Lack Of Unity Blamed For Far East War

Press, Volume XCVI, Issue 28435, 15 November 1957, Page 15

Lack Of Unity Blamed For Far East War

LONDON, November 14. Japan’s march across the Far East in the 1930’s could never have happened had the Western Powers been united, an official history of the war against Japan said today. The book, written by a panel of three Army officers, an Air Vice Marshal and a naval captain blamed lack of unity among the governments of Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States and in the Far Eastern colonies themselves for the “many tragic blunders” made from 1922 onwards. The 568-page book said: “Had there been unity of purpose between the Western Powers. Japan would never have been able to encroch southwards until she directly menaced British, American. Dutch and French interests. “On more than one occasion, concerted action on the part of these Powers might well have prevented the war,” the writers said. “The story is one of might-have-beens. “But it was not only on the international level that this lack of unity showed itself. It existed between the various authorities within the British colonies, between the services themselves and between the. Malays and Chinese in Malaya.’’ The book pictured Japan's victorious onslaught through the Far East, culminating with the collapse of Singapore, rgainst a background of confused British military operations. waning morale and an air defence based largely on obsolete planes. Total Commonwealth casualties in the Malayan campaign were 138,708, including 18,490 Aus-

Italians. Of the total, more than 130.000 were prisoners of war. The Commonwealth losses in the Far East generally during this period of retreat were 166.500. The Japanese lost about 15.000. The book described the loss of Malaya and the Singapore naval base as a disaster of the first magnitude. “Never before in the course of British history had such a large force capitulated and the fall of Singapore came as a terrific shock to the British Commonwealth and to all who had the cause of the Allies at heart.” it said. “The effect of the catastropne on Australia and New Zealand, themselves not immune from invasion. hardly needs to be stressed." the book said. , “In 1937. when Australia s anxieties for her safety growing, both Governments had been assured that the whole British policy in the Far East was directed to ensuring that Singapore would not be allowed to fall, and that no consideration for the security of British interests in the Mediterranean would be allowed to interfere with the despatch of the fleet to the Far East.” the book said.

"In June, 1939, Australia was assured that a fleet, capable of containing the Japanese fleet to a degree sufficient to prevent a major act of aggression against her and to ensure that Singapore would not fall, would be sent, although reservations were made as to the size of this fleet.

“In November. 1939, both Australia and New Zealand were told that Britain would never allow Singapore,to fall hor permit a serious attack on either

country and that, if it came to a choice, the Mediterranean would take second place to their security,” the book said. “In these circumstances, both Governments were entitled to assume that Singapore would be provided with defences which would enable the ‘fortress’ to hold out till the arrival of a fleet in Eastern waters and that they could continue to base their defence plans on this supposition. “The entry of Italy into the war and the fall of France, on whose navy Britain had relied to maintain control of the western Mediterranean. altered the whole naval strategical situation. The despatch of a fleet of sufficent strength to the Far East had become impossible. “Nevertheless, the intention remained that Singapore should not be allowed to fall. The garrison was reinforced and the view freely expressed, till a few weeks before war broke out, that not only was Japan unlikely to go to war with Britain. and America, but that the ‘fortress’, if attacked, could hold out. “It was thus no wonder that the fail of Singapore, after a [campaign lasting only 10 short weeks, came as a shock to both Australia and New Zealand. The bastion on which they had depended was no more, and they were exposed to attack from a Power with command of the sea and supremacy in the air.”