Communist Leaders STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV, TITO

Press, Volume C, Issue 29444, 21 February 1961, Page 7

Communist Leaders STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV, TITO

Montgomery’s Impressions

tßli VISCOUNT MONTGOMSNY OP ALAM t IN. E-GJ Purpose now is to take those leaders of the Communist world who are known to me, to discuss their characters, and to examine what they seem to be trying to achieve—and how their leadership affects the Western world.

I would like to begin with Stalin, since he was the leader of Russia when most people in Britain became interested in that country—which was when Hitler’s forces attacked Russia in June, 1941, and that country became our first active ally in the German war.

I first met Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July. 1946. Looking at those days in retrospect it has always seemed to me that Roosevelt underestimated Stalin. He reckoned that by patience and friendliness the Russians could be guided to our way of thinking, and that he, Roosevelt, could bring this about Even Churchill at times seemed to forget the cunning of the Russian leader. Churchill agreed in the autumn of 1944 to the boundary between the zones of occupation in Germany allocated to the Russians and those assigned to the West; the agreed line ran well west of Berlin! It is clear from a message Churchill sent to Stalin in July, 1944, that he was urging the Russians on toward Berlin, and the message seemed to accept the fact that they would reach that city before the Western Allies.

After Stalin decided that Russia could survive the German assault, and could fight back, he worked to strengthen the Russian hold on all the territory he could manage. And when he found that his actions were not popular with Western leaders, the tone of h:s messages to Roosevelt and Churchill changed—from amiability to reserve, to bluntness, and on occasions to downright rudeness.

“Amazing Sense Of Strategy”

When I first met Stalin in Berlin in July, 1945, he invited me to visit him in Moscow—which I did in January, 1947. Of course to me he was an intensely interesting personality; he had an amazing strategic sense, and I cannot recall that he put a foot wrong in our discussions about the strategic conduct of the war which we had all been fighting against Hitler’s Germany. He was a very good host and had a keen sense of humour. But the impression I gained was that under the Stalin regime the Russian people were depressed and miserable; this was not just the warweariness of a tired nation; there was fear abroad, the secret police operated ruthlessly, and individuals dared not speak what was in their minds. I remember a dinner party he gave for me on January 10, 1947, in the Kremlin. The guests, including myself and my staff, assembled in an ante-room and engaged in light-hearted discussion while cocktails were handed round. Suddenly there was utter and complete silence, one could have heard a pin drop, and all the Russians present shut up like oysters and looked at each other as if they were fearful that they had been speaking disloyally and might be given away—Stalin had entered the room quietly, alone. I have never forgotten the impression created; it was sinister. The Russians present at the party were all very high-level people; but they were afraid.

People Depressed, Frightened

Such was Stalin's Russia. The Soviet leader himself determined to fasten his grip firmly, and ever more firmly, on Eastern Europe; the people depressed and frightened, and little being done for them; food scarce; consumer goods difficult to get; housing conditions appalling. And over all, fear stalked through the landWhen. I left Russia after that visit I was inclined to put Stalin down as a monster—and a elever one. I never saw him again; he died in March, 1963, after some 30 years of repressive dictatorship. He must have caused hundreds of his political opponents to face the firing squad and the world wondered what sort of people were those who survived the many purges. When I withdrew from active employment in the British Army and in N.A.T.O. in September. 1958. I decided to visit the leaders of the Communist world. Judgment without contact seemed to me to be unwise. I asked myself: "What sort of man is Khruschev?” And I thought that the best way to find out was to go and see him. So I sent him a message in early 1959 asking if I might visit him in Moscow and discuss the world situation; he replied that I would be very welcome, and I arrived in Moscow on April 28. 1959. My main object was to discover his views on the tangled problem of European security and to get to know him. Assessment Of Khrushchev I found Khrushchev to be a remarkable person. He has a quick and dear brain and you never have to say anything to him twice. He is definitely a realist, and he sticks to his point all the time. He seems to have an amazing knowledge of the facts of any subject you raise and is never at I • Joss for an answer.

I sat opposite him across the table in the Kremlin and talked with him for .the best part of two days, and even after that it would have been difficult to describe his face; he has an infinity of expressions. which change rapidly.

I would describe him as a brilliant political leader, with all the arguments at his finger-tips. You would have to get up very early in the morning to get the better of him in discussion. You couldn’t frighten him, nor out-smart him. In fact, he is a pretty tough guy. But he can also be emotional, and one gets an occasional glimpse of a warmth of heart which one would not expect in such a ruthless character. His selfconfidence is tremendous; and he can walk with kings and yet talk in a friendly way with ordinary people. He is definitely a formidable personality in international politics.

I intended while I was in Moscow to find out in particular Khrushchev’s thinking on three subjects: First, was he prepared to embark on a major war to achieve his aims more quickly? A major war implies an all-out nuclear war. Second, what was his thinking about the Germans? Third, how did he view the rise of the People’s Republic of China—the Peking Government? All very important questions; and the answers would have a tremendous influence on Western policy—if they could be believed. Nuclear War And Its Results First question—war. Some years ago, about 1953, Khrushchev used to say that the Soviet Union would survive a nuclear war and the West would not. During my talks with him in Moscow in April, 1959, he started by being somewhat bellicose; but he

changed his attitude when I had explained to him at some length what the West could do with its nuclear armament if war came—which was to destroy the major cities of an aggressor nation together with its people and industries. I had a feeling at the time that he had been studying the consequences of nuclear fallout At any rate in his speeches the following year, in early 1960, he began to say that a nuclear war would be a calamity for all the peoples of the world and that even local wars could not be tolerated because they could grow into a world war. And he made a remarkable speech in Vienna in July, 1960, in which he compared life in the Ark with life in this world—finishing with the following sentence:

“If on this earth we are not able to live peacefully together as living things were able to live_ in Noah’s Ark, and if we start a war to settle disputes between States—some dislike socialism, some dislike capitalism—we shall destroy our Noah’s Ark, the earth.” As the result of my discussions in Moscow with Khrushchev and with the Russian Chiefs of staff and when I had seen the progress made in the country since the Stalin regime passed away, it was clear to me that Russia must have peace. War, a nuclear war, would destroy all the progress made since ..I had last been in Moscow in 1947; it would put the country back half a century. I am convinced that Khrushchev is against war—not necessarily because he thinks war is wrong or evil, but because he reckons that the Soviet Union would be destroyed in a future war and the rest of the world also. I wouldn’t put it beyond Khrushchev to change his viewpoint in the West began to embark on a policy of unilateral disarmament and abandoned the nuclear deterrent!

But that will not hapeen. The great point for us to hoist in is that war is ruled out by Khrushchev because he thinks it will no longer pay —and he is right This is a considerable advance on his part; and if we add to it tlm fact that he wants to go down in history

as ‘‘the man of peace,” who gave prosperity and security to the Russian people, it will be readily understood that the advance is something we should recognise and should use to help us in solving the East-West problem. “Khrushchev Under Pressure” But Khrushchev is under pressure in Russia, and this must be understood. My talks with political and military leaders in Moscow convinced me that they can be grouped in two categories—those who agree with Lenin’s theory that war with the West is inevitable in the long run, and those who think that war can be avoided by reaching agreement with the West on a policy of “live and let live”— in fact, peaceful co-existence. The first category contains the old Marxist diehards. Khrushchev belongs to the second category, believing that Lenin’s theory about the inevitability of war is out of date; to this group belong the younger generation. If a struggle for power takes place between the two categories, as could well happen, we would, I hope want Khrushchev to win. But a continuation by the Americans of spy-flights like the U-2 affair, or the flying of aircraft at any time over Soviet territory, or any measures which have an offensive gesture such as alerting nuclear bomber forces for no apparent reason —all such measures merely tend to increase suspicion and tension between East and West, and help the diehard category in Russia. When the problem is viewed in this light, it is easy to understand why Khrushchev reacts so violently, and rudely at times, to American efforts to obtain information about his country. “Brinkmanship” The lesson is that if the West is genuinely interested in finding a way to live at peace with the East, our leaders must avoid the military aspects of what is commonly called “brinkmanship.” Stupidity in this direction could lead to awkward situations and might conceivably be a spark which would set alight a major fire—a nuclear war. And, of course, there is the further point that when such intelligence activities are discovered they give ammunition to Khrushchev in his campaign to split the Western Alliance —which must never be allowed to happen. N.A.T.O. is already a bit shaky, and any further disruption could frighten the smaller nations—especially those which are near Russian territory, e.g. Norway, Denmark, Turkey. Everybody knows that all nations conduct secret service activities to collect information, about the countries of potential enemies. But intelligence activities must be carried out intelligently, and without being found out The proper political action before the Summit Conference in April, 1960, should have been not to upset the detente, which was going along smoothly. But a spy plane was sent over Russia by the Americans shortly before the conference —which was not very intelligent! And it was caught, which was worse! Revival Of Germany Second question—Germany. When talking with Khrushchev I gained the impression that Russia was apprehensive about the revival of Germany and about a possible revengeful spirit which might arise in that country. He made it clear that he was disturbed about the constant references to a united Germany. Politically, economically and geographically, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is Russia’s most important satellite and she is continually investing capital there. She will not relinquish her grip on East Germany under present conditions; she will not agree to a re-unification of the two Germanys except under her own terms—which the West, of course, will not accept. In fact, a united Germany is impossible in the present circumstances and Khrushchev was very definite about that. It followed, he added that it was not possible to make any fundamental redesign of the Berlin situation -until the European secuity problem had been untangled and sorted out to the complete satisfaction of both blocs— East and West And that fact must be faced by the West. I have always felt that everybody knows this. No nation wants a united Germany. In private conversation with me at various times, every Western political leader has agreed that it would be most unwise to unite the two Germanys; but none of them will say this in public for fear of offending the Western Germans—who, I reckon, also do not want it! We shall just have to carry on in Germany with the status quo, and this includes the Berlin problem. Khrushchev And China Third question—China. I found it very difficult to fathom Khrushchev’s feelings about China. He repudiated any suggestion that China might become a problem for Russia. I put it to him that, geographically, Russia was poised between two nations either of which could make things difficult for his country. He had admitted he was apprehensive about the Germans. What about the Chinese?

Not being altogether satisfied with his answers, and being myself a bit suspicious that he wasn’t being quite truthful. I suddenly shot a very direct question at him: “Which are you most frightened of, the Germans or the Chinese?”

Now Khrushchev is very quick to reply to a question; he is never at a loss for the answer. This time he paused for some seconds, and then said: "For the moment the Germans.”

He was right His answer implied that the future of that great nation in the far East which is moving ahead quickly, was wrapped in mystery; it was difficult to unravel that enigma. I was left with the impression that he was in some doubt about what might happen in China in the long run, as are many others; but the picture will become a little clearer when we come to examine the Chinese leaders. One thing was very clear—the Germans were his immediate fear, and he wasn’t going to give an inch in that direction. Before leaving Khrushchev I must make it clear, in case the reader should think otherwise, that I wouldn't go in the jungle with him. But Western leaders would do well to ponder over what might happen in Russia if he were unseated; somebody much worse might arise. Marshal Tito It will be convenient to discuss Tito next, and that will leave the way clear to deal with the Chinese leaders and the Far East Tito’s real name is Josip Broz, and he is 69. I first got to know him in September. 1953, when he invited me to attend the manoeuvres of the Jugoslav Army in the Zagreb area. I was then serving at S.H.A.P.E. as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The Americans were the only Western nation dealing with Jugoslavia, giving military equipment and economic aid, and my visit to Tito was resented in certain quarters; General Ridgway was Supreme Commander, and he did his best to stop the visit I appealed to the Foreign Office in London and received strong backing from that quarter, which saw in such a visit nothing but good. So I went. I recognised in Tito a strong man, a leader of great character and personality. We became very friendly, and I wrote later and asked if I could visit him in Belgrade and get his views on the general world situation. He said I would be very welcome, and my next visit was paid in September, 1954, and lasted a week. I paid many visits to Tito after that the last being on September 2, 1958. when 1 went to say goodbye before leaving S.H.A.P.E. on September 18, and withdrawing from active employment in the British Army.

Story Of Tito’s Life

In conversation one day I asked Tito to tell me about his early life. By trade he was an electrician. He served in the ranks of the Austrian Army in the First World War, became a sergeant, and finally got captured by the Russians. He then spent seven years in Russia, during which time he became a Communist. On his return to Jugoslavia he joined the workers’ movement, and quickly became its leader; he then led a very hectic life and was more often in prison than not. He found it convenient at that time to have several names, thus making it more difficult for the police to keep contact with his movements. One of the names he used was Tito, and he finally adopted it permanently—he said he liked it and it was easier to pronounce than Broz. And “Tito” he has remained to this day. When the Germans overran Jugoslavia in April, 1941, Tito organised a Communist movement and harried the Germans with guerrilla warfare There was also a right-wing force under a regular Army Officer called Mihajiovic, and the two factions at first combined against the Germans; but evenually the two groups came to blows, and Tito won. When the German war was over in 1945 he became Prime Minister, and later President He has done much for his country, without any doubt His greatest service has been to unify the six republics into a united Jugoslavia. It is a Communist country, but as Tito himself once said to me, they are not Moscow Communists; they do not want to thrust their ideology down the throats of any other nation.

Denounced By Cominform

Tito himself is against international Communism, which aims to communise the world. Indeed, so much did he disagree with Moscow that in 1948 he was denounced by the Cominform; he then left the Soviet camp and became a neutral country. He now wants to live in peace with all his neighbours, to be left alone to develop the resources of his country, and to improve the standard of living of the people—all of which he is doing very well. He is under no delusions about what could happen to his country if the conflict between East and West led to general war. He would remain neutral; but under his leadership the Yugoslavs would fight any enemy who attempted in invade their country—and I should be sorry for any military force which made the attempt

I remember well a talk I had with Tito after Nasser had been to see him in Brioni in 1958. The two had had tong talks together. He told me that Nasser had changed greatly since the days of the Suez affair in 1950, realising that he had many problems on his plate and must go slowly. Tito had advised him not to irritate too many people all at the same time, which was good advice.

He considered Nasser was there for keeps and that the Western nations should try to

help him in so far as they were prepared to do so without damaging their own vital interests or prestige. Nasser’s Attitude To The West Apparently Nasser told Tito that he realised he must have friendly relations . with the West, as there lie his markets; and he wanted friendly relations with Abyssinia and the Sudan, as those countries could interfere with his water supplies. His long-term aim was an Arab Confederation or Republic, comprising all the Arab nations of the Middle East and being completely neutral —trading with both East and West but joining neither bloc. He realised this aim would take time to achieve. Tito had replied that he was working on the same lines for Jugoslavia. There were the two blocs, East and West; of the two he preferred the West and he advised Nasser to adopt the same philosophy. Tito said he personally wasn’t anxious any more about the Middle East situaLord Montgomery’s impressions of the Communist leaders of China will be .printed in "The Press" next Saturday. tion; he thought the dangers lay in the Far East and in Africa. He hoped the Western world would be realistic about the Egyptian leader, accepting the inevitable and trying to guide him into achieving an Arab world. He had been considerably impressed by Nasser; he reckoned he was a leader who had a clear and definite object, who had courage, and who spoke to his followers in language they could understand —which, Tito said, many other political leaders often fail to do. This conversation interested me enormously. Tito is a very shrewd judge of character, and in the talks we have had together he has always impressed me as a man of sound common sense. I never heard him say a harsh word about anybody or against any nation. He is very realistic in his outlook on world problems. He wants his own country, Jugoslavia, to be left alone, not to be pushed about by international communism or other external influences, and to have friendly relations with all her neighbours. Given 15 or 2Q years of peace, I reckon that Jugoslavia will be a thriving State of over twenty million people —a neutral State whose friendship will be worth having. I put Tito in the top category of national leaders. He has conviction, tenacity, and political courage—all qualities of greatness. Indeed, put shortly, he Is a great man. [Copyright, 1961, Bernard Law. Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.l Lyttelton Police Car.—A car has now been made available to the Lyttelton police, after a recent request by the Lyttelton Borough Council that transport be provided to assist in checking vandalism and crime on the outskirts of the port.