Mr Nehru Harassed

Press, Volume C, Issue 29695, 13 December 1961, Page 16

Mr Nehru Harassed

Mr Nehru’s statesmanship is being tested by a renewal of the Chinese threat to Indian territory and by Indian extremists’ designs on the Portuguese enclave of Goa. In the Chinese dispute India's rights are far clearer than its ability to check the aggression that is undoubtedly occurring on its Himalayan frontier. If Mr Nehru were to countenance an attack on Goa—as he appears tempted to do—he would sacrifice his biggest asset internationally against the Chinese: India's reputation as a peace-loving nation, worthy of support in the preservation of territorial integrity. Mr Nehru’s dilemma would be less perplexing if elections were not barely three months away, and if his Defence Minister (Mr Menon) had professed less embarrassingly Leftist sympathies during a notably stormy career. In reply to Chinese insults and increasing belligerence, Mr Nehru has assumed an unwontealy positive attitude. The change did not occur overnight; recent statements by the Indian Premier have revealed a firmness incompatible with Ghandian philosophy. This new spirit doubtless showed itself in Mr Nehru’s conversations with President Kennedy, and influenced the course of the Belgrade conference of non-aligned States. The complexities of Indian policy have been increased by Mr Nehru’s anxiety not to alienate Russia, which itself sees in India's resistance to Peking an opportunity of emphasising how comparatively benign is Soviet communism. For many months the Chinese Communists are believed to have occupied probably 12,000 square miles

of rugged terrain claimed by India. They have also intensified political activities in the border States of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. At least since April (when Mr Menon assured the Indian Parliament that steps already taken would make renewed aggression impossible), the Chinese have been strengthening and extending their grip on border areas. This has been easy because the territory is almost indefensible, virtually uninhabited, and useless except for strategic purposes. If evidence of Indian administration had been more obvious, the Chinese might not have displayed such effrontery. Mr Nehru has been reluctant to disclose what he must have known for a long time. The exchange of Notes with Peking has indicated the bitterness and alarm with which most educated Indians regard the news that the Chinese have constructed additional bases tend highways from which they may continue their I advance. In the most warlike statements of his career, Mr Nehru has announced the reinforcing of frontier defences not only to prevent further Chinese incursions, but to prepare “effective action to recover “ the lost territories ”, This is a far cry from Indian reliance on the so-called “ five principles of co- “ existence ” as a guarantee of Chinese probity. Weary though Indians may be of Portuguese colonialism on their doorstep, the present appears a singularly inopportune time to force the issue of Goa's future. Portuguese nervousness has led to unfortunate provocations; but, with the Chinese dispute unsolved, Mr Nehru would be unwise to take hot-heated advice.