The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1958. The French Referendum

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28702, 27 September 1958, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1958. The French Referendum

When the French nation votes tomorrow in the constitutional referendum, it will be asked to endorse not only the Fifth Republic, but also its architect. Approval of General de Gaulle's new Constitution is practically certain, though that, of itself, will solve none of France’s difficulties. In his characteristically self-righteous fashion, General de Gaulle has confronted his compatriots with what appears a simple choice: between anarchy and order, between an ignoble past and a future of limitless possibilities, between chaos and himself. Behind this facade of apparent simplicity lie complex, profound, and intractable issues towards the solution of which the voter is invited to subscribe by the simplest of electoral procedures. At any other time, the manner in which a decision is now sought on any of these issues (and they are all to be decided by the single vote) would alone have provoked ungovernable hostility. To attain governmental stability, end its plague of political crises, and rebuild its shattered fabric, France is called upon to sacrifice a substantial degree of democratic liberty—something that till recently would have been unthinkable. Without General de Gaulle, it still would be unthinkable. Most Frenchmen have become so bemused with crises that they can see no sane alternative to the General. Inevitably the referendum will be as much a vote of confidence in him as for or against the new Constitution: and France cannot have the General’s services without his Constitution. Consequently the affirmative majority that the referendum is expected to produce will include the votes of many who admire and are grateful to Genera] de Gaulle but mistrust his Constitution, as well as some on the Right who are disappointed in the General but hope that the Constitution may be made to work in their favour.

In the hands of a less scrupulous leader, the Constitution could plainly facilitate dictatorship. The General is ho fascist; his disinterested devotion to France was never better demonstrated than by his surrender of power in 1946 upder no other pressure than his own judgment. His programme is so closely linked with his own personal prestige that the constitutional proposals are hard to judge objectively. So long as General de Gaulle remains at the helm, he is likely to safeguard against their obvious dangers: and, by judicious guidance during the formative years of the new Republic, he may ensure that those dangers are permanently avoided. If he does so, no man will have discharged a heavier responsibility. The wisdom of strengthening the executive powers of the French Government * is fairly widely recognised; and only radical methods will achieve this aim. Nevertheless, the new Constitution has aroused fears lest the methods proposed will create as many ills as they may remove. The powers of the President are to be strengthened to a degree which earlier genera-

| tions of French parliamentarians would never have permitted; and an article conferring extended powers on the President in a national emergency (which, in effect, the President would himself determine) could be invoked to [establish completely authoritarian rule. The power of Parliament is to be drastically curtailed; its laws will be subject 'to the scrutiny of a constitui tional court. The domain of Parliamentary legislation is to be limited to specific items, but it can be extended by organic law voted by Parliament. All other fields will be covered by Government decree. The standing of the Upper House (to be called the Senate) is to be enhanced. The Prime Minister will be named by the President, but he and his Cabinet will be responsible only to the National Assembly (the Lower House). Even in its final draft, the Constitution contains serious ambiguities; and much is left for interpretation by organic laws to be enacted by Parliament. Observers with French historv in mind have been quick to point out that the Constitution contains no real guarantees that it may not ultimately be used to legalise tyranny; and General de Gaulle himself has admitted that the Republic will be strong and effective in future only “provided those responsible know how to wish it" Yet the Gaullist proposals are seen by many responsible Frenchmen as a middle way between reactionary dictatorship and a civil war from which only the Communists could benefit. With acceptance of the proposals more or less a foregone conclusion, speculation is concentrated on the electoral system which will be chosen for the General Election in November, and which. will be introduced by Government decree. By its choice, the Government has the power to influence the political composition of the new Parliament. The Gaullist constitutional proposals are the boldest attempt made since the Second World War to settle relations between Metropolitan France and the French overseas territories. All the territories—with the notable exception of Algeria —are offered freedom to choose their future status. The people of Algeria are voting in the referendum as a part of France; but for them the choice will have no direct bearing on their political future. Vigorous measures have been taken to encourage heavy ' polling by Algerians, both Christian and Moslem; and the constitutional provision for a community of free peoples ” ite held out as a hint of future regard for Algerian aspirations. Cynics say the Government will astutely bolster support for its Constitution by artificiallycreated affirmative voting in Algeria. Certainly, within Algeria, the core of France’s recent troubles, the referendum will settle no more real problems than it will in France itself; and, after the voting, the French people will be no less dependent than now upon their chosen Man of Destiny.