Recent Judgments TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS ON STOPPING OR STARTING

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28869, 14 April 1959, Page 11

Recent Judgments TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS ON STOPPING OR STARTING

McManus v. Gordon (By a Legal Correspondent) Before Mr Justice Henry, at Dunedin. This judgment explains the purpose of Reg. 19 (1) (a) of the Traffic Regulations 1956, which creates the offence of stopping, standing, or parking a vehicle on a road without due care or without reasonable consideration for others using the road.

A bus driver, who was employed by the Dunedin City Corporation, appealed against a conviction imposed on him by a Magistrate for breach of Regulation 19 (1) (a), which is as follows: 19 (1) No person being the driver or in charge of any vehicle shall stop, stand, or park the vehicle—(a) On a road, whether attended or unattended, without due care or reasonable consideration for other persons using the roadPublic’s Rights In the course of his judgment, Mr Justice Henry said that every person has, at common law, the right to pass and re-pass along a public highway. The general law which operated to ensure that public right was not violated, was contained in the law relating to public nuisance on highways. It has been held to be a public nuisance to allow vehicles to stand upon a highway for an unreasonably long time while waiting for passengers, or taking an unreasonably long time for loading or unloading. Modern conditions, Mr Justice Henry said, have required more precise definition of the public’s rights on a highway; and we now have statutes, regulations, and by-laws dealing with the topic. It should be borne in mind that the public still has the commonlaw right to use the highway, and to pass freely, safely, and conveniently along it. Regulation 19 (1) of the Traffic Regulations, 1956, is a modification of that right. Ollier Persons’ Rights This modification is important when considering the term in Regulation 19 (1) (a), ‘‘without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road.” His Honour went on to say: “The other persons may use the road only subject to the right to use it enjoyed by the person who is charged with a breach of the regulation. That is to say, it is no offence to subject the other persons to the ordinary and reasonable exigencies, irritations, and delays which may occur in a reasonable use of the highway. “But, to the extent that the nature of exercising the common right of stopping and standing on the highway is exercised without due consideration for others, it is an offence.”

The word “stop” in Regulation 19 (1) (a), the Judge continued, should be given its ordinary meaning of a driver stopping his vehicle on a road, that is to say, bringing it to a standstill. No element of passage of time is necessarily imported by the word “stop,” though it is imported by the word “stand.” In the present case, the driver remained stationary for three minutes at least, and that is within the scope of the regulation. Offence Proved In this case, it had been proved that the driver of the bus, in the circumstances established by evidence, had acted without reasonable consideration for those users 1 of the road in the cars which had to queue up behind his bus. He stopped when it was safe for him to go on without a breach of the law. He knowingly caused the formation of a stationary line of cars in the road behind him. His stopping in such a manner, and for the period of time he remained without moving on was “without reasonable consideration” for those behind him who had the right to use the highway in common with law. The appeal was dismissed. Counsel: for the appellant, M. M. Mitchell; for the respondent, J. C. Robertson.

Solicitors: for the appellant. Baylee, Brunton and Mitchell (Dunedin); for the respondent, Ramsay, Haggitt and Robertson (Dunedin).