The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1962. British Relations With Portugal

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29745, 12 February 1962, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1962. British Relations With Portugal

Britain could not indefinitely allow itself to appear to condone the colonial policies of its oldest ally, Portugal Their relations are still governed by a series of treaties dating from 1373 onwards. Article 111 of the treaty of 1373 provides that if an enemy invades or threatens the territory of either country, the other shall give military support in the form of “ troops, “ archers, slingers, galleys “ sufficiently armed for war, “or any other kind of de- “ fence ”. By a secret article in the treaty of 1661, the British King undertook to “ defend and protect all con- “ quests or colonies belong- “ ing to the Crown of “ Portugal against all his “ enemies, as well future as “present”. In 1899 these treaties were reafiirmed in a secret declaration issued soon after the outbreak of fighting in South Africa; and the Portuguese promised - not to permit the passage of arms and supplies to the Boers, and not to declare neutrality in the British-Boer war. In 1943, Sir Winston Churchill testified to the validity of the treaties when he announced an agreement on

war-time uses of the Azores.

A review of the general • principles upon which this ancient alliance was founded has been necessitated by the complete contrast between the colonial philosophies of the two countries, rather than by British views (which are mixed) on Dr. Salazar’s dictatorship in Portugal itself.

Britain disappointed both India and Portugal over Goa: the Indians because of the British failure to concede the moral purity of the Delhi Government’s intentions; the Portuguese because they regarded British inaction against Indian force as the overt betrayal of old friends. Nevertheless, Dr. Salazar’s caution did not desert him; he merely warned Britain that the alliance was “ under scrutiny ”. He agreed that the modern application of the 1373 and 1661 treaties had come to depend on “ the opinion “formed by each of the “ States on the war situa-

“tion and the possibilities “of intervention therein ”. Thus. Britain had accepted in 1939 the reasons which led Portugal to espouse neutrality. (That, of course, was before Hitler’s death, for which Dr. Salazar ordered national mourning.) Yet Dr. Salazar felt Britain’s contractual obligations were such that Indian membership of the Commonwealth did not absolve the United Kingdom Government from blame for its non-intervention in Goa. Britain’s dislike of the Portuguese colonial administration has since been made unequivocally clear by the vote on Angola in the United Nations General Assembly. Approval of a relatively mild resolution, deprecating repressive measures and constitutional stagnation, simultaneously indicated the breadth of international opposition to the Salazar regime, and reflected the insistence of the Afro-Asian countries on conducting their “ anti- “ colonialist ” crusade according to their own rules, and not those of the Soviet Union, which had proposed a much more fiery resolution.

Theoretically at least, Portugal’s internal government might be no concern of Britain's if Dr. Salazar had not contrived constitutionally to remove all prospect of independence for the Portuguese colonies. Here is the grossest conflict with Britain’s own aims in the Commonwealth. Links through common membership of N.A.T.O. are not affected by this quarrel; they are restricted to West European and North Atlantic security. In Portugal, General Delgado’s supporters and other liberals can be relied upon to continue pressing for democracy. But in the relationships of Portugal and Britain it would be best to recognise, once and for all. the sharp divergence of overseas objectives. Moreover, this need not entail destroying utterly the historic friendship between the British and Portuguese peoples—a friendship that is likely to be fostered afresh by less undemocratic successors to the aging Dr. Salazar