West New Guinea

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29713, 5 January 1962, Page 8

West New Guinea

It is hard to accept at face value President Soekarno’s protestations of Indonesian benevolence towards the Papuans of West New Guinea. Only weeks ago the latest Netherlands offer of negotiations would have been regarded generally as a weak capitulation to the empty threats of an international bully. Today endeavours to preserve peace in a region where a local war might be fraught with all kinds of danger take priority over a belated programme to guarantee the constitutional advance and social welfare of the simple Papuans. For this moral reverse Mr Nehru, with his topsy-turvy view of aggression, must bear a heavy responsibility. Who among the anti-colonialists has been more vociferous than Dr. Soekamo? Should his fervour (he asks) seem less ardent than Mr Nehru’s? The impossibility of comparing Goa with West New Guinea has not deterred Dr. Soekamo from applying the Nehru doctrine to expedite a solution of Indonesia’s dispute with Holland. As long as the Dutch administer West New Guinea, Dr. Soekarno contends, there will be a continuing “ aggression ” against the Papuans. But if the Dutch are supplanted by the Indonesians (whose ethnic and cultural affinities with the Papuans are similarly slight), the “aggres- “ sion ” will be ended. Naturally, Dr. Soekamo would be horrified to think that in this process Indonesian “ colonialism ” would be substituted for Dutch; but such a substitution now appears almost inevitable. Towards this result an upsurge of economic and strategic realism in the Dutch press and Parliament is also contributing powerfully. The prospect that if

negotiations are suspended too long, they will cease to be practicable, has influ-J enced the Dutch Govern-' merit to adopt its present; course. Dr. Soekarno is I ready to negotiate; but the negotiators must first accept Dr. Soekamo’s terms. Dr. Soekamo offers assurances that a substantial degree of Papuan autonomy would be permitted under Indonesia’s suzerainty. The Netherlands Government continues to proclaim the desirability of protecting the interests of the Papuan people; and in this effort to appease the Dutch national conscience the Indonesians find a pretext for rejecting talks. Thus, the narrowing of the gap between Dutch and Indonesians may be illusory; but does Dr. Soekarno want it otherwise? What of Dr. Soekarno’s ability to make good his threats? Indonesia has tried —no doubt with mixed fortunes—to buy arms in many markets, notably those of eastern Europe. If a military crisis is postponed by temporising over the start of negotiations, more of these purchases will have come to hand. Dr. Soekarno has long harboured schemes for turning the belligerence of Indonesian rebels to good account by offering them fresh military adventures beyond his present territories. Chinese or Russian support for such ventures is problematical; yet no democratic country—least of all Australia—would welcome the outbreak of hostilities in this area. If West New Guinea passes under Indonesian control, Portuguese Timor may soon follow—not because. like West New Guinea, it formed part of the Netherlands East Indies, but because Mr Nehru has said force is not force when used against “ colonialists