The Eden Memoirs DEATH OF STALIN PRESENTED SOME NEW FACTORS

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29102, 14 January 1960, Page 7

The Eden Memoirs DEATH OF STALIN PRESENTED SOME NEW FACTORS

Speculative Thoughts On Both Sides Of The Iron Curtain

I N this chapter of his book “Full Circle,” Sir Anthony ™P act on international both sides of fho r* an( i o*e reactions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He deals also with the conferences that were held, the difficult discussions and anxious weeks and months of 1954.

[The death of Stalin in March, 1953, produced a flood of speculation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There were hopes of a thaw in Russia’s foreign attitudes as well as in her domestic policies. On May 11 Sir Winston Churchill suggested the need for a conference “at the highest level . . . not overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda.” A Preliminary meeting with the American President and the French Prime Minister was agreed, and Bermuda fixed as the rendezvous. But this meeting had to be twice postponed, first owing to a prolonged governmental crisis in France, and afterwards owing to Sir Winston Churchill’s indisposition. It was finally arranged for December.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of July, a “little Bermuda” conference had been held in Washington. There the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, conferred with the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, and Lord Salisbury, who was Acting Foreign Secretary throughout the summer while serious illness kept Mr. Eden away from the Foreign Office.] Signs Of Unrest On June 17, 1953, anti-Soviet demonstrations suddenly broke out in East Berlin and in several towns of the Eastern zone of Germany. These riots followed signs of unrest in Czechoslovakia and showed bow thin was the communist crust in these occupied lands. In spite of the hopes these risings inspired, Soviet policy was not, for the moment, toughened in Eastern Germany; some internal political concessions continued to be granted. It looked as if Mr Malenkov and his colleagues needed a pause to consolidate their power in the Kremlin. The dismissal of Beria as Minister of State Security revealed internal rivalry. In these conditions the possibility that Moscow might be ready for some form of agreement in central Europe was slight, but just worth exploring. Lord Salisbury’s conversations in Washington showed that there were other arguments for a fresh approach to the Soviet Government. M. Bidault declared that his Government could not hope to secure the ratification of E.D.C. until a further attempt had been made to reach a European settlement by negotiation. (The Treaty embodying the European Defence Community, reinforced by an Anglo-American guarantee, had been signed at the end of May, 1952). France was not prepared to make the sacrifice of sovereignty involved in E.D.C. until she had final proof of Russian intransigence. Dr. Adenauer, in a letter to Mr Dulles, also declared himself strongly in favour of a new effort to discover Russia’s intentions by bringing her to the conference table. The three Ministers decided, in the words of their communique, “to propose a meeting in the early autumn of the Foreign Secretaries of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. to discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem, namely, the organisation of free elections and the establishment of a free all-German Government.” Proposal Rejected The Soviet Government blocked this invitation in a note they handed to our Ambassador in Moscow on August 4th. They would only agree to a conference which would include Communist China and discuss the problems ) of the world at large. The West- / ern proposal for all-German free elections was flatly rejected. Feeling that something more was needed to influence the forthcoming elections in the Federal German Republic, Moscow proposed, a few days later, that a peace conference on Germany should assemble within six months. Meanwhile, a provisional all-German Government should be formed, as the precondition for holding free elections. I spent some weeks convalescing in the Mediterranean, and cruising in H.M.S. Surprise. When I returned to the Foreign Office on October sth, this mammoth correspondence was heaped upon my desk. On October 16th Mr Dulles and M. Bidault arrived in London for discussions. We decided to persist in inviting the Soviet Government to a conference. We said that it would he better if we four met, instead of sending each other notes. Then things slowly began to move until at the end of November the Russians accepted our proposal for a four-power conference. With a condition. This was that they would ask for a five-power meeting, including China, when the four met I thought we could handle that This Soviet reply added a usei

ful item for the Bermuda conference.

Sir Winston Churchill and I arrived on the island on December 2. Mr Dulles, M. Bidault and I soon met to discuss our reply to the Russians. We had to settle details of time and place. Mr Dulles considered that time was now a vital factor and not just a !? atter of convenience. The United States, he said, were prepared to accept a four-power meeting, on the assumption that it could be held in the near future and that we would be able to extricate ourselves from it quickly, if it became clear that the Russians intended to accomplish nothing and were merely taking part in it for propaganda purposes. It was virtually certain, Mr Dulles said, that the only result which the Russians hoped to achieve at this meeting was to delay our present plans for strengthening the position of the West, both in E.D.C. and in N.A.T.O. The conference must not be allowed to delay the ratification of E.D.C. Mr Dulles told us that the United States Congress were in a mood in which, unless there was some positive action towards European unity in the next two or three months, its foreign aid appropriations would be so rigid and so qualified that there would be very serious repercussions on the N.A.T.O. programme. The four-power meeting should therefore start as soon as possible and, if it became clear that no satisfactory solutions would be reached, it should be ended in time for French parliamentary action to be taken on E.D.C. during February. Mr Dulles concluded with the statement that he could not take the responsibility for saying that Congress would continue their firm and loyal support of N.A.T.0., or pursue the creation of a strong economic and military body on the continent of Europe, if this situation were to drag on much longer. If this time-table could not be adopted, he was afraid that the Soviet manoeuvre would have achieved its purpose of bringing about disunity between us.

“Reappraisal” This was the first I had heard of the possible “reappraisal” of American policy towards Europe. Mr Dulles was to speak forcefully, or brutally as the French thought, about this in Paris a few days later. I saw the strength of the argument for an early date and I would have preferred it. But having worked so long for this meeting, I did not want to rush my fences at the end. I thought that having asked for the meeting and the Russians having accepted, we had at least to give time enough for serious business. At a later discussion January 4. 1954, was suggested.

[On December 13, during the N.A.T.O. Council meeting in Paris, Mr. Eden discussed with Dr. Adenauer whether it would be possible to give Russia some assurance over European security. He again emphasized that Britain would come as close as possible to E.D.C. without actually joining it. Angry Comment Three days later, I had an important conversation with Mr Dulles. What he told me on this occasion was much in my mind throughout the following year, and particularly after the failure of E.D.C. On the evening before he came to see me, Mr Dulles had spoken at a press conference of the “agonising reappraisal” of American foreign policy, which would have to take place if France failed to ratify E.D.C. His speech had raised a storm of angry comment in the French press. It was eagerly seized upon by all those who found Europe’s military dependence upon the United States irksome, and its tone had given rise to concern even amongst America’s closest friends. Mr Dulles now told me that was no accident that he had spoken so strongly about the implications of any failure to ratify E.D.C. His longer statement in the N.A.T.O. Council the previous day had been carefully gone over by the President, and he would have liked to publish it, but M. Bidault had objected. The United States Government felt that it was essential to give French public opinion a jolt. The French, he said, did not seem to be aware of the very grave consequences upon American policy if the hopes of a European arrangement, which would unite France and Germany, were to be dashed. He had been, speaking to M. Jean Monnet [President of the High Authority, Coal and Steel Commission] and had reached the conclusion that it was probably not possible to find a French Government which could put through E.D.C. and govern France, since the majorities required for these two purposes were different.

Parting Of The Ways?

This was clever, but I was not sure it was true, for I was beginning to question whether any French Government could put through E.D.C. It might therefore be necessary, Mr Dulles continued, to work for a French Government which could take office solely for the purpose of

putting through E.D.C. That was one reason why he had thought it necessary to give a jolt now, rather than wait until nearer the ratification debates. Mr Dulles then told me that be thought we, by which he apparently meant the United States and Britain, were approaching a parting of the ways with regard to American policy. If things went wrong, the United States might swing over to a policy of western hemispheric defence, with the emphasis on the Far East. This might not be immediately apparent, but once the trend started, it would be hard to stop. Already there was mounting pressure for such a change. Moreover, he was afraid that if E.D.C. were not ratified in the spring, the Germans would become disillusioned with the European idea, and would press strongly to be released from the present allied restrictions. I told Mr Dulles that I feared it must be regarded as doubtful whether E.D.C. would go through. The French as a whole seemed impervious either to cajolery or to the prospects of dire alternatives. I had therefore been wondering whether we could not strengthen N.A.T.O. obligations and machinery, and thus control Germany ourselves within N.A.T.O. This would surely be better than a peripheral or hemispheric strategy. I added that these thoughts should of course be kept strictly to ourselves, as we must give no hint to the French that there was an acceptable alternative to E.D.C. Berlin Conference On my return from Paris, I set to work with my advisers in the Foreign Office on our plans for the Berlin conference. Good preliminary work had already been done by a working group of American, French and British officials, in which our own dele-

gation was led by Sir Frank Roberts [Deputy Under-Secre-tary of State, Foreign Office]. After studying their findings, which were extremely thorough and included a detailed plan for the organisation of free all-Ger-man elections, I wrote down my own thoughts on the prospects: Soviet objectives in Europe:

For the Soviet Government, the principal obstacle to their plans in Europe is the presence of American troops and American influence on the Continent. The military and political strength of the United States in Europe will be consolidated if Germany is drawn into the Western system and raises forces to assist in Western defence. Soviet policy in’ Europe has thus two main purposes:

(i) to obtain American withdrawal from Europe, thus fatally weakening the Western alliance: (ii) to prevent the resurgence of a strong united Germany integrated with the West.

Western objectives in Europe:

The most important requirement for the Western powers, on the other hand, is to reach agreement on the reunification of Germany as a free, democratic state looking towards the West and able and willing to associate itself with the West in E.D.C., etc. When we originally proposed a meeting of Foreign Secretaries at the time of the Washington talks, it was our intention that E.D.C. would be in existence before the opening of any conference. Our task should then have been to reach satisfactory arrangements with the Russians in he light of this fait accompli. But the hesitations of the French Parliament, which may be partly ascribed to the Soviet Union’s less intransigent international behaviour, have prevented this. Handling of the German problem at Berlin:

The main positive Western objectives in Berlin will be to make progress towards a German peace treaty and to conclude the Austrian Treaty. An important negative objective will be to ensure that French ratification of the E.D.C. treaty is not further delayed by the Berlin Conference. We must avoid creating the impression that we (and more particularly the Americans) are in such a hurry to get on with E.D.C. that we are not aiming at serious negotiations on Germany and Austria. We must therefore establish the position that we, unlike the Russians, have a practical plan for German reunifica■tion, which would produce a representative all - German Government with which alone a peace treaty can be negotiated. This must be based on free, allGerman elections as the essential first step.

We should then be able to

counter the Soviet thesis that a peace treaty should be negotiated without delay, but with an unrepresentative provisional allGerman Government selected from the existing Federal Government and the discredited Soviet zone regime. The subsequent organisation of elections would be left entirely to these two groups of Germans, without any outside supervision. This Soviet approach is designed (a) to build up the waning prestige of its puppets in the Soviet zone and (b) to create an unrepresentative all-German Government, including Soviet zone Communists, which would be prevented from aligning Germany with the West and would be under increasingly strong Russian influence. The Western approach has the support of all the major parties in the Federal Republic and in Berlin, who regard th eSoviet alternative as completely unacceptable.

“No Compromise” We must also resist any Soviet proposals aiming at German neutralisation or at a return to four-power control of Germany. In short, we must adhere firmly to the principle (i) that an allGerman Government, with which we can negotiate a peace treaty can only emerge from free elections, and (ii) that this allGerman Government must be able to choose its own international associations provided that they are not inconsistent with the United Nations Charter. This policy is in line with that pursued by the three Western Governments at the last fourpower ministerial meeting with the Soviet Government in 1949, and with the provisions of the Bonn Conventions which I signed in 1952. On these principles there can be no compromise.

[The Foreign Ministers’ conference opened in Berlin on January 25, 1954. The four delegations were headed by Mr. Eden, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Molotov and M. Bidault.

At the end of his opening speech, Mr Molotov proposed an agenda consisting of: 1. Measures for reducing international tension and convening a five-Power conference, to include China. 2. Germany and European security. 3. Austria. In the hope of getting down to the German problem as quickly as possible, this agenda was accepted by the three western Ministers.]

On January 27, Mr Molotov came to dine with me, and I was able to sound out his views on Germany. I explained that we were quite as anxious as the Soviet Government to prevent any revival of the German danger. We were convinced that the best, and indeed the only method yet suggested from any quarter was E.D.C. I then developed all the arguments for E.D.C.; that there would be only 12 German divisions, that they would be under the control of obviously peace-loving countries such as France and Holland and also ourselves, that Germany’s armaments production would be under international control, that these 12 divisions, with only a tactical air force and with no navy or atomic weapons, would absorb a contribution from the German economy as great as Hitler’s 1939 forces, and that they would not be under the control of a German national government. I pointed out that if despite these safeguards, Germany were to attack the Soviet Union, we would be at the side of the Soviet Union in accordance with the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. Surely this was the best way to prevent the dangers we both feared. But if this was not enough, I went on, we had offered to consider with the Soviet Union that further security arrangements could be made. “Pieces Of Paper” Molotov commented rather acidly that pieces of paper were not sufficient security against the revival of the Germany army. He then expressed considerable scepticism about E.D.C. He thought we were under illusions about future developments in Germany. He was very critical of Adenauer, whom he described more than once as an enemy of the Soviet Union. He added that Adenauer’s successors were likely to be even more aggressive and dangerous. E.D.C. said Molotov, was an organisation without the Soviet Union and directed against her. Of course, the Soviet Union was strong enough to defend herself against Adenauer, but surely we were agreed that our objective should be to avoid any war at all, by an agreement between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France to prevent any revival of German militarism. We had proposed free elections, he continued, but Hitler had come to power as a result of elections which were free. He agreed that there should be free elections in Germany, but that the four occupying powers should surely agree beforehand upon the kind of government they wished to result from free elections.

This last remark, I thought, revealed too much of Soviet thinking. The Russians had been convinced that Mr Churchill and I would come back to the Potsdam Conference. They made no concealment of their opinion in advance and were much astonished when the results of the 1945 election were known. One of my Foreign Office friends who had seen the Soviet leaders that day, commented in a message to me: “One

result is quite certain. Uncle Joe is more than ever convinced that free elections are a great mistake.” At this later meeting in Berlin, I said to Molotov that I had not heard of any Soviet alternative to E.D.C., other than the proposal in one of the Soviet notes for a German national army. Surely, I continued, this would enable the Germans to develop their strength independently, and to play off the Western powers against the Soviet Union as Molotov had feared. We must all face the fact that Germany would be rearmed; and indeed, the Soviet Union had begun to rearm Eastern Germany. Molotov commented that this was not a very serious rearmament, to which I retorted that there was not a single German soldier in West Germany. Molotov’s only positive contribution was to say that it all depended upon the kind of German government which controlled the future German army, and to repeat his criticisms of Dr. Adenauer. I pointed out once more that the whole virtue of E.D.C. was that the limited German force would not be under the control of any German government but of an international organisation composed of obviously non-aggressive countries, with whom we would be closely associated.

Before turning to these specific subjects, I proposed to Mr Molotov, and he agreed, that we must try to re-establish the climate in which we had discussed our common problems in the war years. He suggested more than once that after many years of lack of contact he was rather out of touch with our point of view. He certainly revealed this, in what was a rather difficult though not unfriendly conversation, in which I had to take all the initiative. My main object was to persuade him that we had not come to Berlin only to oppose the Soviet Union. Proposal Refused On January 30, we had our first discussion of the German question. Molotov proposed that representatives from the Federal Republic and the East German regime should be invited to attend. We had expected this request, and Dulles, as chairman, refused to accept it, on the grounds that the East German regime were

not legitimate representatives of the German people. I pointed out, in support of this refusal, that it was precisely in order to establish legitimate representatives of the German people that I had repeatedly urged the holding of free and all-German elections.

After lengthy argument over this demand, Molotov proposed during a recess that we should continue the discussion in closed session the next day. I said that I could not accept this proposal. It would have prevented me from taking the initiative with Western and German opinion by presenting our plan for German reunification. I had agreed with my Western colleagues that I should do this at the earliest opportunity. When the session resumed, Bidault gave me a lead-in by saying that whereas in Austria there was a single Government recognised by all four powers, in Germany there was not; the first thing, therefore, was to bring about a union of Germany. I

took this opportunity, though not strictly in order, to set out the main points in the Western plan. These were:

I. Free elections throughout Germany. 11. The convocation of a National Assembly resulting from those elections. 111. The drafting of a constitution and the preparation of peace treaty negotiations. IV. The adoption of the constitution and the formation of an all-German Government responsible for the negotiation of the peace treaty. V. The signature and entry

into force of the peace treaty. I elaborated each of these points in some detail, and Western policy was now on record for all to see. This became known as the “Eden Plan.” For the moment Molotov contented himself with a mild remark to the effect that Bidault and I had. perhaps taken advantage of the indulgence of the chair, and with that we adjourned. Molotov’s Attitude At our meeting on January 31st, Molotov gave us his preliminary comments on the Western proposals. He disclosed two main lines of argument from which, throughout the rest of the conference, he never budged. The first of these was that as a result of making free elections the first stage of our plan for reunification, the arrangements for the elections would be left in the hands of the occupying powers. This, he said, showed distrust of the Germans.

Secondly, and more important, Molotov insisted that the all-Ger-man Government which would emerge from our plan would not be free in external affairs, since it would be bound by the engagements which had been imposed on the Federal Government in the Bonn and Paris Agreements. E.D.C., he added, would untie the hands of the German militarists and would restore a regular German army. At successive meetings, our discussion revolved continuously around these two points. Against all the evidence and despite our repeated assurances. Molotov professed to believe that the Western plan for reunification was a device for compelling a unified Germany to adhere to Western defensive organisations whieh were hostile to the Soviet Union. In reiterating this, he lost flo op-

portunity to attack the policy of the United States in Europe. In order to underline the unreality of this argument, Mr Dulles proposed on February 4, and I agreed, that the clause in the Western plan which emphasised the freedom of an allGerman Government in external commitments should be altered to read as follows: ‘‘the all-German Government shall have authority to assume or reject the international rights and obligations of the Federal Government and the Soviet zone of Germany.” Even this, with our explicit assurance that a unified Germany would choose for itself whether or not to join E.D.C., made no impression. Molotov argued in one breath that we were not prepared to give real freedom to Germany, and in the next that we were giving free rein to German militarism.

Stranger still was the Soviet position revealed by Mr Molotov when he produced his own proposals. These were modified versions of earlier draft peace treaties which the Russians had put forward in 1952 and again in 1953. Two of their salient points were plausible enough, that all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from German territory, all foreign bases being liquidated; and that Germany should undertake not to enter any coalition or military alliance directed against her former enemies. The third point made nonsense of the whole Soviet position. It proposed that Germany should have her own national army, thus creating the very dangers which Molotov had told me he feared. If paper restrictions were, as Molotov argued with me, of no avail when dealing with Germans now, they would hardly be more valuable when Germany had a national army.

On free elections, Molotov continued to insist that the formation of a provisional Government drawn from the Federal and East German regimes should precede their organisation. Of our own plan, we heard little or nothing. After studiously ignoring it for five sessions, Mr Molotov rejected it flatly on February 4. It was then clear that the Soviet Union was determined to block the reunification of Germany, except on terms which would have deprived the German people of their freedom indefinitely and would have dismantled the Western alliance. Message To London I dined again with Molotov on the evening before he rejected the Western plan, and sent to London this personal account of our conversation: “Although Molotov had had a rather hard day at the conference and had shown some signs of strain, he was as always a courteous host and his general attitude, although reserved on questions of substance, was as friendly as at our first dinner last week. Once again, however, I had to make all the running. He raised no particular subjects himself and seemed to prefer a listening role, although many of his reactions were interesting. “At dinner we talked about old times and exchanged the usual toasts on Anglo-Soviet friendship, etc. The main point of interest which emerged concerned today’s quadripartite meeting. Molotov clearly thought he had been successful in inducing Mr Dulles and M. Bidault to chase all the hares he had raised in his speech yesterday. He tried to argue that, in insisting upon taking the problem of all-German elections first, I was overlooking the wider issues of European security. “After dinner, we once again spoke in a smaller circle. I said we really must produce some results from this conference (he did not dissent) and asked Molotov what he thought the prospects were. I mentioned the Far East, and he said he hoped something might be done there. I then mentioned Austria, and He said that this might indeed be possible. He immediately added that there should be some agreement on Germany without, however, suggesting what this should be or how it should be brought about. He said good-humouredly that my plan was an ultimatum. I denied this, and urged him to comment upon it and to suggest any improvements. European Security “This immediately brought us back to the whole question of European security. I at once reminded him of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, which we had toasted at dinner, and said that he knew as well as I did that neither the British people nor our allies would ever join in an attack against the Soviet Union. If Germany did so, we would be at the side of the Soviet Union. I repeated the arguments why N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. could only be defensive, and explained why Germany, even if she wished to do so, could not, given the present world balance of power and our plans for the future of Germany, resort again to aggression. When I once again pointed out that the German contribution to E.D.C. would only be twelve divisions, Molotov retorted that nevertheless we apparently could not do without them.

“Molotov was quite ready to admit our own good intentions, and indeed paid several compliments to the peaceful character and the political wisdom of the British people. But he came out more strongly than at our first dinner against E.D.C. and N.A.T.O. His theme was that these organisations did not include the U.S.SJEL, and were directed against her. I reminded him that the Soviet Union had built up a

military and political bloc in eastern Europe long before N.A.T.O. or E.D.C. had been thought of. He laughingly asked me whether I was referring to Jugoslavia with whom the Soviet Union still had a treaty. In more serious mood, he assured me with every appearance of sincerity that the Soviet Union’s treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, etc., were directed only against a renewal of German aggression, and that there were no open or secret clauses conflicting with this. I retorted that N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. were equally defensive and concerned only with aggression in general. Molotov commented that this was a riddle. American Intentions “This naturally led us on to a discussion of American intentions. I had previously told Molotov that he was very wrong in regarding the Americans as a bellicose people. I had added that he was equally wrong in fearing American bases, and in handing over, as he had in his last speech, many purely British bases, such as Aden, to the Americans. I told him that he must know as well as I did that no bases on British territory would ever be used for aggression against the Soviet Union —indeed, they could not be used at all without the express consent of Her Majesty’s Government. Whatever Molotov might say in public, he must realise that the United Kingdom, and indeed the other nations in N.A.T.0., retained their complete independence. Molotov readily agreed that United Kingdom policy was entirely independent.

“I said that he must also realise from his wartime contacts with General Eisenhower that President Eisenhower was a wise and peace-loving man. Molotov agreed, and said that soldiers knew what war was like. Mr Dulles had also figured in our previous conversation. Molotov did not speak of him with any bitterness. Indeed, he described his speech today as defensive in character.

“During our N.A.T.O. discussion, Molotov insisted that the last word in regard to starting a war rested with an American com-mander-in-chief. I denied this, and insisted upon the political control by the different N.A.T.O. Governments, reminding him that N.A.T.O. generals were under quite as good control as Soviet generals. I asked him whether he would be happier if the N.A.T.O. commander-in-chief were not an American, but got no answer. ‘,‘On E.D.C. in particular, Molotov’s opposition was more uncompromising than in our previous conversation, but this was no doubt inevitable, given the present stage of the quadripartite conversations. He certainly did not respond to my repeated suggestion that he should tell me what better way there was to keep German militarism in check.

“We concluded once again on the note that candid conversations or this kind were helpful, and that we should try to meet again in the same way during the conference. Mr Malik [Russian Ambassador in London] told me as I left that Molotov had welcomed the way I had spoken. I wish I could believe that it had done any good. I do feel, however, that I may have done some good in bringing home to him that our own Western intentions in general are not aggressive, and also in showing him that we are firmly attached to N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. and that he cannot expect to drive wedges between the Western democracies. It is clearly one of Molotov’s main purposes in Berlin to detach us or the French, or both, from our American allies.” Progress Halted In the days that followed, it became obvious that so far as the German question was concerned we could get no further. However much the form of the various Soviet proposals changed, their substance remained the same. On February 11, I sent a message to London giving my conclusions:

“Yesterday was by far the worst day in discussions here, in that Molotov showed his hand more unashamedly. It is now perfectly evident that the objective of the Soviet attack is not merely E.D.C. but N.A.T.O. and the whole Western defence system. As I mentioned before I left London, they plan to entice all Europe under the slogan: “Europe for the Europeans.” The so-called European Security Pact would in my judgment result in the free countries of Western Europe enjoying the same independence and security as Hungary, Poland, etc. “I do not think we can do any good by discussing Soviet demands for the abolition of N.A.T.O. in public, and I am more than ever convinced that the sooner this conference ends its discussion of the German side of our affairs the better. I will do my best to this end.”

[Contrary to earlier hopes, progress proved as impossible on Austria as on Germany. It was, however, agreed to convene a further conference on Far Eastern problems. This was the only positive outcome of Berlin.]

Copyright: The Times Publishing Company, Ltd., London, 1960. All rights reserved. Distributed by Opera Mundi, Paris. Reproduction in whole or in part strictly prohibited. [To be continued tomorrow]