Slow Boat To Peking? BRITISH MEDIATION IN COLD WAR LIKELY

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29401, 31 December 1960, Page 12

Slow Boat To Peking? BRITISH MEDIATION IN COLD WAR LIKELY

tßy ANTHONY DORSET of the “Economist”! (From the “Economist" Intelligence Unit)

London, December 14. The Kennedy Administration, which takes over in Washington next month, is committed to a vigorous foreign policy that will reassert American predominance in all Western negotiation with the Soviet Union. It is recognised in the Foreign Office in London that the type of initiative that Mr Macmillan took when he visited Moscow in 1959 may not be repeated; the need for a go-between in Russian-American exchanges will be far more limited under President Kennedy than under the Eisenhower regime. But this does not necessarily imply Mr Macmillan’s exclusion from the personal diplomacy that he likes to practise. Opinion in both the Conservative and Labour Parties has been pressing on the Prime Minister the suggestion that he should plan some early approach to Communist China. There are signs that he does not consider the idea altogether far-fetched. Mr Macmillan told the Commons on December 8 that timing was the essence of such initiatives. He did not think this was the time to invite the Chinese Premier, Mr Chou En-lai, to London; but he left the impression among some of his hearers that a Far Eastern tour, with a stop-over in Peking, was a distinct possibility for the future.

Picking the Moment Mr Macmillan is expected to visit Malaya, the latest member of the Commonwealth, in the not-too-distant future. From Kuala Lumpur he could conveniently go on to Tokyo, to return the official visit to London made by the former Japanese Premier, Mr Kishi. It would be an unimaginative statesman who did not dally with the idea of including Peking in such an itinerary. It is a matter of picking the moment. Mr Macmillan will certainly want to talk things over with Mr Kennedy. He may well wish to get a summit meeting with Mr Khrushchev out of the way first. But there is no doubt that Mr Macmillan sees the sense of trying to draw the Chinese into international society. There is a need to follow up the hard work that Mr Khrushchev has begun in persuading, Peking that co-existence is possible. It is felt in London that this is a task that British mediation is best fitted to undertake. Britain is the only major Western power that recognises the Communist regime in Peking. This was done by the Attlee Government after the Communist military triumph on the mainland in 1949. If the practical results of this action have been meagre—there has not even been an exchange of ambassadors —it is still a basis to build on. There has been a measure of practical understanding, based on mutual convenience, over the existence of Hong Kong. Of all the countries close to the United States, Britain is the one most anxious to see the establishment of proper Chinese-American diplomatic relations and the entry of the Peking Governmertt into the United Nations. This is a policy in which the Canadian Government is also directly interested United Nations Seat? From the Labour front bench, Mr Gaitskell has called for a positive course of action. He proposes that Communist China should be seated at the United Nations, but that the Asian place on the Security Council should go to India. This is only one com-

promise between Chinese claims and American susceptibilities that suggests itself. While the majority of Conservatives are not as specific in their proposals, there is a growing feeling in the party—voiced by a number of M P ’s who entered the Commons at the last election—that American hesitations over China should not be allowed to persist unchallenged. These British critics of United States policy are hoping for a new approach by President Kennedy and his Secretary of State, Mr Dean Rusk, who has specialised in Far Eastern affairs. But they admit that the present prospects for a political settlement with Peking are discouraging. The Chinese Communists will do nothing that would imply their tacit acceptance of the Nationalist Government of General Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa. Rather than allow Formosa to remain independent, the Communists say they would even refuse to enter the United Nations. Nuclear Test Discussions The point that is made by those who want Peking to be invited by the United Nations is that this Communist attitude would be far harder to maintain if Peking were actually to be voted a member. At present Mr Chou En-lai finds it too easy to claim that China is being victimised by the United States.

But there are other ways, too, of bringing the Chinese into international diplomacy. One backdoor entry that Mr Selwyn Lloyd was known to favour when he was at the Foreign Office was to invite the Chinese first to the East-West discussions on nuclear tests and then to full disarmament negotiations. The Chinese would simply appear at the conference table; there need be no immediate question of their precise diplomatic status. When Peking does develop its own atomic bomb the necessity for this course will be self-evident. It is felt in London that the first sign of the Chinese coming near to an atomic explosion will be a renewed flurry of Soviet activity in the nuclear test talks. Mr Macmillan is unlikely to plan any initiative until after the Kennedy Administration has found its feet and he has secured the new President’s confidence. But it begins to look as if a slow, and cautious, voyage to China is high on his list of diplomatic ideas for 1961.