Disarmament Exchanges

Press, Volume XCV, Issue 28169, 7 January 1957, Page 6

Disarmament Exchanges

Russia’s proposals for a conference of major Powers on disarmament, made in a message from Marshal Bulganin to the United States, Britain, • France, and India on November 17, received little attention because they were made while the Hungarian and Suez crises were at their height. Moreover, because the message was wrapped in propaganda and contained threats against the West, it was widely interpreted as an effort to distract world attention from Russian brutality in Hungary. However, in the Western capitals it was recognised that the Russian proposals could not be left unanswered. Notes from Britain and France and a statement from President Eisenhower (which will be incorporated in an American note) now give the Western reply. The French Prime Minister (at some length) and the American President (more briefly) have dealt with the propaganda content of Marshal Bulganin’s message. Mr Mollet turns some of his own propaganda back on Marshal Bulganin and points out that the solution of the disarmament problem “would be “so much easier ” if Russia practised Marshal Bulganin's precept that “ the existing “ ideological differences should “ not constitute a reason for “ aggravating relations between “ States, bellicose propaganda. “ and still less the use of force “ by one State against another ”. President Elsenhower points out that if Russia responded to the United Nations recommendations about Hungary as the “ parties at dispute in the “ Middle East ” responded to United Nations recommendations, it would “ constitute a “ significant step toward a re “ duction of the tensions to “which the Russian declaration “ addressed itself ”. Marshal Bulganin’s chief proposal for a “ top-level ” conference of major Powers has been rejected for the present. The door is left open for such a conference wherever, as President Eisenhower cautiously puts it, “ circumstances would make

“it seem likely to accomplish “a significant result”. For the present, the three Western Governments express the belief that the best forum for discussion is provided by the specialist bodies within the United Nations—the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee. .

The time could hardly be less * opportune ” for a meeting of the heads of State on dis-

armament, and in present , circumstances there is no reason ; to believe it could achieve more than a negotiating body so appropriate and experienced as the Disarmament Commission. It is true that the Disarmament Commission has spent very many profitless hours in the past. Nevertheless the commission does provide a testingground for suggestions and proposals. If, as some believe, recent events (particularly in Eastern Europe) are likely to induce less rigid attitudes on disarmament questions, particularly on the Russian side, the Disarmament Commission will have the opportunity of further narrowing the differences between East and West. President Eisenhower’s statement promises that the United States will make ** further proposals” within the United Nations—presumably to the Disarmament Commission. There have been reports that President Eisenhower favours disarmament proposals . which would go farther than ever before to meet genuine Russian misgivings. He is said to be ready to accept something' less than his full “open-skies” inspection plan, though his statement makes it clear that he does not accept the limited version of the plan that Marshal Bulganin’s message describes as acceptable to Russia. Because the Russian limitation (proposing an inspection zone extending 500 ; miles each side of the dividing | line between the N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact allies) turned i the plan into a military asset ? for Russia, the “ guarded i “ favour ” with which the President views Marshal Bulganin’s i expressed willingness to consider some form of aerial in--1 spection is understandable. Inspection is the issue on which disarmament discussions have i drifted to deadlock; and any f hint of flexibility on this fundamental issue is to be wel--1 comedi If the Russian leaders believe that a new strategic situation has been created in ; Eastern Europe by the in- : dependent attitude of the sateli lites, they may now want to • negotiate seriously about i armaments. The opportunity ; will occur when the Disarmament Commission resumes disi cussions shortly. Its proceedings t will be watched with renewed interest by a world anxious for two objectives which have hitherto proved incompatible—security, and some relief from the cost and tension of armaments.