The Montgomery Memoirs DRAMA OF GERMAN COLLAPSE

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28766, 11 December 1958, Page 11

The Montgomery Memoirs DRAMA OF GERMAN COLLAPSE

Luneberg Heath Scene

Of Surrender

[By Field-Marshal the Viscount MONTGOMERY of Alamdn, K.G.] XXXI

TN the present instalment of his memoirs, Lord - 1 Montgomery describes the events and the discussions that heralded the surrender of the German forces.

On April 24, 1945, Himmler had made an offer of capitulation throught the Swedish Red Cross. Then came an announcement of Hitler’s death. From then on, events began to move rapidly, with German negotiations for surrender, and very brief discussion of the conditions to be enforced by the Allies

Once we were over the Rhine I began to discuss future operational plans with Eisenhower (Lord Montgomery’s narrative eontihues). In his letter to me dated September 15, 1944, he had agreed with me about the great importance of the German capital and had said, “Clearly, Berlin is the main prize ” But now he did not agree. His latest view was expressed in a message he sent me on March 31, 1945, which ended with the following sentence: You will note that in none of this do I mention Berlin. That place has become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a geographical location, and I have never been interested in these. My purpose is to destroy the enemy’s forces and his powers to resist. It was useless for me to pursue the matter further. We had had so much argument already on great issues. The important point was to ensure that when the final defeat of the German armed forces occurred we should have a political balance in Europe which would help us, the Western nations, to win the peace. This meant getting possession of certain political centres in Europe before the Russians—notably Vienna, Prague, and Berlin. If the higher direction of the war had been handled properly by the political leaders of the West, and suitable instructions given to Supreme Commanders, we could have grabbed all three before the Russians. Strategy, Politics But what happened? The possibility of seizing Vienna disappeared when it was decided to land the Dragoon force in southern France: the troops for the landing were taken from FieldMarshal Alexander’s force in Italy, and that put a brake on his operations. It should be noted that Stalin wholeheartedly approved the Dragoon landing. Of course he did. It made certain that his forces would get to Vienna before ours! As regards Prague, the Third American Army was halted on the western frontier of Czechoslovakia towards the end of April —for reasons which I never understood. When It was finally allowed to cross the frontier early in May, Bradley states in “A Soldier’s Story,” it was ordered not to advance beyond Pilsen “because Czechoslovakia had already been earmarked for liberation by the Red Army.” He goes on to say that had S.H.A.E.F. remanded its order Patton “could probably have been in Prague within 24 hours.” Berlin was lost to us when we failed to make a sound operational plan in August, 1944. after the victory in Normandy. Repercussions The Americans could not understand that it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we lost it politically; because of this curious viewpoint we suffered accordingly from VE Day onwards. and are still so suffering. War is a political instrument; once it is dear that you are going to win. . political considerations must influence its further course. It became obvious to me in the autumn of 1944 that the way things were being handled was going to have repercussions far beyond the end of the war; it looked to me then as if we were going to “muck it up.” I reckon we did. There is not much more

to tell which has not already ,■

been narrated by others. With the Rhine behind us we drove hard for the Baltic. My object was to get there in time to be able to offer a firm front to the Russian endeavours to get up into Denmark and thus control the entrance to the Baltic: In order to speed up the rate of advance, divisions operated in great depth on narrow thrust lines: enemy areas of resistance were by-passed by armoured spearheads, and later attacked from the flank or rear by other troops coming bn behind. As we moved eastwards the Prime Minister and Eisenhower both became anxious lest I might not be able to “head off” the Russians from getting into SchleswigHolstein and then occupying Denmark. Both sent me messages about it I fear I got somewhat irritated and my replies possibly showed it! , Slowed Down To Eisenhower I replied on April 27 that I was very well aware what had to be done, but he must understand that when he had removed the Ninth American Army from my command (which he had done on April 3) the tempo of operations slowed down automatically on the northern flank. In the end we beat the Russians to it. It was interesting to consider the difference in the two major catastrophes the Germans had suffered at the hands of the Western Allies since June, 1944. In August, 1944, they had suffered a major defeat in Normandy but they were allowed to recover, and their man-power situation was such that they could form and equip new divisions. Their present defeat in March-April, 1945. was not comparable with that suffered in Normandy; now they had lost so heavily in personnel and territory that they could not again form and equip new divisions. They would never again have uninterrupted communications and assured mobility. Therefore, their cause was lost and the German war had reached its last moments. Hitler’s Germany now faced utter disaster. '■ .‘-s’ Capitulation Offer On April 27 I received a report from the War Office that on the 24th Himmler had made an offer of capitulation through the Swedish Red Cross. Himmler stated that Hitler was desperately ill anct that he (Himmler) was in a position of full authority to act. I did not pay much attention to this report. So far as I was concerned the oncoming Russians were more dangerous than the stricken Germans. I knew the German war was practically over. The essential and immediate task was to push on with all speed and get to the Baltic, and then to form a flank facing east: , this was the only way to atop the Russians getting into Schleswig Holstein and thence into Denmark. Events now began to move rapidly. Late on May 1 we picked up an announcement on the German wireless that Hitler had died at his command post in Berlin and that he had appointed Admiral Doenxtz to succeed him as Fuhrer, No mention was made of Himmler; one of my liaison officers later saw him at Doenitz’s headquarters at Flensburg and gathered that he was no longer playing a leading part in the direction of affairs. On the afternoon ot May 2,

General Blumentritt, who was commanding all the German land forces between the Baltic and the River Weser, sent a message to Second Army headquarters that he proposed to come in the next morning to offer the surrender of his forces. But he did not appear, and instead he sent a message to ■ the effect that negotiations were to be conducted on a higher level. Terms Of Surrender On May 3 Field-Marshal Keitel sent a delegation to my headquarters on Luneburg Heath, with the consent of Admiral Doenitz, to open negotiations for surrender. This fcarty consisted of GeneralAdmiral von Friedeburg, C.’jn-C. of the German Navy; General Kinzel, Chief of Staff to Field-

Marshal Busch, who was commanding the German land forces on my northern and western flanks; Rear-Admiral Wagner; and Major Freidel, a staff officer. This party was later joined by Colonel Pollek, another staff officer. They were brought into my caravan site and were drawn up under the Union Jack, which was flying proudly in the breeze. I kept them waiting a few minutes and then came out of my caravan and walked towards them. They all saluted, under the Union Jack. It was a great moment—l knew the Germans had come to surrender and that the war was over. Few of those in the signals and operations caravans at my Tac Headquarters will forget the thrill of hearing the faint "tapping” of the Germans trying to pick us up on the wireless command link, to receive the surrender instructions from their delegation.

“Who Are These Meh?” I said to my interpreter. "Who are these men?” He told me. I said, “What do they want?” Then Admiral von Friedeburg read me a letter from FieldMarshal Keitel offering to surrender to me the three German armies withdrawing in front of the Russians between Berlin and Rostock. I refused to consider this, saying that these armies should surrender to the Russians. I added that, of course, if any German soldiers came towards my front with their hands up they would automatically be taken prisoner. Von Friedeburg said it was unthinkable to surrender to the Russians as they were savages and the German soldiers would be sent straight off to work in Russia. I said the Germans should have thought of all these things before they began the war, and particularly before they attacked the Russians in June, 1941. Von Friedeburg next said that they were anxious .about the civilian population in Mecklenburg. who were being overrun by the Russians, and they Would like to discuss how these could be saved. I replied that Mecklenburg was not in my area and that any problems connected with it must be discussed with the Russians. I said they must understand that I refused to discuss any matter connected with the situation on my eastern flank between Wismar and Domitz—they must approach the on. such matters. I then asked if they wanted to discuss the surrender of their forces on my western flank. They said they did not. But they were anxious about the civilian popula-

tion in those areas, and would like to arrange with me some scheme by which their troops could withdraw slowly as my forces advanced. I refused. I then decided to spring something on them quickly. I said to von Friedeburg: “Will you surrender to me all German forces on my western and northern flanks, including all forces in Holland, Friesland with the Frisian Islands and Heligoland. Schleswig-Holstein, and Denmark? If you will do this, I will accept it as a tactical battlefield surrender of the enemy forces immediately opposing me and those in support in Denmark.” He said he could not agree to this. But he was anxious to come to some agreement about the civilian population in those areas; I refused to discuss this. I then said that if the Germans refused to surrender unconditionally the forces in the areas I had named I would order the fighting' to continue; many more German soldiers would then be killed and possibly some civilians also from artillery fire and air attack. I next showed them on a map the actual battle situation on the whole western front; they had no idea what this situation was and were very upset. By this time I reckoned that I would not have much more difficulty getting them to accept my demands. But I thought that an interval for lunch might be desirable so that they could reflect on what I had said> I sent them

away to have lunch in a tent by themselves, with nobody else present except one of my officers. Von Friedeburg wept during Junch and the others did not say much. After lunch I sent for them again,, and this tijne the meeting was in my conference tent with a map of the battle situation on the table. I began this meeting by delivering an ultimatum. They must surrender unconditionally all their forces in the areas I had named; once they had done this I would discuss with them the best way of occupying the areas and looking after the civilians; if they refused, I would go on with the battle.

They saw at once that I meant what I said. They were convinced of the hopelessness of their cause but they said they had no power to agree to my demands. They were, however, now prepared to recommend to Field-Marshal Keitel the unconditional surrender of all the forces on the western and northern flanks of .21 Army Group. Two of them would, go back to see Keitel and bring his agreement. (Copyright—Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 1958.] (The next instalment will be printed on Saturday.]