The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1957. The Israeli Withdrawal

Press, Volume XCV, Issue 28178, 17 January 1957, Page 8

The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1957. The Israeli Withdrawal

It seems likely that the Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied during the recent military action will be the subject of the next important proceedings at the United Nations. The United ! Nations General Assembly on November 2 ordered the Israelis back to the 1949 armistice lines: and in conformity w’ith this order the Israelis have handed over the bulk of the Sinai Peninsula to units of the United Nations Emergency Force. But the question of further withdrawal is contentious. The Israeli Prime Minister has assured the Israeli Parliament (the Knessett) that “on no “ account will Israel agree to the * return of the Egyptian invader “to the Gaza strip ”. Furthermore, the official Israeli attitude seems to be that Israeli troops will remain on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, and on the island of Tiran, at the mouth of the gulf. These territories. Egypt insists, are Egyptian, and the Egyptian Government has declared that until the Israelis have left all Egyptian territory, British and French ships will not be allowed through the Suez Canal. Syria supports Egypt’s illegal and impertinent attitude by a piece of blackmail of its own; it declares that permission to repair the sabotaged Iraq pipelines will not be given until Israel leaves Egyptian territory. Israel’s reluctance to leave the two areas is understandable. The Gaza strip, which is 25 miles long and five miles wide and runs from Gaza to the Sinai frontier at Rafah, was the base for raids by Egyptian fedayeen (commandos) on the fertile settlements Israel established, after bringing water from long distances, around Beersheba. In any case, Egypt’s title to the Gaza strip is not as clear as Egypt pretends. The strip was part of the Mandated Territory of Palestine, and on the British withdrawal Egyptian troops moved the frontier forw’ard from Rafah to include Gaza. The general armistice signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949, allowed Egypt to remain in Gaza (and Israel in Beersheba) until the peace settlement; but both sides reserved their political rights and claims. Egypt fortified the island of Tiran, and from there and from the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba maintained a blockade on the Israeli port of Eilath at the head of the gulf. With the development of mining in the Negev (where King Solomon once mined copper) Eilath has increased its importance to Israel. Indeed, Eilath could well become not only Israel’s outlet to the markets of Asia, but a terminal for new oil pipelines from the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, through Israeli territory, to the Mediterranean. Israel quite reasonably feels that to give up the two areas would be to put the future of Israel in jeopardy to a man who has declared Egypt’s “ exalted aim ” to be “ the annihilation of Israel

“ and her extermination in the “ shortest time and in the most “ cruel and brutal battles

The Israeli attitude will no doubt be defined when the question of complete withdrawal is brought before the General Assembly by a resolution sponsored by the Asian-African group; but it is likely to express readiness to withdraw from the Gulf of Aqaba on the condition that the United Nations guarantees Israeli shipping freedom from blockade, and willingness to hand over the Gaza strip to a United Nations force that would control it permanently. If Egyptian consent could be obtained for this arrangement, it would be most satisfactory, not only because it would ease the Israeli-Egyptian dispute, but because it would place the United Nations in a position to do something constructive with the long-standing problem of the Arab refugees, 200,000 of whom are in the Gaza strip, where they are maintained on a sustenance level by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. But Egypt’s pride was humbled grievously in Sinai. President Nasser has adroitly used the United Nations to restore Egyptian prestige in the eyes of the Arab world, and, fed on success, he can hardly be expected to forgo another chance to exhibit his mastery of affairs.

Egypt is fortified, of course, by the November 2 resolution calling on Israel to withdraw behind the armistice lines. But by drawing attention to the 1949 armistice agreement, Egypt directs attention to its own persistent breaches of the agreement. It has engaged in “ aggressive, acts ”, which the agreement prohibited, and has defied United Nations resolutions which ordered . Egypt to abandon *ts blockades of Israeli ports and its refusal of transit to Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. The General Assembly debate, in fact, will provide an opportunity to correct an impression fostered by the general enthusiasm to condemn Israel, Britain, and France that aggression in the Middle East began when Israel launched its attack and when Britain and France intervened. The Israeli attack was provoked by intolerable conditions, for which President Nasser, more than any other m.m, was responsible. Those conditions will return if Egypt is allowed to regain its raiding base in the Gaza strip and to renew its stranglehold on Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba If the United Nations honours its responsibilities it will not be content with harrying Israel on Egypt’s behalf. It will seek for operable guarantees which would satisfy Israel and its neighbours, and in the meantime insist that the United Nations Emergency Force stays in the disputed areas not, as at present, dependent upon the consent of the Egyptian Government, but on the orders of the United Nations and with its authority.