The Chinese and Korea

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28541, 21 March 1958, Page 10

The Chinese and Korea

The 16 nations that took part in the war in Korea are understandably cautious in considering proposals by the Peking

Government for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea end for the unification of Korea through elections under neutral supervision. The proposals were made in Notes sent to the 16 countries last month and have been considered at a conference in Washington. On the face of things, the Communist Chinese are proposing to surrender a position of strength in Korea; but experience has taught the need to look behind the' face of things when dealing with Communists. In any case the proposals are ambiguous. For instance, if the Chinese want all foreign troops to be withdrawn before country-wide elections, the others could hardly agree, because that would leave the Korean electors under the duress of Chinese armies just beyond the Yalu river, while the United Nations forces would be a substantial sea voyage away. The Korean electors would know that if matters did not please them, the Chinese could return quickly. The 16 nations also want to know what the Communists mean by “free” elections. A single panel of candidates could not be accepted. What is meant by a “ neutral ” body to supervise elections? Experience of the “ neutrality ” of Poland and

Czechoslovakia on the tfuce supervisory commission in Korea is ground for scepticism. Further, since the 16 nations fought in Korea on behalf of the United Nations and in conformity with a Security Council resolution, they want to know where the Chinese think the

United Nations stands in the matter. The 16 nations would not easily agree to flouting United Nations’ resolutions, particularly those calling, for free elections throughout Korea under United Nations supervision. Some observers believe the Peking Government is genuinely anxious to disengage itself in Korea. One suggestion is that the Chinese proposals are part of a campaign to gain respectability in the community of nations. It would be to the Peking Government’s great advantage if it could rid itself of the opprobrium that attached to its aggression in Korea. China’s unrepentant attitude has been the main moral basis of recent United States policy. Some support for this suggestion is seen in the recent slackening of pressure by Communists In Laos, Burma, and Malaya. Another possibility is that internal troubles in China are influencing the Peking Government to reduce external commitments. Chinese press and radio statements give evidence of what the Government terms “ local ” nationalism, in other words, unrest among national minorities increasingly distrustful of the Communists’ claim to stand for the interests of all nationalities in the vast Chinese State. A third suggestion is that China is anxious to prevent the Americans from “ nuclearising ” the defences of South Korea, and would be willing to pay a substantial price. Whatever China’s motives, the progress of discussions will be watched with much interest, because a settlement in Korea is vital to a general settlement in Asia.