TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1960. Antarctic Treaty

Press, Issue 29236, 21 June 1960, Page 14

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1960. Antarctic Treaty

Years ago Will Rogers said that “the United States never lost “a war or won a conference”.

The comment may again be valid if opponents of American ratification of the Antarctic Treaty succeed in their campaign. This treaty, signed last December by the United States, Russia, and 10 other nations (including New Zealand), was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy, a promising : tep towards improving international relations, and a common-sense method of subjugating territorial rivalries to scientific and other peaceful aims. It was drafted after many weeks of patient negotiations, initiated as the result of President Eisenhower’s appeal in May, 1958, for a continuance in Antarctica of the scientific cooperation that ensured the success of the International Geophysical Year. The treaty is notable in that each of its provisions represents an objective asserted by all the negotiating Powers. As Arthur Krock has observed in the “ New York “ Times ”, there were no “losers” in the negotiations; but “ none was a larger “‘winner’ than the United “States, whose representatives “designed and supervised the “ manufacture of this instru“ment for peace as they did “ the creation of the Inter- “ national Atomic Energy “ Agency two years previously So far as can be ascertained, only Britain has ratified the Antarctic Treaty, the efficacy of which now depends primarily upon endorsement by the United States and Russia. Since the summit fiasco the “ spirit of “Camp David” has ceased to have other than a pejorative significance; and, if some American Congres*men are successful, the recently-discov-ered spirit of Antarctic cooperation will be similarly discarded. Many observers, while suspicious of Mr Khrushchev’s grander gestures, welcomed the thaw in relationships that the Antarctic Treaty seemed to symbolise. Is this gain, however slight, to be

jettisoned with all the summit hopes? Arguments against the Antarctic Treaty were canvassed thoroughly during the preliminary negotiations. They are now being resuscitated by witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The treaty provides for the world’s first international system of arms inspection to prevent the militarisation of Antarctica. Until recently this arrangement was applauded as a possible precursor of worldwide disarmament machinery which would be acceptable to both Russia and the West. American critics now fear lest permission for military equipment and personnel to be used for peaceful scientific purposes may facilitate evasion of the ban on war-like activities in the Antarctic; but they appear to forget that this permission was written into the treaty at the instance of the United States and after prolonged resistance by the Soviet Union. The treaty “ freezes ” territorial claims. Russia and America have never claimed Antarctic territory; and the present is a singularly inopportune time for urging the United States to reverse its policy. By its handling of the U-2 incident the American Government has already presented Russia with a deplorable propagandist victory. By rejecting the Antarctic Treaty, its own brain-child, the United States would provoke renewed Soviet charges of insincerity and warmongering. The Geneva disarmament talks would be further prejudiced; and prospects of future agreement about international control systems—for instance on the use of outer space—would be dimmed. Ratification of the treaty will not solve the vast problems of Antarctica; representatives of the signatories are bound to meet in Canberra two months after the treaty comes into force. The sooner, therefore, that all 12 countries ratify the treaty and allow further progress, the better.