The Eden Memoirs RUSSIA’S ANXIETIES ABOUT GERMANY

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29108, 21 January 1960, Page 11

The Eden Memoirs RUSSIA’S ANXIETIES ABOUT GERMANY

Long-Remembered Conflicts

[By th* Rt Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K..G.1

Towards the end of March, 1955, our hopes were centred on the ratification of the Paris Agreements. This would finally complete the union of the West bring into being the Western European partnership, which I had been working on since my journey round the capitals in the previous September. With the memory of the fate of the European Defence Community in our minds we could not be sure what would happen in Paris, but I was confident that if the agreements were ratified, free Europe would be given a fresh impetus and would regain much of its authority in the world.

[After more than two years of uncertainty, the French Assembly had finally rejected the European Defence Community at the end of August, 1954. Sir Anthony Eden at once undertook a tour of west European capitals to explore alternative arrangements to the supranational EJJ.C., now defunct. Out of this tour came a nine-Power conference in London, which in its turn produced the Paris agreements, signed on October 23. These agreements ended the occupation status of west Germany, admitted Germany to membership of N.A.T.0., and created a new defensive grouping. Western European Union, by which Britain undertook to retain four divisions on the Continent.] The Russians kept repeating their vehement objections to the agreements, but I did not set much store by this. I was sure that, once ratified, they would pass into history and be accepted with that realism which is part of communist practice. As a consequence, my thoughts ranged wider and I began to consider afresh the possibility of a fourpower meeting. Independently, the French had the same idea and the French Prime Minister, M. Edgar Faure, expressed it in a public speech on March 25.

[lt was arranged that Western officials should hold preliminary talks.]

International Discussions Th* discussions between the Western allies, to prepare a meeting with the Soviets, went smoothly, principally in Paris. On May 10 the three Western Governments invited Russia to join with us in an effort to remove the sources of conflict. We said that we realised that these problems could not be solved in a single meeting, nor hastily, in view of their complexity and importance, and suggested that they should be approached in two stages. First, by a meeting of the Heads of Government, accompanied by their Foreign Secretaries, for an exchange of views. In the limited time for which the Heads of Government were able to meet, they could not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the major difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting st- Id rather provide a new impetus and establish new methods. The Heads of Government would prepare and order the next stage, in which the problems would be examined in detail. We also suggested that the Foreign Secretaries should come together shortly in advance of the Heads of Government to assist them in their work. If the Soviet Union agreed to an early meeting, we suggested that the Foreign Secretaries, who were soon to meet in Pienna, should first discuss this proposal there.

Russian Concessions Events had moved rapidly on the Austrian question. Early in April the Soviet Government had summoned an Austrian delegation to Moscow and, after some discussion, announced their willingness to sign the Austrian State Treaty and to withdraw their occupation forces, in return for an Austrian declaration of neutrality. The Russians made some important concessions in the economic clauses of the treaty, including the renunciation of their claim to the Austrian oilfields and refineries. It is possible that they hoped by this apparent leniency to make a favourable impression upon Federal Germany, with which they were about to open diplomatic relations. The Austrian Treaty was signed on May 15 and the last of the occupying forces withdrew during the following months.

[The Russians accepted a Western invitation to a summit meeting in Geneva in July. Problems of Germany and European security would once again be at the head of the agenda, and were the subject of preliminary discussions among the Western allies.] Things To Come Our ideas began to take shape. I had in mind a collective proposal which would include at least three ingredients.. The first a demilitarised strip in Europe. I did not believe that the Russians at Geneva would be ready to make broad concessions in Germany, but I thought that they might agree to step back a little if given a positive reassurance. A modest proposal was more likely to lead to results than ■ far-flung plan which would lead to endless negotiation. In discussions with my col-

leagues and the Chiefs of Staff in June, I put forward a suggestion for the demilitarisation of a comparatively narrow strip on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This certainly would have involved the military planners at N.A.T.O. in some withdrawal of their advanced bases in central Europe. But I thought that this would be worth while if Russian and Russian-sponsored forces could be persuaded to retire many miles to the east and if the Soviet Government would then agree to free elections in Germany and to progress on German unity. In the general field of discussion an agreement with the Russians, even upon a narrow segment of Europe, would help. The second ingredient of my package proposal would be a limitation of armaments within specified areas of Europe, and the third a European security pact. These limitations would not finely equality, nor would there be o .ny thinning out of our forces in Western Germany. They would, however, be subject to the ceiling imposed by the Paris Agreements, and, if the Russians agreed to a common system of control. [Under W.E.U. certain maxima were laid down for allied troops.]

Control As The Key I wanted to try out such a system with the Russians taking part in it. Control was the key to so many matters, including nuclear tests. The Russians were suspicious of control. This was part of their national character and not just to be ascribed to communism. I felt that if a system of international control could be established, even on a limited scale, the dragon might be found to be not so very dangerous after all. When the great

powers have accepted a system of international control in some sphere and begun to work it, we may emerge from the cold war. Until they do, we shall be rival armed camps dividing the world and endangering peace.

Dr. Adenauer, the Chancellor of Federal Germany, paid me a visit at Chequers at my invitation, on June 19. I was glad of the opportunity to talk to him before the conference opened. He had recently told us of a tentative German plan for demilitarised areas in Europe, which bore some likeness to my own thoughts. We had a discussion in which we found our ideas very much in accord. World Affairs I always enjoyed a talk about world affairs with the German Chancellor. We sat in the Long Library that summer afternoon, looking out over the countryside, and took a prowl together round Europe. Dr. Adenauer is clear and forceful, and never allows his purpose to become confused. He understands the full reality of the Communist challenge, that it is something much more than a leftwing movement, and he reacts against it with all the conviction of a European and a Catholic from the Rhineland. But, in my many conversations with him, I never knew him deal with his problems in exaggerated terms. The Soviets had recently recognised the Federal German Government and had invited its Chancellor to go to Moscow. We discussed this state of affairs. Dr. Adenauer understood that he must go and was fully prepared to do so, but he had no illusions about Soviet intentions. The Western European Union had just been created, and he and I had played a leading part in bringing it about The Russians had made no secret of their dislike of this association, and still more of Germany’s entry into N.A.T.0.; as always, the Kremlin wished to divide the West The Chancellor thought that he should accept the invitation to Moscow now, but not make the visit until after our Geneva meeting. Position In Germany I outlined our collective proposal to the Chancellor and he seemed to like it. He spoke of the importance of showing at Geneva that the Western powers wanted the unification of Germany and that they had practical

suggestions to make. We must also show that we wanted disarmament; in sponsoring the idea of a demilitarised area, he considered that we were taking a great step to bring this about The Chancellor held that in these conditions, the Soviets had no good reason to be afraid of reunification. If Germany were united, a great deal of German energy would for a long time be absorbed in bringing the Eastern zone back into prosperity. Conditions, there, he emphasised, were deplorably bad. The Chancellor agreed with me that we could not expect either quick or easy success in our discussion with the Russians. He believed, as I did, that if the conference held out no serious prospects of immediate agreement, then a series of meetings with the Russians should be kept going, in the hope of making gradual progress.

[The Geneva conference opened on July 18. The first two days’ public speeches and private talks showed that Western and Russian attitudes were still far apart. The three western leaders, President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, and M. Faure, the French Prime Minister, emphasised the need for an all-German Government, based on free elections. Marshal Bulganin urged the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe and a security pact for all Europe.]

Heart Of The Problem

After the discussion at the second conference session was ovtr, Bulganin came up to me and admitted the reality of our divergence and the seriousness of the German question. He said he thought that I understood their position. I said I did understand that they did not want to see East Germany join West Germany in N.A.T.0.. On the other hand, how could we devise a security arrangement which satisfied him and allowed Germany to take her own decision, as any country must be able to do? He agreed that this was the heart of the problem and made various complimentary remarks as to how I could resolve it. I indicated that I felt the prospects were not bright after the day’s discussions. We agreed to continue to examine the topic that night after the dinner which we were giving to the Soviet leaders. I drove back to my villa reflecting that if this should prove to be so, at least our evening would be more useful than that of our French and American friends, whom the Russians had left without any serious talk, immediately after the caffee. The Foreign Secretary and I, with Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, and Sir William Hayter, our Ambassador in Moscow, welcomed our Soviet guests to dinner that evening. Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev, with Mr Molotov. General Zhukov [Russian Minister of Defence, 1955-57] and Mr Malik, Soviet Ambassador in London, made up the party During dinner I sat between Bulganin and Khrushchev and had a forthcoming talk with the former, who appeared to wish to give an account of his preoccupations.

Soviet Fears Of Germany

After some preliminary conversation about the war years, Bulganin plunged into the problem of Germany He explained, on familiar lines, how real were Soviet fears of a German recovery. Almost every family in Soviet Russia, including his own, had suffered some personal loss. I replied that we in Britain also had no reason to feel tenderly to the Germans after the experience of two wars. But we had to look to the future and, whatever the fear of Germany had been, I could not believe that in this nuclear age Germany could really be a formidable danger to Russia. Bulganin, however, would not altogether accept this. He admitted that the Germans might not be able to make hydrogen bombs, but after all they could be given them. We discussed the possibility of reaching some agreement about forces and armaments in Germany and neighbouring countries, together with a form of supervision to control them. He thought this worth examining, but said that he had not given detailed thought to it. I advised him to give it consideration. We also discussed the security pact and I told him I thought it a pretty hopeless proposition to try to create a pact for all Europe. How, for instance, could Tito and Franco be accommodated together? He laughed and said that perhaps this was not necessary; maybe the Soviets cast their nets too wide. Perhaps it would be possible to form some pact between us which covered at least a part of Europe.

Later Discussions

In later discussions that evening, in which Mr Khrushchev took part, the suggestion was made that the N.A.T.O. powers should maintain their organisation and the Warsaw powers maintain theirs. All these should join the European pact, with the addition of some other countries. They gladly accepted that these should include the United States and Canada. After we had discussed these matters for some time, Bulganin said that he wanted to say something to me which he had said to nobody else. It was really not possible for his Government to return to Moscow from this conference, having agreed to the immediate unification of Germany. They were a united Government and reasonably solidly based in the country, but this was something that Russia would not accept and if they were to agree to it, neither the army nor the people would understand, and this was no time to weaken the Government The people would say that this was something Stalin would have never agreed to. On

this he simply could not meet us. As I reflected upon our conversation later that night, I felt that there was a genuine streak in what I had been told. The West, and in particular the United States, has never clearly understood the terrible significance of the German invasion for Russia. A nation of eighty million had invaded a nation of one hundred and sixty million, devastated its western provinces and almost reached its capital. The Russian people could never forget this. They had no Atlantic between them and Germany, not even a Channel. They would not run such risks again. In much that is false in the stream of comment which flows from the Soviets, there is one cry that is real. It is that of a nation which has nearly bled to death, not for the first time in Russian history. The Napoleonic war, the First World War, both tolled the same experience. Russians have long memories, they would be feckless not to take precautions.

[The conference ran into heavy weather in its discussion of Germany. Sir Anthony Eden proposed that there might be a simultaneous approach to a security pact and to German unity. The Russians countered with a plan for a nonaggression treaty between the members of N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact States. Turning to disarmament, President Eisenhower produced his “open skies” proposal, for mutual reconnaisance by aerial photography.] Reducing Tension Meanwhile, at the conference table, I had put forward another of the proposals we had been working on. I had already told the French and Americans about it. This, I now informed the c. Terence, was aimed at reducing tension in the area which most acutely concerned us all, where the forces of East and West faced each other. My idea was that we should work out a simple plan for the joint inspection of the forces actually confronting one another in Europe. Over a specified area to be agreed between us, extending for a fixed depth on either side of the line now dividing east and west Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides. I considered this a practical proposal which could easily be extended outwards from the centre of the area in which it was launched. This scheme could be a useful one, and a start might be made with international inspection this way. No harm could result and confidence might be gained.

[There were difficulties in agreeing the directive to be given to the Foreign Secretaries for their further consideration of the problems raised at Geneva. Finally, to avoid a breakdown, the western leaders agreed to accept the Russian draft, in which European Security and German unity were merged in the same paragraph. The conference ended on July 23.]

The Geneva Conference taught some lessons, which were powerfully to affect the course of events in the next few years. Each country present learnt that no country attending wanted war and each understood why. The Russians realised, as we did, that this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo-nuclear weapons. Accordingly, they were determined to keep a free hand to develop these

weapons as far and as fast as their country’s very considerable resources would take them. They had resolved to hold the most up-to-date weapons; this decided their attitude to control, which they feared might hamper them. In the minds of the men who commanded power in the world, the lessons of the conference might result in a reduced risk of total destruction to the human race.

In one of our informal discussions Mr Khrushchev commented that the Chinese had been very patient; he did not think that the Russians would have been so patient. I replied that he underestimated his own statesmanship. The position of Quemoy and the Matsus was very difficult for the Americans and for everybody concerned. The Americans might wish their ally to take steps he was not prepared to take. We were not always able to get our friends to do what we wanted. The Russians appeared to accept this, but they were clearly still anxious about the Far Eastern situation.

As these ipformal exchanges proceeded, I felt increasingly convinced that all the member powers wished to avoid conflict in the area. This, I believed, also applied to the Chinese Government of Peking, though, as the Russians commented, “The master of the house is absent” I thought that it might even suit the Chinese Communists to have Chiang’s forces on the off-shore islands. They constituted a constant grievance with which most of world opinion would sympathise. The islands were militarily vulnerable and could be harassed or bombarded by conventional weapons at any time, when Chiang would have to evacuate or supply them. The former would be a humiliation, the latter costly in supplies and perhaps in life. Formosa On the other hand, if Chiang were soon to evacuate Quemoy and the Matsus, as he had Tachen, then the Chinese Communist case against Chiang and the United States would be much weaker, politically and militarily. [The Tachen Islands, 200 miles north of Formosa, had been evacuated by the Chinese Nationalists in February, 1955.1 World opinion would not feel about Formosa, with its chequered history and so recently Japanese, as it did about small islands in the mouth of Chinese harbours and rivers. Militarily, the Chinese Communists could do little that was effective to threaten Formosa, so long as it was part of the United States defensive chain. To get there, they would have to swim or fly against a formidable fortress a hundred miles away. Therefore, from the American point of view, the position in Formosa would be stronger without the commitment of the offshore islands. Anxious Weeks A less comfortable conclusion could also be drawn. The communist powers would continue to prosecute their purpose by every means. To do this, they would work in areas, and by methods, including the use of conventional weapons, which they believed would not entail retaliation by nuclear weapons. Here I felt was the likely pattern of future events.

Our formal meetings were concerned with Europe, our private anxieties with the Fast East. I soon learnt that the other delegations at the conference thought there was no immediate danger of war in Europe. It was equally clear that all were deeply concerned at the situation in the Far East, especially that of the offshore islands of Quemoy and the Matsus. [Fighting had flared up at the beginning of the year between Nationalist forces on the offshore islands and Communist forces on the mainland.] The United States might declare that they owed nothing to Chiang Kaishek, but he wgs necessary to the defence of Formosa, or so at least the Americans believed, and For-

mosa formed part of the United States Pacific defences. No Chinese Government could be expected to accept this, though it might tolerate it under repeated protests. The Formosans themselves would probably prefer to lead their own lives, without either Chiang or Peking to dominate them.

Time On The Side Of Peace

It seemed to me that here was an occasion where time was on the side of peace. Already in Formosa the army was changing its character. It was becoming composed more and more of young Formosans, who did not want to return to the mainland. As that development continued, the off-shore islands would matter less In the talks I held. I did

everything I could to persuade those present, and absent, of the peaceful intentions of the other side.

On the evening when I dined with the Russians, Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev spoke of the position in the Far East. Marshal Zhukov was also present, but he took no part in the conversation.

My hosts said that they had been greatly impressed by what they had seen during their visit to China. The new leaders there were men to be reckoned with. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai 1 were strong characters, men of balanced judgment, who were unlikely to take hasty or illconsidered action. The regime was firmly established; much material progress was being made and, in 10 years or so, China would be a strong modem state. Meanwhile their revolution was young. It was natural, therefore, that they should resent Chiang's occupation of Quemoy and the Matsus so near their coastline, and the United States protection of Chiang in Formosa. It was natural, too, that they should wish to take China’s seat in the United Nations. On that point the Russians claimed that they certainly had right on their side. Off-Shore Islands The off-shore islands were in a different category. They had always been part of China, and were garrisoned and defended by Chiang Kai-shek. No great power could seriously want to fight about them, yet they could be a cause of war, just the samp. They were never mentiond at the conference table, but they were the world’s flash point in the summer of 1955. I am convinced that the Geneva Conference damped their explosive force, for the time being at least. Clearly this was not a topic likely to yield to direct United States and Soviet talks, but I had no inhibitions about taking a hand in it myself. After a detailed conversation alone with the President, I was absolutely convinced of American sincerity. The Americans knew that they had a bear by the tail. I soon found that the Soviet leaders shared my concern at the danger, while persistently upholding their ally’s standpoint.