Tibetan Aftermath CHINESE FEAR FRESH REVOLTS

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28897, 18 May 1959, Page 10

Tibetan Aftermath CHINESE FEAR FRESH REVOLTS

[By

ANTHONY DORSET,

of the °Zconomiit**]

[From the "Economist* Intelligence Unit]

London, May 7. —Communist China’s anger and anxiety at the Tibetan rebellion were not aroused entirely by the fighting in Tibet itself. It is now clear that the Peking Government is highly sensitive to all nationalist forces in central Asia, and it has already taken steps to ensure that revolt does not break out in other provinces. In particular, a purge has just been carried out in Sinkiang. Tibet’s northern neighbour, which is reputedly rich in mineral deposits and which has been the scene of past Russo-Chinese rivalry. The Chinese have removed five prominent leaders of the Sinki-, ang opposition from their posts, and 300 other persons have been sentenced to manual labour. Those convicted are accused of being “anti-party” men who wanted to overthrow Peking’s authority and establish an “Islam Republic.” Deviations of this kind are particularly serious for the Communists at any time. With the world’s eyes now fixed on the failure of their nationalities policy in Tibet, the news of trouble elsewhere is acutely embarrassing. Sinkiang, like Tibet, is a high land of mountain, desert, and plateau that used to be removed in both space and time from the politics of the twentieth century. But the Chinese, with Russian technical help, have been steadily opening it up since its military occupation in 1950. In the thirties, Stalin made some efforts to incorporate the area in the Soviet Union; but since the defeat of the Kuomintang this old rivalry has died away. Instead, Peking has suffered from the distrust of the province’s Moslem population. It is now reported that a six-month “rectification campaign” has been carried on, leading to the purge of the opposition.

Origin of Revolt The Tibetan rising itself did not begin in Tibet. Chinese sources have made no secret of the fact that the revolt began in the former Sikang province in the east—once part of Tibet but since severed from it administratively. The rebels crossed into Tibet and* quickly found effective support there. In spite of Chinese claims that the revolt affected only 20,000 Tibetans, a small part of the population, it seems plain enough that the sense of former identities and allegiances is still strong among the central Asian peoples. Disturbances have been reported from three Chinese provinces which have a partly Tibetan population. Some clear hints of the uncertainty in Peking were given by Mr Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, in his speech to the National People’s Congress last month. While vigorously condemning the Tibetan rebels and their sympathisers in India and the West, Mr Chou let slip some interesting indications of what had been going on elsewhere. The full story has still to reach the outside world. Mr Chou admitted that, “in the last few years,” it had been necessary to wage a “continuous struggle” to prevent undue pressure by the Han (Chinese) majority against the small minority groups inside China. But the national minorities themselves had given trouble. “During the rectification campaign,” Mr Chou declared, “struggles were also waged in many national minority areas against local nationalisms of different forms and degrees.” This makes poor publicity for Communist China among the independent southern Asian States, and it is no coincidence that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek'S government in Formosa has constantly reported widespread unrest in these minority areas. China has over 30 national minorities. The regime has recognised four major autonomous regions—apart from Tibet—in dealing with the administnfe tive problem. The four refloat are Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kwangsi, and Ninghsia. In addi* tion, it has established many more autonomous countries and minor administrative areas to take care of the smaller groups. Except in Tibet and certain other regions, the farm commune system has been set up in the minority areas. Great emphasis is placed on social and economic advance. During the delay before the Tibetan revolt was officially announced, the Peking Government mustered as many minority spokesmen as it could to declare that they, at lcttt» were perfectly content with th! road to socialism. No Popular Reaction The Tibetan agony has not prompted the popular reaction in Asia that the Russian suppression of Hungary did in Europe. Chinese publicity has insisted that the revolt has been confined ta what Peking .calls < the “upper social strata.’’ This has had its effect. Feudal Tibet is not thought the same martyr to Communist oppression as working-class Hungary. All the same, India and the other free countries have understood the warning. Mr Nehru will anxiously watch future Chinese policy toward the small Himalayan buffer states like Nepal and Bhutan which separate India from Tibet. Evidence of Chinese pressure or infiltration could set off a serious crisis.

But Indian observers do not expect Peking to follow a tough policy along its borders for some time. They point to the party shake-up last winter that has now caused Mr Liu Shao-chi to be elevated to the curiously powerless post of President of the Chinese People’s Republic. The signs of a continuing tussle between Mr Liu and Mr Chou En-lai for the succession to Chairman Mao suggest that the issue is by no means settled yet. At the same time. Chairman Mao himself is concentrating on reorganising the commune system. Fresh changes may be announced this autumn, particularly when the tenth anniversary of the Communist military triumph in 1949 is celebrated in October.

These distractions, including the continued industrial drive to overtake British production, are likely to keep Peking away from external adventure at present The nationalities problem, heightened by the Tibetan revolt is * n unexpected embarrassment It is not important enough to threaten the Peking regime; but it could hurt it badly, both at home and abroad. The Tibetan rebels are plainly not alone.