The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1958. Nuclear Tests

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28552, 3 April 1958, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1958. Nuclear Tests

A world gripped by an overwhelming longing for some escape from the nightmare of nuclear war may too readily welcome the Soviet decision to halt the testing of nuclear weapons as a first step on the road to nuclear disarmament. It cannot do so unreservedly, for the decision is clearly inspired more by its political and propaganda value than by a genuine desire to protect the world from the effects of radioactive fallout and to end the nuclear arms race. An end to the testing of nuclear weapons has always been a part of the Western disarmament programme, which Russia has refused to accept because it was made conditional on ceasing the production of the bomb itself and on adequate safeguards for inspection. Russia has cut the ground from under the Western position by its unilateral decision; but it has not helped in the search for a formula for nuclear disarmament Without ending the production of nuclear weapons, the suspension of tests is futile and, for the West, dangerous. Once again Russia has seized the initiative in the propaganda war. The effects will be immense, particularly among uncommitted nations and in Japan, Germany, and Britain, where a campaign for nuclear disarmament has risen almost .as quickly and uncontrollably (as "Pendennis” says in the "Observer”) as the mushroomshaped cloud itself. If the West does not agree to follow the Soviet example, it will be

represented as unwilling to disarm; if it does, it will be represented as weakly acquiescing in Soviet demands. The pressure to follow suit in both Washington and London will he strong; but it seems likely that the military needs of the West will prevail, at present, over all other arguments. The Soviet has acted just after completing a long series of tests and just before the United States is to begin testing a hydrogen bomb, with virtually no fallout, in the Pacific. It shows Russia is well satisfied with its nuclear arsenal. But it was because of Russia’s overwhelming strength of conventional arms that the West resorted to the nuclear deterrent. Even if Russia makes no more nuclear weapons, which it does not guarantee, the West will still be at a disadvantage, unless Russia can be persuaded to reduce substantially its ground forces with an adequate inspection system to ensure against deception. This is the rock on which disarmament negotiations have foundered. Until it is removed, the West is unlikely to give up its nuclear arms or the tests necessary to perfect them. The suspension of the Soviet tests alone, for a limited period, will not ease world tensions significantly. But disarmament, rather than any change in the status quo in Europe, now seems likely to be the main topic for the summit talks later this year. Whether the present Soviet action represents a sincere desire for peace will be tested then.