The Montgomery Memoirs ROMMEL IN FULL RETREAT

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28728, 28 October 1958, Page 9

The Montgomery Memoirs ROMMEL IN FULL RETREAT

Defeat In The Battle Of Agheila

IBy ;

Field-Marshal

the ,.y^ sc ° Montgomery of Alamein, K.G., in

his Memoirs. to be published by Colligo of fondon oTNibembe? 3." [XII]

' | 'HE pursuit proper of Rommel began on November 5, 1942, with 10 Corps (Lumsden) in the van. I left 30 Corps (Leese) to reorganise to the west of the break-out area. 13 Corps (Horrocks) had the task of cleaning up the battle area of Alamein and of salving all the war material of the enemy and of our own forces. It also had to collect all the Italian prisoners—there were many of them, and they surrendered in droves, headed by the generals carrying their suitcases.

My ultimate objective was ■ Tripoli; this had always been con- ; sidered the objective of the Eighth i Army. But unfortunately the op- ] erations to get there had become : known as the “Benghazi Handicap.” As one officer expressed it to me, “We used to go up to Benghazi for Christmas’ and return to Egypt early in the New 1 Year.” I was determined to have done with that sort of thing. When the pursuit began I was clear that the task was as follows: (a) To capture the Agheila position and hold securely the approaches to it from the west. (b) To locate a corps strong In armour in the Jebel about Mekili, trained to operate southwards against any enemy force that managed to break through the Agheila position and make towards Egypt. (c) To get the Air Officer Commands ing to establish the Desert Air Force on the Martuba group of airfields, and also to the south of Benghazi. The establishment of aircraft on the Martuba group was not just a long-term proposal; it was an immediate requirement, since a convoy for Malta was due to leave Alexandria on November 16, and fighter cover was needed as it passed in daylight through the narrow, area between Crete and Cyrenaica. By November 15 the air forces were established in the Martuba airfields, in time to see the convoy safely on its way. Use Of Air Arm For the development of these operations I agreed the following detailed plan with the A.0.C., Desert Air Force (Coningham). We would use the air arm as the long-range hitting weapon, working in close co-operation with armoured car regiments; fighter squadrons would operate from advanced landing grounds soon after the armoured cars had reported them clear, and well ahead of the main bodies. These tactics would lead to the enemy being shot up and harassed in his withdrawal, while good fighter cover was given to our own forces. I did not think we should have any serious fighting till we reached Agheila. Rommel would undoubtedly withdraw to that position and endeavour to stop us there; his supply route would then be shortened while ours would be long, thus reversing the supply situation which had existed at Alamein. I therefore planned to leave 10th Corps to lead the pursuit as far as the Jebel, and to halt it there with orders to push light forces forward towards Benghazi and Agedabia; Lumsden, I considered, would handle these operations satisfactorily. Then I would pass 30th Corps through to tackle the Agheila position and the movement to Tripoli.

Changes In Command I also decided that as soon as 10th Corps was established in the Jebel I would bring Horrocks up to command it and send Lumsden back to England—l had reached the conclusion that command of a corps in a major battle was above Lumsden’s ceiling. On the other hand he was a good trainer, and as such he would be valuable back in England. I decided to ask for Dempsey to be sen,t out from England to take over 13th Corps from Horrocks. All these moves were agreed by Alexander. To Lumsden I gave precise instructions about the development of operations for the pursuit to Agheila, and kept a firm hand on the battle in order to ensure that the master-plan was not ‘‘mucked about” by subordinate commanders having ideas inconsistent with it. I knew well that, in the past, corps and divisonal generals had had their own ideas about operations in the desert and had not liked a firm grip from above —this was one reason why we had nearly lost Egypt. I made it very clear to Lumsden that this time all would carry out my orders; I had promised the soldiers complete success and 1 was determined to see they got it.

11l Danger Of Capture

Soon after the pursuit began I was in danger of capture. A reconnaissance party was sent forward to select a site for my Headquarters in the Mersa Matruh area. On approaching Mersa Matruh the party, which included by stepson, Dick Carver, took a road leading down to a place on the shore called Smugglers’ Cove, just to the east of the town. The enemy were still there; they should all have been rounded up by that time but, as will be seen later on, our forces moving across the desert were halted by heavy rain. The reconnaissance party was captured. I myself, with a small escort, was moving well forward in rear of the leading elements of the Army and was about to take the road leading to Smugglers’ Cove. But at that moment I ran into a sharp engagement which was going on a few hundred yards in front—we had bumped into an enemy rearguard which was trying to hold us off while they cleared Mersa Matruh. If I had gone down the road to Smugglers’ Cove it is possible that I should have run into the enemy; if so, I’m pretty clear that I shouldn’t be writing this story today. , The other —and more important —operations developed successfully. Twice Rommel’s forces were saved from complete disaster by heavy rain. The first occasion was on November 6 and 7, when we had three divisions ‘‘bogged’’ . in the desert, unable to move —it

was not possible even to get petrol to them. This set-back saved Rommel’s forces from complete encirclement at Mersa J Matruh. The second occasion was ■ when very heavy rain on Novem- ■ ber 15, 16 and 17 held up our forces moving across the desert 1 towards Agedabia to cut off the enemy before he could reach the Agheila position. A Curious Incident A curious incident occurred as our light forces were moving forward south of Benghazi. I was right up behind the leading armoured cars, reconnoitring the area; a small escort was with me. We had outstripped the fighter cover and from time to time enemy aircraft strafed the road. It was not a healthy place, and I suppose that I ought not to have been there. Suddenly I saw a lorry coming up from behind, and on it a large boat; a naval petty officer sat with the driver and some sailors were inside. I stopped the lorry and said to the petty officer: ‘‘What are you doing here? Do you realise that you are right up with the most forward elements of the Eighth Army, and you and your boat are leading , the advance? This is a very dangerous area just at present, and you are unarmed- You must turn round and go back at once.” He was dreadfully upset. He had been ordered to open up a ‘‘petrol point” at a small cove well to the north of Mersa Brega; small naval craft were to land petrol in order that the leading armoured car regiments could refill their tanks. He explained this to me, looking at me with pleading eyes rather like a spaniel asking to be taken for a walk to hunt rabbits. He then said: ‘‘Don’t send me back, sir. If the armoured cars don’t get their petrol, they will 1 have to halt and you will lose touch with the Germans. Couldn’t Igo on with you? I would then, be quite safe.” ; That petty officer was clearly a student of psychology! In point of fact I did not know ’ about these small petrol points , for the armoured cars—it was a staff plan and a very good one. . I took the naval party forward . with me and saw them safely to their cove, where I was their first customer for petrol. I have often thought of that • petty officer; he was from the : Merchant Navy and in the ; R.N.V.R. His sense of duty was I of the highest order.

Feeling Of Anxiety As we approached the Agheila position I sensed a feeling of anxiety in the ranks of the Eighth Army. Many had been there twice already, and twice Rommel had debouched when he was ready and driven them back. I therefore decided that I must get possession of the Agheila position quickly—morale might decline if we hung about looking at it for too long. As it was a difficult position to | attack I decided to attempt bluff s and -manoeuvre and to bustle J Rommel to such an extent that ( he might think he would lose his < whole force if he stood to fight. , He would be anxious, too, about ’ the morale of his own troops; ( they had been retreating continuously since they were defeated at Alamein, more than : 1000 miles away; they had been hustled out of every position on which they had tried to make a i stand; they were continuously < being “shot up” from the air. All this would tend to make Rommel’s forces dispirited and defensively minded, looking over their shoulders for the next position to which to withdraw—as had been the case in the Eighth Army once upon a time. In view of the awkward country to the south and the difficulty of a frontal attack, it would obviously be preferable to manoeuvre Rommel out of the Agheila position and then attack him in the easier country to the west. I thought this could be done if I did not delay too long. Found Himself Famous I fixed December 15 as the date on which the operation would begin, and then decided that I would fly back to Cairo to discuss further plans with Alexander; I also wanted some more clothes and generally to get cleaned up after nearly four months in the desert. I did not realise until I got to Cairo, where I spent a , very pleasant week-end at the British Embassy, that I had suddenly become a somewhat “notorious character”—my appearance at St. George’s Cathedral for the Sunday evening service. ! where I read the lessons, created , quite a stir. It is a strange ex- ; perience to find oneself famous, and it would be ridiculous to j deny that it was rather fun. . When I got back to my head- [ quarters just east of Benghazi I t found that preparations for . facing-up to the Agheila position r were well advanced. It seemed clear that the enemy was be- > coming nervous about our prepart ations and had begun to ferry ; back his immobile Italian troops [ to the Buerat position—the next r good defensive position to the rear. I therefore decided to adt vance the proposed timing by two - days. s E New Zealanders’ Part i Everything went well. The ” enemy began to withdraw the 11 moment our frontal attack de-

veloped, but the New Zealanders had got in behind them by December 15 and at one time we had the whole of Rommel’s Panzer Army in between the New Zealand Division and 7 Armoured Division, which was advancing strongly. The Germans broke into small groups and burst their way through gaps in the strungout New Zealand positions. Fighting was intense and confused all day on December 16 and prisoners were captured and recaptured on both sides. The Panzer Army finally got through to the west, severely mauled by the New Zealanders and suffering heavily from air attack. I ordered the New Zealand Division to halt and reorganise at Nofilia, and we followed up Rommel’s army with light forces, making contact with them in the Buerat position, which they were holding strongly. The Battle of Agheila was over: that position was firmly in our hands. We were now well into Tnpolitania and more than 1200 miles from Alamein, where we had started. Rommel and his Axis forces had been decisively defeated. Egypt was safe for the duration of the war/ I Copyright—Bernard Law,. Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 1958. J [The next instalment will be printed on Thursday.]