The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1961. U.N. Appeal To Russia

Press, Volume C, Issue 29657, 30 October 1961, Page 12

The Press MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1961. U.N. Appeal To Russia

The United Nations appeal to Russia not to explode its big bomb is heartening because it shows the good sense of the rest of the world—not because it is likely to have the least influence in the Kremlin. The only circumstances in which it might appear to carry seme weight would be the completion to Russian satisfaction of the long series of present tests (including one really large one) and Russian desire to tie the West to a new moratorium, under cover of which fresh Communist tests could be prepared. As Professor E. W. Titterton, Professor of Nuclear Physics at the Australian National University, has pointed out, the United States and Britain are not likely to fall into a trap again, particularly if they have defensive measures to test While the Russians were apparently engaged in serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament they were secretly preparing their new devices and threw off the pretence at a doubly convenient time. They waited until they had three testing stations prepared and until they were ready to blackmail the West over Berlin. The tests were also convenient, perhaps, to show Russia’s guests at the Communist Congress that under Mr Khrushchev co-existence could still be a forceful policy. If Russia now said it would heed the United Nations appeal, it could count on the unwillingness of the United States and Britain to accept the specious condition that nuclear testing of all kinds should cease' However, it is more likely that Russia will go ahead with firing the 50-megaton bomb, serving notice on all

nations that one way to escape a continuation of nuclear terror is to yield to Communist demands. This is more than sabre-rattling. Every explosion raav frighten people more; it will certainly kill more, as radioactive clouds grow bigger and more frequent. The fact that the deadly rain will fall on the Communist faithful as much as on unbelievers—in UstUsa and in northern China as well as in Oslo and in Britain—is r.ot likely to disturb Mr Khrushchev. He is presumably aware of the predictions of world overpopulation; so why should he worry if a cold war brings a few casualties to either side? The only deterrent to which Russia attaches any significance is the possibility of nuclear war, which would bring Mr Khrushchev’s promised Soviet millennium down round his ears. In his dream of a new Russia lies the world’s best hope, because he will not overplay his hand if he can avoid it Mr Khrushchev’s faith in the ultimate triumph of communism is the essential point of his conviction that wars can and must be avoided in the nuclear age—a conviction he has been at pains to impress on China at the Communist Congress Horrible though Russia’s tactics of terror are, they are an extension of diplomacy rather than an act of war. If the world can live through this crisis the time may come when a more confident and more prosperous Russia will be inclined to take more notice of world opinion. The United Nations will find it easier io make this opinion known now that it has once braced itself to speak up for all mankind.