoke of another demilitarised zone, to be contributed to by France. Belgium and Germany and to be negotiated between them; non-agression pacts to last 25 years were to be signed between the same States and maybe with the Netherlands, while Great Britain and Italy would act as guarantor Powers Brazen Methods The final paragraph of the document stated: "The Ger-

man Government consider the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations to be removed. They are therefore willing to re-enter the League of Nations.” [The German Ambassador said] he must make it clear that there were no conditions attached to Germany’s return to the League; she wished to return now. As for the Rhineland zone, the ambassador added casually, a few small German, detachments were today moving into the zone.

This was, so far, the most carefully prepared example of Hitler’s brazen but skilful methods. The illegal deed was abundantly wrapped up with assurances for the present and promises for the future. Hitler, having no further demands, would rejoin the League at once and be on the side of the angels hereafter.

The appeal was nicely judged. Most of the British public would certainly see very little harm in Hitler’s action. It would merely appear that he was taking full possession of territory which was his by right The timing was perfect, including the usual choice of a weekend. France had a new Foreign Minister and a Government more than usually provisional. for a general election was due to be held. Mussolini had estranged himself from his former allies. Love Of Peace Even so Hitler aroused resentment by his deed and created watchful foes. What is surprising is that this man could repeat the exercise so often in later years and still find many to excuse him. The answer is probably to be found in any intelligent dictator’s understanding that the democracies are passionately sincere in their love of peace, and in his consequent ability to exploit this sentiment for his own ends. I could not forget how Hitler

had spoken to me of Locarno; if he was not to be believed in this, he could not be believed in anything. AU through the morning German troops were cheered into the Rhineland towns. Infantry battalions, supported by detachments of artillery, moved into strategic positions, with support from the air force. In aU, 30,000 or more troops, as weU as a large contingent of Green Police, were speedily placed in position. French opinion, even as reflected in the Cabinet, v.’as timid and undecided. Flandin tells us that only four Cabinet Ministers were in favour of military action. Flandin also admits that no mUitary plan of any kind existed. Physical Checks In one respect, at least, the French and Belgian Ministers saw lucidly and straight. If Hitler were not pulled up now. he would be more troublesome to deal with, every year that passed. This was true, even if he were only checked by the counteraction and not overthrown. Here wu a lesson I learnt, and was determined to apply if I could, 20 yean later. A militant dictator’s capacity for 1 aggrandisement is only limited by the physical checks imposed upon him.

Hitler was not challenged until his power had been swollen by a succession of triumphs, and the price to be paid changed the history of our planet. The Council (of the League), with the single exception of Chile, condemned Germany’s violation. On the same day, the Ministers of the Locarno Powers concluded their negotiations in my room at the Foreign Office and made the results known. Call To Germany We affirmed our obligations under the Treaty and instructed our General Staffs

to hold discussions so that we might be in a position to fulfil them. Germany was invited to lay her claim, that the Franco-Soviet Treaty was incompatible with Locarno, before the Hague Court, and asked not to fortify the zone or increase her forces in it. The German Government were also invited to accept that an international force be placed in a narrow strip of German territory running along the frontiers with France and Belgium. If they would co-operate in this way, Britain, France and Belgium would take part in negotiations to examine Hitler’s offers, revise the status of the Rhineland and draw up a mutual assistance pacts open to all the signatories of Locarno. These results were received by all in Britain with relief and by many with satisfaction. Opinion in France was divided. If, as Clemenceau tells us, politics is the art of the possible. Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland was an occasion when the British and French Governments should have attempted the impossible.

Nobody Ready Academically speaking, there is little dispute that Hitler should have been called to order, if need be forcibly, at his first breach of an accepted international engagement. But nobody was prepared to do it, in this country literally nobody. Even the most warlike proclaimed that the League Council must be called, which would not have endorsed the use of forc.e. Military action was only possible by France immediately. Had it been taken, it "ivould only have been successful if aimed at the Rhineland, where fighting would probably have resulted. I doubt if world opinion would have approved in 1936, and for a melancholy reason, the conviction that international order must be upheld was already fading. The growing tendency to find excuses had been fertilised by the Abyssinian failure. Be On Guard All of which has its lesson for today. Once the obligation to uphold international agreements is evaded, pretext will follow pretext, until the structure of confidence is destroyed and respect for treaties hangs “like a rusty nail in a monumental mockery.” Asia and Africa have already furnished their examples in flouting engagements with impunity. The West must be on its guard, therefore, and be punctilious in fulfilling its word, to the new-found ally as to the old one, to West Germany as to France.

For the issues that concern any of the free nations concern us all. The Soviets will not then be deceived into thinking that they can divide us, and there will be peace. Tomorrow: Chamberlain takes over. Copyright, 1962. The Times Publishing Company Ltd. All rights reserved by Opera Mundi Paris In all countries except Great Britain. Reproduction ui $»!*« Part strictly prohibited.

VARLY in 1936, shortly after he became Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden was confronted by a German threat to occupy the demilitarised sone of the Rhineland. The sone had been guaranteed under the Locarno Treaty, freely signed by Germany in 1925.