The Eden Memoirs FAR-EASTERN PROBLEMS DISCUSSED AT GENEVA

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29101, 13 January 1960, Page 3

The Eden Memoirs FAR-EASTERN PROBLEMS DISCUSSED AT GENEVA

Serious Differences Between Western Allies

TT is clear from the memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden that difficulties in the Far East were hard to solve —that there were serious differences between the Western allies on the best way to meet both the actual thieat in Indo-China, and the long-term dangers in the whole region.

1 [,4t the Berlin conference in February, 1954, it had been agreed I to convene a five-Power conference (including Communist China) to consider the affairs of Korea and South- >• east Asia. This was to open in Geneva on April 26. in the interval the military situal tion in Indo-China had deteriorated. Dien Bien Phu was invested by t; | Vietminh forces in the middle of > March, and seemed on the point of . fallingI Thre were serious differences ..- between the Western allies on the ' best way to meet both the actual threat in Indo-China and the longterm dangers in the whole region. The American Government had pro- ,, i posed the issue of an immediate < declaration expressing preparedness io use “eventual military means” for ■ checking the expansion of Communi ism in South-east Asia. Were this declaration approved American air- . . | craft would be in a position to inter- , rene in the Dien Bien Phu battle on .-[April 28. The British Government y- decided that it was unable to agree to the American proposal.] My wife and 1 flew that even- - -1 ing [April 25] to Geneva and I M broke my journey briefly at Orly ■‘l Airport, where M. Bidault '[[French Foreign Minister] was waiting. I informed him of the ’ I Government’s decision concerning . | the American proposals for inter--'vention in Indo-China. He was ...[not surprised by this, although he h* was gravely perturbed by other aspects of the situation, especially • s.l by the fact that there had been ■ a leakage to the American press . | on the current differences between wthe Western allies. [in addition to Mr. Eden and M. . Bidault, delegates to the conference • included Mr. Dulles, American Sec•'.letary of State, Mr. Molotov, Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, (Chinese Prime Minister, representatives of the three Associated States Cambodia and Laos) and K‘Vf Vietminh.] • The Intervention Issue The issue of intervention con- ’ itinued to dog us during the opening stages of the conference. As soon as I arrived in Geneva, Mr ..fiDulles came to see me to learn »jthe British attitude to the United [States proposal. I told him once Jmore that if a settlement were jaehieved at the conference, the Knifed Kingdom would be pretfpared to join in guaranteeing it. 'IK the conference failed, we would «e ready to examine the situation ■tafresh, but we were not willing .(to take part in armed interven■orttion now. The Americans continued to be4ieve that some action must be taken outside the conference. They . to encourage the French io keep fighting and prevent a jpeady communist advance in ,4South-East Asia. On April 30th. -w Dulles and I once more discussed the proposed South-East ■Asia pact. I said that there was ;joo question of our weakening in ♦ffur willingness to examine such a [proposal. On the other hand, we Aeally must know before we be•atan the talks what we both had gin mind and, in particular, the proposal implied a

■commitment to military action in wndo-China. ■ As I had several times explained, Mr Dulles knew we 'fould not agree to this. He replied that he did not think any«:fody was advocating military in--■’tervention in Indo-China, though •.tie understood that perhaps some l ? a . rlis of Admiral Radford 3 IChairman of the American Joint ;£ h >e f s of Staff Committee, 195315"], whom he was inclined to . jnticise. had caused us to draw -<oack in our attitude towards the pact. Admiral Radford, he said, ????. n °t the spokesman of the jlnited States. Only the President ■ himself could express their ''government’s opinion. wisfle <t press ahead ■.{■th setting up a defensive organisa- .(,?’* X OT south-east Asia, believing •.ytthis would hearten the French. ' IsJL . aT gued that it was essential tr U to win the support of intreai nt Asian Governments in the “Forthright, But A Friend” The arrival of Mr Bedell Smith ic?? e 5 lcan Under-Secretary of Rotate) at Geneva on May 1, to tt over the leadership of the Jlnited States delegation, did * *®®ething to lift the pall which ‘i beginning to descend on the 9 SCUss i° ns between the three Irm n™ allies - 1 had known Mr d uedeU Smith since our wartime -s association, when I was my coun- *^ ys foreign Secretary and he was General Eisenhower’s Chief -■r Staff. I had attended conferences with him and seem him at flork, and from the first I liked •fun. He could feel strongly, yet fa ß always understanding. He was '' )^S ua ght, but a friend. The value of Mr Bedell Smith’s i nderstanding attitude was appar- ~ at an exceptionally difficult J iscussion which Lord Reading minister of State at the Foreign ‘ mce) and I had with the Ameri•J® delegation after dinner that ~ n ' n S- It brought to a head the . ifferences between our American ‘has and ourselves, which had 1 building up since January record it as I reported it in a I *ssage to London that night: After some discussion as to the i tasons for the present mutual tatility between the United J u? es China, in spite of the ®se relations which bad existed 1 “ween them in the past, the con'trsation turned to the situation ’lndo-China and we were subreted to a prolonged, and at ’ntnents somewhat heated, on■“Ught upon our attitude. Only ~ Bedell Smith seemed to have ■ rea l comprehension of the ons which had led us to take ■h> our present position. Mr Dulgan by saying that the situy.n Wa J very disturbing. In the • si we had always been in accord r OUr Policy at conferences: now 4 Were in complete disarray. I

said that we were not in any disarray as regards Korea, but as regards Indo-China I simply did not know what it was that we were being asked to do. If it were that we should intervene with armed forces, I could only say that I had already explained fully the reasons why any such action was impossible and that anyhow I was unable to discover what steps we were being asked to take and what result was expected to follow.

“Mr Dulles then said it was his impression that we were not prepared in any circumstances to back them up in action in IndoChina. He asked the direct question whether that was so and went on to say that he was not asking us for any material assistance, but only for our moral support in any action that they might take. I said that this was quite a new approach. I asked what sort of action they had in mind and he replied that that had not yet been decided. ‘‘Mr Bedell Smith intervened at this point to say that he agreed neither with the United States nor the British Chiefs of Staff. The former were too optimistic and the latter too pessimistic. Dien Bien Phu had become a symbol, but it was no longer possible to save it. He thought, however, that though it would be quite impossible to attempt to stop a communist advance on the border of Malaya, it was possible to find a position from which Thailand, Burma and Malaya could be defended. One of the difficulties was that they had never been able to sit down with the French over a map and examine the military possibilities of the situation. “I said that we must really see where we were going. If the Americans went into the IndoChinese war, the Chinese themselves would inevitably step up their participation. The next stage would be that the Americans and the Chinese would be fighting each other and that was in all probability the beginning of the third world war. “Theme Song” “Meanwhile, Mr Robertson (American Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), whose approach to these questions is so emotional as to be impervious to argument or indeed to facts, was keeping up a sort of ‘theme song’ to the effect that there were in Indo-China some three hundred thousand men who were anxious to fight against the Vietminh and were looking to us for support and encouragement. I said that if they were so anxious to fight I could not understand why they did not do so. The Americans had put in nine times more supplies of material than the Chinese, and plenty must be available for their use. I had no faith in this eagerness of the Vietnamese to fight for Bao Dai (Emperor of Annam; Chief of State of Viet Nam). “Our American hosts then introduced the topic of the training of Vietnamese forces to defend their own country. Whatever the attractions of this scheme, they admitted that it would take perhaps two years to finish. The problem was what would happen meanwhile. When Lord Reading asked Mr Dulles what he thought about this, he replied that they would have to hold some sort of bridgehead, as had been done in Korea until the Inchon landings could be carried out. Lord Reading commented that this meant that things would remain on the boil for several years to come, and Mr Dulles replied that that would be a very good thing.” There was then some discursive and divergent discussion as to the resemblance of the IndoChina conflict to that in This did not advance us very much and I was not sorry when we broke up. As I reported to London that night. I was disturbed by this conversation because it showed clearly that the Americans were deeply aggrieved by our refusal to support them in such military measures as they might think advisable and that, except for Mr Bedell Smith, they could not understand why we were holding aloof. At the same time they had no plans of their own, but were searching about for some expedient which would serve to restore, or at least to hold, the situation. The first session of the conference on Indo-China was only a few days away and we had still failed to reach agreement on Western policy, but I was determined that we should not endorse a bad policy for the sake of unity. On May 2 I reported to London: “My view is that we cannot give the Americans the moral support they seek for their plans as at present conceived. It still seems that they have not worked out their ideas at all clearly and we must know exactly what it is they propose to do and under what authority they intend to proceed. ... I am conscious of the effect of our differences over this question upon Anglo-Ameri-can relations. But I am sure our only wise course is to follow Tkic mnnnc

“My view is that we cannot give the Americans the moral support they seek for their plans as at present conceived. It still seems that they have not worked out their ideas at all clearly and we must know exactly what it is they propose to do and under what authority they intend to proceed. ... I am conscious of the effect of our differences over this question upon Anglo-Ameri-can relations. But I am sure our only wise course is to follow a consistent line. This means we must refuse, pending the outcome of negotiations here, not only to allow ourselves to be drawn into the Indo-China war, but also to promise our moral support for measures of which we do not yet know the full scope. On the' other hand, we can continue to assure the Americans, as we have done already, that we are eager to work with them in building a collective de-

fence with the widest possible Asian support, to guarantee and support whatever settlement can be achieved in Indo-China and to assure the security of the rest of the area.”

During these preliminaries to the conference, the French delegation was carrying a load of troubles. M. Bidault came to dine with me on May 4 to discuss our joint position in the coming session on Indo-China. He was accompanied by M. Jean Chauvel, one of the many able and devoted civil servants who have kept the machinery of French Government working during the frequent political changes of recent years. Their abilities cushioned the consequences of these changes, the importance of which the foreign critic is inclined to exaggerate. M. Chauvel was in his element in this emergency. An excellent war record influenced General de Gaulle to place him at the head of the Quai d’Orsai. After some years at the United Nations, he was now Ambassador in Berne (Ambassador to London since 1955) and could be seconded to give his time to the negotiations at Geneva. M. Chauvel had a quick and lucid mind, and saw clearly where France’s true interests lay. He never stepped outside the strict limits of his authority, but within these he guided the discussion relentlessly to the vital decisions. I respected his sense of purpose and his firmness in maintaining it. If, as a result of these negotiations, his country was spared the worst calamities, a large share of the credit should go to Jean Chauvel.

Agonising Days

Two days later, Mr Bedell Smith and I went to see M. Bidault. 1 knew that his position, trying to agree on a policy with his colleagues in Paris at such a time, was not an easy one. I thought that it would help him if I told him where we stood, so I said that, for ourselves, we were prepared to support the French strongly, if they were able to clear their policy, concert it with us and present it at the first meeting. Bedell Smith firmly endorsed my view and after some talk and telephoning, Bidault finally agreed to have concrete proposals ready in time for a plenary session of the conference on May 9th. I fell the deepest sympathy for Bidauli during these agonizing days. News of the fall of Dien Bien Phu had just arrived and he was dreading the receipt of instructions from Paris which would amount to virtual surrender in Indo-China as a whole.

lAfter many procedural difficulties the conference on Indo-China was ready to open. Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov were elected joint chairmen.]

The formal session began on May 9. Before the final settlement was reached on July 21, we discussed Indo-China at eight plenary and eighteen restricted sessions. During much of this period the Korean Conference was also in session, and Molotov or I had often to act as chairman there. We made no real progress over Korea, but these meetings and their preparation made heavy demands upon our strength and time.

As is usual at international conferences, much of the real work was done in informal talks which took place daily, away from the conference table. It quickly became clear to me that we should make little progress if we continued to discuss Indo-China in plenary sessions, which merely provided a stage for the striking of attitudes by both sides. On May 13, I accordingly suggested to Bedell Smith and Bidault that we should continue our talks in restricted sessions, consisting of the heads of all nine delegations with only two or three advisers apiece. No account of the proceeding? would be given to the press. This proposal was agreed upon, and on the fol'owing day Molotov and Chou En-lai also accepted it.

Newspaper Reports Were True

1 was concerned at this time by developments outside Genvea which, it seemed to me, might endanger our admittedly slender chances of making progress in negotiation. On May 15 I was surprised to find reports in the Swiss morning papers of FrancoAmerican discussions on the possibility of military intervention by the United States in IndoChina. That this issue should have been resurrected at such a moment was startling. I at once asked Mr Bedell Smith if there was any truth in these reports, and he told me he knew nothing about the matter. When M. Bidault came to see me later in the morning, I asked him if he could confirm the rumours, and he gave me a vague denial which largely reassured me. However, at the end of our meeting, M. de Margerie (Deputy Director of Political and Economic Affairs at the Quai d’Orsai), his principal adviser on that occasion, led me to the window and said that he had a document which he had been instructed by M. Bidault to read to me. This contained the condition for United States intervention in Indo-China- I commented: “Then what the newspapers said is true.” “Certainly,” Margerie replied, “very much so.” He gave me the conditions, which were for intervention either after the failure of Geneva, or earlier if the French so desired, and he emphasised that the American preference had been clearly expressed for the earlier date. Later in the day, the “New York Herald Tribune” arrived, giving the full details of the FrancoAmerican negotiations. This was a relief, as it enabled me to raise the matter with Bedell Smith without disclosing that I already had information from the

French. Bedell Smith exploded with indignation, and deplored Washington’s inability to keep any discussions secret. I pointed out that, for us, the seriousness of the situation lay not only in the matter of the announcement, but in the fact that we had received no prior intimation whatever of these conversations. Bedell Smith said at once that it was intolerable that we should get information of this kind from a newspaper and that of course we should have been told. The United Kingdom Government was to have been informed, once French acceptance of the conditions was known. He emphasised that the matter was not nearly so serious as the newspapers had made it look. All that was contemplated, he said, was American assistance with the training of troops. Whatever the nature of the intended action, it was clear that the publicity given to these talks could do grave damage, and Bedell Smith and I agreed to limit it as best we could.

I told the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian delegates what had happened, and sent a reassuring telegram to Mr Nehru. I was relieved when M. Bidault informed me, two days later, that France would make no request for intervention while the conference was still in session. Nevertheless, the episode had its dangers. It was not that I minded “noises off.” They could be helpful, but only under certain very definite conditions. I reported to the Prime Minister:

Talk Of Intervention

“I myself fear that this new talk of intervention will have weakened what chances remain of agreement at this conference. The Chinese, and to a lesser extent the Russians, have all along suspected that the Americans intend to intervene in IndoChina whatever arrangements we try to arrive at here. The Chinese also believe that the Americans plan hostilities against them. These reports could help to convince them that they are right, and I do not acept the United States argument that the threat of intervention will incline them to compromise.” My pessimism appeared at first to be justified. We were making no progress in our attempt to segregate the problems of Laos and Cambodia from that of Vietnam, and two restricted sessions devoted to the subject failed to bring us nearer to agreement. I was nevertheless flabbergasted when the American delegation showed to Bidault and myself, on May 19, a prepared statement proposing that we should now bring the restricted sessions to an end and go back into plenary session. I said that we could not possibly do this after so short a time. It had taken us three weeks to get into secret session and now we were to go out in two days. We must, I thought, give the experiment a full and fair trial. M. Bidault commented simply that a proposal such as the Americans had put forward would immediately bring his Government down. It was decided that the restricted sessions should continue.

China’s Intentions

lAt dinner on May 20 Mr. Molotov told Mr Eden that China was "very much her own master" in the negotiations.]

Nothing occurred to make me modify my original impression that Molotov was genuinely anxir ous to reach a settlement. In our frequent private conversations he often came forward with some helpful suggestion or concession, which enabled the work of the conference to move forward. Our partnership as joint chairmen worked smoothly. Chou En-lai’s intentions were less easy to fathom, and it took me some time to achieve any kind of personal contact.

(Mr. Eden continued his work, in and out of the conference, and had private meetings with Chou En-lai, but progress was slow.] In negotiations of this character, long periods of deadlock are worth enduring while there is any chance that informal talks can uncover fresh possibilities of agreement. On June 15, the conference seemed nearer to breakdown than it had ever been. Bedell Smith showed me a telegram from President Eisenhower advising him to de everything in his power to bring the conference to an end as rapidly as possible, on the ground that the Communists were only spinning things out to suit their own military purposes. This implied that to keep hostilities going would help the French and their allies. I was sure that the reverse was the truth.

Minor Concessions

On that same evening Molotov asked to see me and produced some minor concessions on the issue of the supervisory commission, which at least indicated that he still had an interest in reaching agreement, Chou En-lai’s visit on the following day to talk about Laos and Cambodia was more encouraging. He told me that he thought he could persuade the Vietminh to withdraw from these two countries, and that China would recognise their royal governments, provided that there were no American bases in the territory. I received a strong impression that he wanted a settlement and I accordingly urged Georges Bidault to have a talk with him and to discuss this new offer. I told Bidault of my conviction that there might be a chance of a settlement as the outcome of his talk, and begged him to go into it with the utmost seriousness and determination.

My hopes were justified. On June 17, after Bidaulfs successful interview with Chou En-lai, 6

Jean Chauvel was hard at work drafting a proposal whieh-would set in motion two further sets of military staff talks, on Laos and Cambodia. If accepted, this would result in armistice talks being begun on all three fronts in Indo-China. Mr Chauvel urged me to stay on in Geneva until these groups were constituted and had started their work. I agreed, and persuaded the Americans to do the same. However, Mr Robertson, deputising for Mr Bedell Smith at our restricted session on the 18th, at the last moment launched a violent and wholly unexpected attack on the Chinese proposals which the French were working on.

Not Perturbed

This did not fit in with anything the Americans had told me, nor with Bedell Smith’s description of the Chinese offer at an earlier session. I feared that this might wreck things. Fortunately, Cambodia and Laos were not perturbed and made friendly statements.

[The principal negotiators adjourned for a time.]

On my way home to London on June 20, I stopped in Paris to have luncheon with the new Prime Minister of France, M. Mendes-France, who had bean voted into power by a large majority two days earlier. In his investiture speech to the Assembly, Mendes-France had courageously undertaken to achieve a settlement in IndoChina by July 20. He told me that in view of the difficulties presented by the American and Vietnamese attitudes, he was not optimistic about his chances of fulfilling this pledge. I gave him my own assessment of the situation at Geneva in the same terms which I had later used to my colleagues in London. I urged Mendes-France to have an early meeting with Chou En-lai, and also, if he felt able to do so, with the representative of the Vietminh. He agreed to do this. M. Mendes-France had an intensive driving power and a ruthlessness which was necessary for the straits we were in. He was the man for the short lap.

Sir Winston Churchill and 1 flew to Washington on the 24th. Our main purpose, as I saw it, was to persuade the United States Government at least to give the French a chance of reaching a settlement at Geneva within the next few weeks. This implied that there must not be, before the conference was over, any publicised meeting to plan and proclaim an anti-communist alliance in South-east Asia. We should make it plain once more that we could not commit ourselves to any form of “united action’’ in the area, before the results of Geneva were known.

Plan Explained

My first conversation with Dulles at the State Department was encouraging. He now accepted that nothing short of intervention with ground forces could restore the situation in IndoChina, and also seemed ready to countenance the partition of Vietnam, but he stressed that partition would only be effective if the French could be persuaded to abandon their stranglehold on the Vietnamese economy. Otherwise, the non-communist regime would be vulnerable to subversion from within. 1 accepted the force of this. Dulles asked me what was behind my idea of a dual system of guarantees. I then explained my plan. I told him that my ideas had arisen partly out of the discussions at Geneva. If an acceptable settlement could be reached, there had been talk of guaranteeing it. I favoured this, but I added that a guarantee to be implemented only by collective action would be unacceptable. Noone would then act unless all acted. This was the communist idea and it amounted to giving them a veto on action. Some other system of the Locarno type would be much better, so that, if the settlement were broken, guarantors could act without waiting for unanimity. In addition to this. I thought that there should be a collective defence agreement, which would be limited to those powers willing to undertake specific commitments for military action, in the event of renewed communist aggression.

I told Dulles that the United Kingdom was willing to examine the possibilities of this latter arrangement at once. I also tried to impress upon him the importance of United States participation m guaranteeing an Indo-China settlement. He replied that there was little chance of this. It would be difficult, he said, to persuade Congress to guarantee, in effect, the communist domination of North Vietnam. We agreed, however, that it would be useful to inform M; Mendes-France, before he entered into final negotiations, of the minimum, terms which the United States and the United Kingdom would feel able to accept.

Tense Atmosphere

1 returned to Geneva for the last phase of the conference on July 12. The atmosphere was taut. Only eight days remained Of the month which M. MendesFrance had allowed himself for the conclusion of an agreement. Whatever happened, it was clearly going to be what Wellington called “a damned nice run thing.” The auguries were not encouraging. During the absence of the principal delegates, the meetings between the military representatives of the high commands had made little progress. The Vietminh were being intransigent. The problems of the composition and functions of the supervisory commission still remained, and we could expect prolonged haggling over the demarcation line in Vietnam. I held conversations with Mr Molotov and Mr Chou En-lai in turn, immediately after my arrival. As a result of these, 1 reckoned that we had an even chance of agreement, provided that we could persuade the Americans to join us in a final all-out diplomatic effort. With this thought in mind, I flew to Paris the next day for discussions with M. Mendes-France and with Mr Dulles, who had just arrived from America. M. Mendes-France’s main purpose in these conversations, which he pursued with drive and skill, was to dispel Mr Dulles’ suspicion that there would inevitably be some departure by France from the seven points on which we had agreed in Washington. [These laid down the conditions the armistice should fulfil to obtain Anglo-American support.] He described to us his negotiations with the Vietminh on the question of the demarcation line in Vietnam, and effectively demonstrated that at no point had his position diverged from the

minimum terms which had been| defined by the Americans and ourselves. He said that it would be of the greatest help to him if Mr Dulles would come on to Geneva and give France full backing there: success or failure might depend on this. I did all I could to support MendesFrance and to reinforce his request. I told Dulles that we were on a knife-edge, with an even chance of getting the sort of agreement we all wanted. His decision might well decide the issue.

In the end, Mr Dulles told us that he would give us his final answer on the following day. M. Mendes-France’s courage and persistence were rewarded.

On the following morning, Mr Dulles and I first met together and had some discussion on the kind of documents which might be exchanged, based on drafts which he had prepared of a joint “position paper.” It was decided that this should be reduced to one document setting out the attitudes of the United States and French Governments, and that 1 should express in a separate letter my general agreement. A conference followed at the Quai d’Orsai, where Mr Dulles announced that Mr Bedell Smith would be returning to Geneva in the very near future to share in the work of the conference. The documents were put into shape, signed and exchanged after luncheon at the American Embassy At that meeting the scene was one of friendly confusion, papers and luncheons, and ladies all over the place. However, this all disentangled itself in time and Mendes-France and I got away for a reasonable flight to Geneva I was grateful for the reception

I received in Paris from the crowds who were coming and going for the Quatorze Juillet celebrations. They were extremely friendly and many of them called out “merci!” The first few days after my return to Geneva from Paris passed in a hurry of meetings between the various Heads of Delegations. often as many as five in one day. The military sub-com-mittees and delegation staffs had been working feverishly and an immense number of draft agreements had accumulated, both military and political.

[Useful progress was made in regard to Laos, but vital points of the Vietnam settlement remained in dispute.) We still had to reach agreement on the composition of the supervisory commission. 1 had a. crucial meeting with Chou En-lai when he came to see me on July 17. He placed a sinister interpretation on the tripartite talks in Paris a few days before, and argued that we were going to, split South-East Asia in two with, an anti-communist alliance. He' was particularly insistent that the three Associated States must be independent, sovereign and neutral. I could reassure him on some of this. I said that there was nothing new about the proposed defensive agreement in SouthEast Asia, which I had myselt been advocating for years It would merely form a counterpart to the Soviet-Chinese alliance, and I added that so far as I knew there was no intention that the Associated States sho I-’ be members.

A Definite Step

The first indication that the conference might at last be on the verge of success came on the afternoon of July 18, when Chou En-lai proposed to me that the supervisory commission should consist of India, Canada and Poland. After all the argument, this was a definite step towards us and the proposal was accepted by all three Western powers. From that moment the tangled ends of the negotiations began to sort themselves out. On the afternoon of the 20th, after frantic activity at all levels, Mr MendesFrance and the Vietminh delegate were able to announce that they had reached agreement on a demarcation line, which was to be a river just south of the 17th parallel. Mr Mendes-France had also persuaded the Vietminh to agree that elections should not be held until July, 1956. By nine o’clock that evening, the armistice agreements for both Vietnam and Laos were almost complete. The Cambodians skilfully held out till last, when we were exhausted. Molotov and I, as joint chairmen, together with MendesFrance, held a long meeting with them and the Vietminh. It was a gruelling session. A 2 o’clock on the morning of the 21st, after hard bargaining and some surprising last minute concessions by Molotov, we succeeded in resolving the remaining differences between them. As we were concluding our meeting, news arrived thht the armistice agreements for Laos and Vietnam had been signed by military representatives of the two commands. The Cambodian agreement followed shortly after noon. The pattern of the final settlement was now complete. [The final session of the conference was held in the afternoon of July 21, with Mr. Eden in the chair. Three cease-fire agreements brought to an end eight years of fighting. A reservation was added by the Americans to the effect that, while they could not approve of half Vietnam’s falling under the control of Vietminn, they would accept and abide by the agreement.)

“A Splendid Friend”

I drove down on my last journey to Geneva Airport with Bedell Smith, a splendid friend throughout. As I flew home, 1 was naturally relieved that my faith in the negotiations had to some extent been justified and that we had managed to stop the fighting on acceptable terms, though 1 knew that the problems of Indo-China were by no means over. I hoped that France would be able to overcome the agonising memories of recent calamities, and would use her unrivalled experience of the country to help the Vietnamese to acquire equal status among the free nations of South-east Asia. Laos and Cambodia, I believe, had the will to live, and Vietnam the means. In the months ahead the United States would be playing a greater part in all their destinies. I hoped that she would do so in such a way that her generous assistance would not be resented. My own country would still have its share of responsibility in assisting these events and in ensuring the future security of a troubled region. That security ir still under menace, as has been shown by the ruthless occupation of Tibet by Chinese military powers. Tibet in 1959 is -the Albania of Good Friday, 1939.

Copyright: The Times Publishing Company, Ltd., London, 1960 m rights reserved. Distributed by Opera Mundi, Paris. Reproduction in whole or in part strictly prohibited. .[To be continued tomorrow.]