Mr Khrushchev in Peking

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 29021, 9 October 1959, Page 10

Mr Khrushchev in Peking

Mr Khrushchev’s reception in Peking may not have been much warmer than his reception in Washington (and certainly it was cooler than his welcome in San Francisco). No doubt Russia and China do not always agree on the extent of the thaw desirable in current diplomacy. These differences (and possibly more serious ones such as argument over the direction the allegiance of Outer Mongolia should take) do not yet add up to any serious split between the two leading Communist Powers. They would still, at this time, find each other useful, even if they were not united, as they are, by their Marxist philosophy. The circumstances in which they might part company, each loudly accusing the other of Titoism, can be imagined; and this situation could eventuate sooner than anyone expects; but in the meantime the Communist front is solid enough to be accepted as an important fact.

How far Mr Khrushchev’s desire for a European settlement really goes may be uncertain; but his changed attitude to Berlin shows that he is prepared to go some distance to improve relations with the West. Taking into account the pressure within Russia for the higher living standards that are now becoming feasible, it is probable that the Kremlin has peaceful intentions, always provided that it can retain its satellite empire for a time. The domestic situation in China is quite different, however. China is painfully trying to build

quickly the industrial base that would permit it to become a modern Power. Ample evidence of the strain this imposes on the Peking Government as well as on the people is available. Not surprisingly; the Chinese Government resorts to whipping up nationalism by external diversions—kept warm but not too hot. The curious campaign against Quemoy, the frontier dispute with, India, the quarrel with the United States, events in the old Indo-China are all issues that seem most useful as long as they remain unresolved. Even membership of the United Nations (which would not necessarily be accepted) is something to be angry about rather than a goal to pursue. In this position the Peking Government could not give countenance to Mr Khrushchev’s peace campaign by according him a hero’s welcome. In another 10 or 20 years Peking may be in the position of deciding whether to swing over to a mass consumption econpmy or to maintain a war economy, a choice that Russia can now make. Since China is not yet at that stage, Mr Khrushchev, with his own memory of Russia under Stalin, will understand his reception. If he has been able to persuade the Chinese that caution is indeed their best policy he will not be much worried by their lack of enthusiasm for his immediate aims. Nor should we, if that means the Chinese think Mr Khrushchev is being too conciliatory. After all, that is what we should like him to be.