Two Crises—II COMMUNIST SPLIT OVER INDIAN WAR

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29984, 20 November 1962, Page 14

Two Crises—II COMMUNIST SPLIT OVER INDIAN WAR

[By ISAAC DEUTSCHER)

London. November 9 Before the fever wer Cuba had subsided, the hostilities between China and India developed into the other and major problem of policy over which Krushchevites and Maoists (and their respective allies) are deeply divided. To both sides this controversy is. in fact, a prolongation of the argument over Cuba. Moscow has made no secret that it wants the fighting between China and India to b stopped at once, even though this may not suit either Mr Mao or Mr Nehru. Ostensibly Mr Khrushchev is trying to play the arbiter; and at times (for instance, at the height of the Cuban crisis) he appears to lean towards Mr Mao. Behind the scenes, however, he is now engaged in what seems to be the most bitter exchange of accusations and invective he has ever had with Mr Mao. Moscow Policy

Moscow still aims at “saving the friendship” with Mr Nehru's Government; and compared with this the pros and cons of the ChineseIndian frontier quarrel look to Moscow quite insignificant, for even if the debatable land is four times as big as Belgium, it consists of rocky, soarsely-populated and desertlike Himalayan country. On the other hand, Mr Nehru, co-author of the “Five Bandung Principles.” has been the symbol of nonalignment, and India has been the largest single element of the “neutralist” buffer between the two Power blocs. Moscow is now asking whether the Chinese want recklessly to destroy that buffer.

The present “moderate" Communist policy in the underdeveloped countries has been devised by Mir Khrushchev mainly with an eye ’to India. He has preached “friendly co-operation with bourgeois nationalism” in Africa and Asia, even if this involves, as it has done in India, reconciliation to a lack of radical land reform, and the surrender of such Communist strongholds as the State of Kerala; or if it entails, as it has done in Egypt and Iraq, acquiescence in the suppression by President Nasser and General Kassem of the local Communist If Mr Nehru's India were now to become the West’s ally against communism, Mr Khrushchev’s policy towards the underdeveloped countries would be suspended in a vacuum; and Maoism would establish its ascendancy in Afro-Asian and LatinAmerican communism. Mr Mao Suspected Moscow suspects that Mr Mao is little inclined to seek or facilitate a compromise with India because he does not mind antagonising Mr Nehru, driving him into the Western camp, and so dealing a blow to Khrushchevism.

Moreover, the central issue of the Russo-Chinese ideological dispute, the issue of “peaceful coexistence” would also be affected by the entry of India into the Western camp, and by the accentuated political polarisation of the world. Mr Khrushchev’s chances of bringing about any international detente, no matter how limited or temporary, would be greatly reduced. Mr

Khrushchev has, therefore, enough reasons to be alarmed by the fire spreading in the Himalayas, and to press the Chinese to put it down before it gets out of control. Peking replies that: “China is not Cuba,” and that the Chinese will not allow Mr Khrushchev to carry jut "another capitulation before world capitalism at the expense of a socialist country.” The Chinese resent Mr Khrushchev’s aspiration to set himself up as an empire what he calls his “Chinese brothers” and his “Indian friends” They accuse him of acting in this way on Marshal Tito’s promptings, that is. of following the “revisionist' ’ inspiration. They point out that “in a conflict between a bourgeois and a communist Government it is plain treason for any Communist to try to sit on the fence.” Chinese Argument In documents addressed to Moscow (and to Communist leaders elsewhere) Mr Mao argues that Mr Khrushchev and his advisers In their asseessment of the Indian situation, are confusing cause and effect: “it is not because of the frontier conflict that Mr Nehru is waging war and joining the Western camp—he fans the conflict and wages the war because he has already gone over to the West.”

In Mr Mao’s view Mr Nehru and the Congress party are now undergoing “ a process of political degeneration, similar to that which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang underwent in 1927, when they burned against Communism and made peace with Western imperialism.”

Mr Mao reminds Moscow’ that in 1929. when the USS.R. and China were engaged in armed hostilities over the possession of the Eastern Chinese (or Manchurian) railway, the Chinese Communist Party unhestitatingly lent its support to the Soviet Union, although the Russian claim on the Eastern Chinese railway was by no means impeccable in origin and validity. “It did not then occur to us Chinese Communists that we might try to remain neutral, let alone to go along patriotically with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.” Is Red China—Mr Mao asks —not entitled now to expect the same unconditional solidarity from Soviet and other Communists? Indian Party

Peking raises the cry of treason especially against the Indian Communist Party,

whose official leadership has backed Mr Nehru in his antiChinese stand. Mr Mao demands nothing less than the excommunication of the entire Khrustichevite wing of the Indian Communist Party —the party’s official leadership, which Mr Mao says, "has betrayed communism as shamefully as any socialimperialists or socialchauvinists have ever done ” It is pointed out from Peking that although the Indian Khrushchevites have gone further in appeasing Mr Nehru than Mr Kheurtiehcv would have liked them to go, Mr Khrushchev is nevertheless morally responsible for their “betrayal” and for the virtual collapse of the Indian Communist Party. This, according to Mr Mao. is the fruit of Khrushchevaite “revisionism” or at indulgence towards “revisionism."

Peking is now using the “bankruptcy of the Indian Party” as the starting point for a drive to purge all the Far Eastern Communist Parties of “revisionists” and to demote the Krushchevites from positions of influence. Crisis of Leadership

The attacks on Mr Khrushchev connected with both the Cuban and the Chinese conflicts are thus resulting in a grave crisis of leadership. Mr Khrushchev's position is all the more difficult because the pro-Ch inese elements In various parties, including his own, are raising their heads and many Communists prefer to wait and see what happens next in the Caribbean and in the Himalayas before they commit themselves for or against the one or the other Communist chief. In Bulgaria, the situation threatened to get out of Mr Khrushchev’s control so dramatically that he had to react at once, if only to discourage the others. But he cannot nowadays afford to decree expulsions too often. He certainly cannot afford to excommunicate Dr. Castro now or in the near future: and he has had to send Mikoyan to talk him over and promise increased economic aid, and even to give cautious diplomatic support to the demands with which Dr. Castro confronts Washington. At home, Mr Khrushchev had to mobilise in his own defence the somewhat decrepit Marshal Voroshilov, who came out with a eulogy of Mr Khrushchev's conduct of the Cuban campaign, presumably in order to counteract criticisms from military quarters. Mr Khrushchev has sought to obtain similar support from a large group of veteran Bolsheviks: but he has not quite succeeded in this, for the veterans have come forward with a lukewarm and non- committal statement.

The prospects of this intense inner-party struggle are not yet quite clear; but those involved in the struggle are well aware what is at stake. If the Cuban crisis is not followed by a real RussoAmerican detente, if the Chinese-Indian conflict is not quickly localised and brought under control, and if the pro-Western shift in India continues, Khrushchevism will have suffered two signal defeats, and its position in regard to Maoism will be greatly weakened throughout the communist world. Mr Khrushchev will then be confronted with the dilemma with which Stalin was so familiar—but which Mr Khrushchev cannot resolve in the Stalinist manner. He will either have to suppress opposition even while he steals the opposition’s clothes and partly adopts its policy; or the opposition may deprive him of effective power, even if it does not overthrow him altogether. In either event, .Soviet policy will for a time'become much tougher than it has been during these critical weeks.— (World Copyright Reserved by Isaac Deutscherj (Concluded.)