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The Press MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1961 The Prime Ministers’ Communique

After South Africa’s dramatic decision the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ final communique appeared likely to be an anti-climax. That the communique partly escaped this fate resulted from the powerful influence of the very forces that caused Dr. Verwoerd last week to predict the selfdestruction of the world’s most remarkable multiracial organism. Although for many months before the conference nobody had doubted the predominance of the South African problem, the comparatively limited scope of the effective formal discussions could scarcely have been foreseen. New Zealand and other primary-produc-ing countries are vitally concerned to safeguard their interests in any future arrangements between Britain and the trading groups of free Europe. The Prime Ministers’ conference opened only a few days after the United Kingdom Government had announced important new proposals to heal the rift with the European Economic Community. These proposals envisaged Britain’s abandonment of most preferences in Commonwealth markets, but appeared to preserve all the traditional preferences or other privileges for farm products exported to Britain by other Commonwealth countries. Because of the political overtones of Britain’s negotiations the E.E.C., the general issues are best debated in a less restrictive forum than a Finance Ministers’ conference. It is disappointing, therefore, that the Prime Ministers chose to pass by an opportunity for giving a united lead on future economic and political relationships that will affect profoundly not only the Western alliance but all the non-Communist countries During all Commonwealth conferences much is accomplished by informal meetings and private bilateral discussions; but such talks are an inadequate substitute for a concerted statement of policy on something so perplexing and important as trade with the Common Market countries. If the Prime Ministers had been readier to compromise with principles over South Africa, the conclusions of the conference about disarmament, the structure of the United Nations, and other major topics would probably have been very different. The delegates’ clear declaration of a joint policy on the aims, methods and guarantees of world disarmament should reinforce tremendously the Western Powers’ case for

an efficient international inspection system as an essentia] requirement for the progressive dismantling of arsenals. The declaration should assist to convince Russia of the unanimity of Commonwealth countries as dissimilar as Ghana and Canada on questions of international conduct The Prime Ministers had neither the time nor the duty to prepare new, detailed disarmament proposals. Their agreement on broad lines testified extraordinarily to the contribution Commonwealth conferences may make towards solving even the most contentious of world problems. Proof of the Prime Ministers’ sincerity and realism lay in their statesmanlike suggestion for associating Communist China with current disarmament negotiations. The Prime Ministers paid special attention to the ending of nuclear tests, in which they could be said to have a double interest. Countries such as Canada, India, and Australia are high on the list of possible candidates for the “ nuclear “ club ”. If tests are not banned permanently, they may soon face anxious decisions of defence policy. The repugnance with which they view this possibility is mild, however, compared with the acute moral loathing that nuclear tests arouse among the Asian and African countries. In these circumstances the London conference must have required little urging to endorse the urgency of the test issue. More than any other group of countries, the Commonwealth reflects the difficulties and the potentiality of the United Nations. The growth of unity within the Commonwealth, including uncommitted and newly-indepen-dent “ black ” countries, was expressed at the London conference in endorsement of the United Nations’ efforts in the Congo, in support for the United Nations Secretariat, and in disapproval of external meddling in Laotian affairs. Numerically the Commonwealth countries are still unimpressive among the United Nations membership. but because they share common origins and purposes their moderating influence is disproportionate to their voting strength By South Africa’s defection the Commonwealth will lose even more of its “white” character; and the trend will continue as other territories gain autonomy. This, however, may be irrelevant provided all Commonwealth countries adhere to the ideals of partnership and progress in which the Commonwealth has been conceived

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19610320.2.98

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume C, Issue 29467, 20 March 1961, Page 14

Word Count
687

The Press MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1961 The Prime Ministers’ Communique Press, Volume C, Issue 29467, 20 March 1961, Page 14

The Press MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1961 The Prime Ministers’ Communique Press, Volume C, Issue 29467, 20 March 1961, Page 14