The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1958 S.E.A.T.O. Meeting

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28532, 11 March 1958, Page 12

The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1958 S.E.A.T.O. Meeting

The fuss the Russians have made about the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation gives the alliance an importance that it

may not quite deserve, since its fairly loose arrangements bind only three Asian Powers. Nevertheless, the fact that the Russians find it worth while trying to bully the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand into withdrawing is evidence that S.E.A.T.O. has more value than is sometimes realised in New Zealand. The Russian description of it as an aggressive organisation is not likely to deceive anyone. It may just be possible to ascribe some aggressive tendencies to a North Atlantic alliance of members that would like to see Eastern Europe free to choose its own forms of government. After the collapse of the Hungarian revolution last year a considerable stretching of the imagination would be required to do so. In South-east Asia no question of any Western aims beyond defence of proper Western interests and of Asian members’ interests arises. S.E.A.T.O. is plainly defensive, and any real criticisms concern its ability to serve this purpose against the one possible aggressor, China. S.E.A.T.O. has always seemed a delaying mechanism until a firmer political settlement could be reached in Asia. The big question for every S.E.A.T.O. meeting is whether any progress has been made towards such a settlement. Could progress be faster? Could Western Powers, and particularly the United States, do anything to speed up progress? On the whole peaceful co-existence should be easier to practise in Asia than in Europe, where difficult problems of boundaries and jurisdictions seem no closer to resolution.

Although the shadow of China will be large over the Manila conference table, two more immediate questions must be dealt with, if not formally, at least in private discussions. The civil war in Indonesia brings nearer the threat that must always have worried the S.E.A.T.O. planners. If Indonesia came under direct Communist control, the whole S.E.A.T.O. position would be split down the middle and Australia and New Zealand would acquire an uncomfortable neighbour. S.E.A.T.O. could take no sides in a genuine civil war, even if it knew which side it would like to take, and must be careful to avoid the appearance of doing so. But it must be prepared to reshape its plans for defensive cooperation so that a possibly hostile salient could be masked. The second immediate question is the future of military cooperation with Malaya once the terrorist rising has been crushed, which should not take too long now. Australia would like to see Malaya a full member of 5.E.A.T.0.; and that would be a tidy arrangement in a system that already has too many loose ends. The Malayan Government, however, is unlikely to accept an invitation, because it must ‘pay due regard to the opinions of the strong Chinese element in the country. It can be expected to co-operate with its Western friends. As with Indonesia it seems that the best course for S.E.A.T.O. is to adjust its plans to meet a situation it can do little to influence. Any attempt to persuade Tunku Abdul Rahman against his judgment could well bring down his friendly Government and prejudice the peace and good order that have so painfully been established in the new Dominion.